The American initiative for regional change includes:
- Continued Israeli security responsibility (Israel has the right to remove threats), and a deal to free the hostages
- Normalization with Saudi Arabia
- Replacement of Hamas’ rule with the rule of a “revamped and revitalized” Palestinian Authority, i.e., different from the current PA
- A US-Saudi defense alliance against Iran and the axis of resistance
- Saudi backing and financing for the reconstruction of Gaza (as opposed to Qatari backing, which supports Hamas)
And now, clarifications:
- This offer exists only thanks to Israel’s operational achievements and military success on the ground.
- Israel’s offensive effort is not stopped. In fact, deepening it is important.
- The proposal is a basis for negotiations under fire. There is no ceasefire.
And a word of clarification about prevalent, almost household terms that may be confusing – regarding the army, regarding the goals and objectives defined for the army by the political echelon, and regarding "the day after the war. " Does the army fight separately and without connection to what the political echelon has defined for the day after the war? Is combat effectiveness maintained even without the directives of the political echelon regarding the exit strategy?
The “army” is too broad a term and "the day after the war" is too vague. In order to preserve the achievements of the army and its effectiveness in combat, the government must define the desired end state to the army. In turn, the security establishment must plan how to realize this end state, and the General Staff must direct the operational activity toward this achievement. In the tactical command, it does not matter to the company commander, the battalion commander, and the division commander who controls Gaza after the war, but this is not true for the level of the General Staff, which – based on the directive of the political echelon – will prepare to hand over the reins to the party that will take the place of Hamas. Regarding the concept of "after the war," we must learn the lesson from developments in the north of the Gaza Strip. The intense fighting is over and Hamas returns, because chaos is a comfortable place for Hamas to return to rule.
In conclusion, the fighting is not intense enough and the statesmanship is not proactive enough. What is underway in the north of the Gaza Strip also applies to other areas, and we have not yet talked about the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi corridor.
The American initiative for regional change includes:
And now, clarifications:
And a word of clarification about prevalent, almost household terms that may be confusing – regarding the army, regarding the goals and objectives defined for the army by the political echelon, and regarding "the day after the war. " Does the army fight separately and without connection to what the political echelon has defined for the day after the war? Is combat effectiveness maintained even without the directives of the political echelon regarding the exit strategy?
The “army” is too broad a term and "the day after the war" is too vague. In order to preserve the achievements of the army and its effectiveness in combat, the government must define the desired end state to the army. In turn, the security establishment must plan how to realize this end state, and the General Staff must direct the operational activity toward this achievement. In the tactical command, it does not matter to the company commander, the battalion commander, and the division commander who controls Gaza after the war, but this is not true for the level of the General Staff, which – based on the directive of the political echelon – will prepare to hand over the reins to the party that will take the place of Hamas. Regarding the concept of "after the war," we must learn the lesson from developments in the north of the Gaza Strip. The intense fighting is over and Hamas returns, because chaos is a comfortable place for Hamas to return to rule.
In conclusion, the fighting is not intense enough and the statesmanship is not proactive enough. What is underway in the north of the Gaza Strip also applies to other areas, and we have not yet talked about the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi corridor.