First, let's put things in order and into perspective – this is not Operation Defensive Shield II. I also suggest we stop using statements such as "a campaign to restore deterrence": restoring deterrence is not an operational goal, because it cannot be measured. Solid objectives are wearing down the enemy and attacking arms workshops and militants. And no, Jenin is not the capital of terrorism, because terrorism has no capital – terrorism is rooted in the hearts and minds of the people, and it is not about one physical site whose dismantlement solves the problem. The reality is much more complex. This is also not an operation against the Palestinian Authority, whose preservation is an Israeli interest, despite inflammatory statements by some parties. The Palestinian Authority, for all that it lacks, is part of the solution and not part of the problem.
It is also important to note that this is a tactical operation. In other words, without a comprehensive political strategic infrastructure the operation will not really change the reality over time. The military act can help thwart attacks, eliminate militants, and enable a better operational reality, but only the political action will ensure stability in the long term.
What we saw this morning is the first phase of the operation – an operation launched with accurate intelligence and an opening move, primarily with airpower. In the next stage, there is usually friction with the armed operatives on the ground. This has not happened yet. The good news is that when there is no such friction, the number of our casualties decreases, but the bad news is that without friction the number of terrorists killed is also small. It remains to be seen how this develops. The third phase of an operation such as this is action based on accurate intelligence that will emerge from the field – this phase can take a long time. Israel will have to decide when it has exhausted the current move and know how to make this decision in time before it is ensnared by the situation.
The question whether this event will be limited to the Jenin sector or expand beyond will be decided by the number of casualties on the other side. A very high number of casualties can ignite other theaters as well. In such a case, as we have seen in the past, rocket fire from Gaza or Lebanon may be a viable possibility. In my estimation, Hamas has no interest in a campaign with Israel, and Islamic Jihad is also still scarred from the previous round. But the question depends on how much pain builds up the Palestinian side.
Finally, at the strategic level, the hourglass of international legitimacy has already turned. As long as what is at work is a purely military act without a political framework, international patience will be shorter. The question is, what is Israel's political objective? Is it creating better conditions for the return of the Palestinian security forces to the northern West Bank (not through IDF force but by the creation of the requisite conditions), or is it displacing the Palestinian Authority, assuming responsibility, and returning security control of the territory to Israel? As long as this question remains vague and undecided, the operation will lead to security improvement at the tactical level, but it is not certain that this will last for long.
First, let's put things in order and into perspective – this is not Operation Defensive Shield II. I also suggest we stop using statements such as "a campaign to restore deterrence": restoring deterrence is not an operational goal, because it cannot be measured. Solid objectives are wearing down the enemy and attacking arms workshops and militants. And no, Jenin is not the capital of terrorism, because terrorism has no capital – terrorism is rooted in the hearts and minds of the people, and it is not about one physical site whose dismantlement solves the problem. The reality is much more complex. This is also not an operation against the Palestinian Authority, whose preservation is an Israeli interest, despite inflammatory statements by some parties. The Palestinian Authority, for all that it lacks, is part of the solution and not part of the problem.
It is also important to note that this is a tactical operation. In other words, without a comprehensive political strategic infrastructure the operation will not really change the reality over time. The military act can help thwart attacks, eliminate militants, and enable a better operational reality, but only the political action will ensure stability in the long term.
What we saw this morning is the first phase of the operation – an operation launched with accurate intelligence and an opening move, primarily with airpower. In the next stage, there is usually friction with the armed operatives on the ground. This has not happened yet. The good news is that when there is no such friction, the number of our casualties decreases, but the bad news is that without friction the number of terrorists killed is also small. It remains to be seen how this develops. The third phase of an operation such as this is action based on accurate intelligence that will emerge from the field – this phase can take a long time. Israel will have to decide when it has exhausted the current move and know how to make this decision in time before it is ensnared by the situation.
The question whether this event will be limited to the Jenin sector or expand beyond will be decided by the number of casualties on the other side. A very high number of casualties can ignite other theaters as well. In such a case, as we have seen in the past, rocket fire from Gaza or Lebanon may be a viable possibility. In my estimation, Hamas has no interest in a campaign with Israel, and Islamic Jihad is also still scarred from the previous round. But the question depends on how much pain builds up the Palestinian side.
Finally, at the strategic level, the hourglass of international legitimacy has already turned. As long as what is at work is a purely military act without a political framework, international patience will be shorter. The question is, what is Israel's political objective? Is it creating better conditions for the return of the Palestinian security forces to the northern West Bank (not through IDF force but by the creation of the requisite conditions), or is it displacing the Palestinian Authority, assuming responsibility, and returning security control of the territory to Israel? As long as this question remains vague and undecided, the operation will lead to security improvement at the tactical level, but it is not certain that this will last for long.