The war in Gaza and the fighting in the north have not prevented Israel from operating in Syria as well. In effect, alongside the increase in Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the dramatic killing of senior Hamas figure Saleh al-Arouri in the heart of Beirut, it appears that Israel is also stepping up its activities in Syria and attacking weapons transfers and strategic targets in a more frequent and deadly manner.
The most powerful operation attributed to Israel so far took place on December 25, when Sayyed Razi Mousavi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Damascus who was entrusted with the transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria and Lebanon, was killed. Beyond the fact that he was a central figure who led the Iranian consolidation efforts in the arena, Razi was a senior Iranian officer. Attacking him means attacking Iran, which so far has not paid the price for operating its agents against Israel.
Since then, at least five additional attacks have been reported, not including those carried out in response to Palestinian rocket launches toward the Golan Heights. These attacks have been spread across the entire Syrian space, from Damascus in the south, to Aleppo in the north, and the border area with Iraq in al-Bukamal in the east. In the framework of the attacks, additional deaths among Shia axis elements were reported, including Hezbollah operatives – another unusual move in routine Israeli activity. The IDF has also eliminated Palestinian targets operating from Syrian territory and in unusual fashion took responsibility for the killing (on January 8) of Hassan Akasha, who was responsible for launching Hamas rockets from Syria.
So far, except for a few UAV launches attributed to pro-Iranian militias in Syria or Iraq, the attacks attributed to Israel in Syria have not been met with significant responses by the axis. The considerations of Syrian President Assad are clear – he is not interested in dragging Syria into a widescale war, which could also endanger his position. So far the Iranian leadership and Hezbollah have accepted this and refrained from responding from his territory. They are also not interested in responding from Iran or in a harsh manner from Lebanon, in order not to drag their respective countries into an all-out war with Israel. Thus, a situation has arisen in which the multi-arena logic of action plays in Israel's favor and allows it to escalate its operations in Syria, while deviating from the rules of the game that preceded October 7 in a way that makes it difficult for the axis to respond adequately and without endangering its assets more than it already has.
The war in Gaza and the fighting in the north have not prevented Israel from operating in Syria as well. In effect, alongside the increase in Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the dramatic killing of senior Hamas figure Saleh al-Arouri in the heart of Beirut, it appears that Israel is also stepping up its activities in Syria and attacking weapons transfers and strategic targets in a more frequent and deadly manner.
The most powerful operation attributed to Israel so far took place on December 25, when Sayyed Razi Mousavi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Damascus who was entrusted with the transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria and Lebanon, was killed. Beyond the fact that he was a central figure who led the Iranian consolidation efforts in the arena, Razi was a senior Iranian officer. Attacking him means attacking Iran, which so far has not paid the price for operating its agents against Israel.
Since then, at least five additional attacks have been reported, not including those carried out in response to Palestinian rocket launches toward the Golan Heights. These attacks have been spread across the entire Syrian space, from Damascus in the south, to Aleppo in the north, and the border area with Iraq in al-Bukamal in the east. In the framework of the attacks, additional deaths among Shia axis elements were reported, including Hezbollah operatives – another unusual move in routine Israeli activity. The IDF has also eliminated Palestinian targets operating from Syrian territory and in unusual fashion took responsibility for the killing (on January 8) of Hassan Akasha, who was responsible for launching Hamas rockets from Syria.
So far, except for a few UAV launches attributed to pro-Iranian militias in Syria or Iraq, the attacks attributed to Israel in Syria have not been met with significant responses by the axis. The considerations of Syrian President Assad are clear – he is not interested in dragging Syria into a widescale war, which could also endanger his position. So far the Iranian leadership and Hezbollah have accepted this and refrained from responding from his territory. They are also not interested in responding from Iran or in a harsh manner from Lebanon, in order not to drag their respective countries into an all-out war with Israel. Thus, a situation has arisen in which the multi-arena logic of action plays in Israel's favor and allows it to escalate its operations in Syria, while deviating from the rules of the game that preceded October 7 in a way that makes it difficult for the axis to respond adequately and without endangering its assets more than it already has.