The Israeli retaliatory attack following the Iranian assault on October 1 came after more than three weeks of coordination between Israel and the U.S. to define the scope of the operation and bolster Israel’s air defenses (including the deployment of American THAAD batteries). During this period, Iran issued severe threats against Israel.
The Israeli attack, involving around 100 aircraft in three waves lasting approximately four hours, targeted air defense systems, key Iranian industrial production facilities (missiles and drones), and missile launch bases. Another noteworthy characteristic of the assault was the geographical spread of the targets – including Tehran, Kermanshah, Qom, Ahvaz, Shiraz, and Isfahan.
As mentioned, the Israeli strike was the result of close coordination with Washington, which publicly clarified its opposition to attacks on Iran's nuclear or energy facilities. Meanwhile, Israel and the U.S., through third-party intermediaries, conveyed a clear message to Iran to refrain from responding to allow the cycle of mutual strikes to conclude. The targets of the Israeli attack served this purpose, making clear to Tehran the extent of its vulnerabilities if it chose to continue the exchange of hostilities. Initial responses from Iran, through a government spokesperson, downplayed the damage caused by the assault, asserted that the situation remained stable, and that flights had resumed. At the same time, the regime reinforced Basij forces in major cities to prevent public gatherings and protests, which the regime fears most.
Following the attack, Iran's leadership faces the challenge of deciding whether to respond, and if so, how. In its considerations, several restraining factors must be weighed: foremost is the possibility that Israel, in a future strike, could target Iran's already fragile infrastructure and economy or, alternatively, its nuclear sites; secondly, the "ring of fire" that was initially intended to protect Iran in the event of an Israeli attack – primarily Hezbollah and to a lesser extent Hamas – has been severely weakened and is no longer part of Iran’s deterrent force; thirdly, the concern about the outcome of the U.S. elections, which could see the return of Trump to the White House, whose openly anti-Iranian stance has only hardened following alleged Iranian attempts to harm him physically and through social media campaigns.
Against these considerations stands the issue of Iranian deterrence, which guided its decision to attack Israel for the second time. In the background, American efforts are underway to promote a ceasefire and resolution on the Lebanese front. These efforts serve Iran’s interest in ending the conflict and facilitating Hezbollah’s rehabilitation but simultaneously worry Tehran, as it seeks to remain involved and prevent any erosion of Hezbollah’s political status in Lebanon in the post-war settlement.