On June 9, The Guardian Council of Iran published the list of final candidates for the Iranian presidential elections, which were moved up to June 28 following the sudden death of President Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19. The council approved six out of approximately 80 candidates at the end of the screening process: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Majles; Saeed Jalili, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; Masoud Pezeshkian, former minister of health; Ali-Reza Zakani, former mayor of Tehran; Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, former vice president; and Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, former minister of interior and justice.
Only one of the six finalists is a reformist (Pezeshkian), while the other five are conservatives, three of them (Jalili, Zakani, and Ghazizadeh) are affiliated with the hardline faction within the conservative camp. The disqualification of the other candidates, including Ali Larijani (a pragmatic conservative) and Eshaq Jahangiri (a reformist), demonstrates the Iranian regime's determination to maintain conservative hegemony in all state institutions, even if it means further deterioration of public trust and representation.
Nonetheless, unlike previous presidential elections, in which the composition of the final list of candidates essentially left Raisi as the only candidate with a chance of winning, potentially qualifying him as a possible successor to Iran's leader, no candidate can be seen as a sure winner at this stage. Basically, it appears that Ghalibaf's chances are relatively high, owing to his extensive executive and managerial experience (both as Speaker of the Majles and as Mayor of Tehran), his military and security background as commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force and commander of the Law Enforcement Forces, and his good connections with the Revolutionary Guard. The chances of the hardliner candidates, led by Jalili and Zakani, are dependent on a particularly low voter participation, which may favor them because ideologically pro-regime hardliners tend to be more interested in elections and vote at a higher rate. At the same time, Pezeshkian may gain from the conservatives' division (at least a 50% majority is required in the first round), but his chances of winning appear narrow and depend on a very high voter turnout, which is improbable given the public's distrust of the two main political camps.
At the end of the day, if there are no surprises, a conservative president committed to the Islamic Republic's fundamental principles and the path of the Supreme Leader is expected to be re-elected. As a result, no significant change is predicted in Iranian policy, particularly in the foreign policy strategy ditctated primarily by the leader. However, Ghalibaf, who demonstrated a great deal of managerial and executive abilities as the Mayor of Tehran (though he was also suspected of corruption) and is regarded as a relatively pragmatic conservative, could, if elected, take a slightly more moderate approach and possibly achieve better performance results than his predecessor Raisi.
On June 9, The Guardian Council of Iran published the list of final candidates for the Iranian presidential elections, which were moved up to June 28 following the sudden death of President Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19. The council approved six out of approximately 80 candidates at the end of the screening process: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Majles; Saeed Jalili, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; Masoud Pezeshkian, former minister of health; Ali-Reza Zakani, former mayor of Tehran; Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, former vice president; and Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, former minister of interior and justice.
Only one of the six finalists is a reformist (Pezeshkian), while the other five are conservatives, three of them (Jalili, Zakani, and Ghazizadeh) are affiliated with the hardline faction within the conservative camp. The disqualification of the other candidates, including Ali Larijani (a pragmatic conservative) and Eshaq Jahangiri (a reformist), demonstrates the Iranian regime's determination to maintain conservative hegemony in all state institutions, even if it means further deterioration of public trust and representation.
Nonetheless, unlike previous presidential elections, in which the composition of the final list of candidates essentially left Raisi as the only candidate with a chance of winning, potentially qualifying him as a possible successor to Iran's leader, no candidate can be seen as a sure winner at this stage. Basically, it appears that Ghalibaf's chances are relatively high, owing to his extensive executive and managerial experience (both as Speaker of the Majles and as Mayor of Tehran), his military and security background as commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force and commander of the Law Enforcement Forces, and his good connections with the Revolutionary Guard. The chances of the hardliner candidates, led by Jalili and Zakani, are dependent on a particularly low voter participation, which may favor them because ideologically pro-regime hardliners tend to be more interested in elections and vote at a higher rate. At the same time, Pezeshkian may gain from the conservatives' division (at least a 50% majority is required in the first round), but his chances of winning appear narrow and depend on a very high voter turnout, which is improbable given the public's distrust of the two main political camps.
At the end of the day, if there are no surprises, a conservative president committed to the Islamic Republic's fundamental principles and the path of the Supreme Leader is expected to be re-elected. As a result, no significant change is predicted in Iranian policy, particularly in the foreign policy strategy ditctated primarily by the leader. However, Ghalibaf, who demonstrated a great deal of managerial and executive abilities as the Mayor of Tehran (though he was also suspected of corruption) and is regarded as a relatively pragmatic conservative, could, if elected, take a slightly more moderate approach and possibly achieve better performance results than his predecessor Raisi.