Ephraim Asculai

Current Situation – High-level enrichment · Thousands of advanced centrifuges · Limited inspection · Fissile material for  4 devices within 1 month · Continued regional subversion · Challenges of legitimacy and countermeasures | Current Israeli Strategy – Reject renewed JCPOA · Advocate “longer & stronger” agreement · Create credible military threat · Attack in Syria against regional subversion | Recommended Strategy – Expand cooperation with the US to improve the military option · Build a political framework against the nuclear program, while developing an independent military option · Continue to prevent qualitative capabilities in Syria and Lebanon · Reduce the entrenchment in Syria

The 10th Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is underway in New York, against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in itself a gross violation of the treaty; Putin’s threat to resort to nuclear weapons; the deadlock in negotiations with Iran; and more. In these difficult circumstances, the participants will hopefully be able at the very least to issue a joint statement affirming the norms underlying the NPT

Although the nuclear talks in Vienna were renewed over a year ago, a return to the deal is not on the horizon, and the regime of the ayatollahs has increased the pace of its violations of the deal, which will make it even harder for the parties to reach understandings. The coming weeks will be critical, and at this point the world powers, as well as Israel, must prepare for a reality where there is no agreement, accompanied by troubling Iranian progress on its nuclear program

In 2021 Iran saw a change of president and government; rounds of talks that did not produce a return to the nuclear deal; an intensified confrontation with the IAEA; strengthened relations with China and Russia; and initial talks to improve relations with the Gulf states. At the same time, Iran experienced increasing difficulties in Iraq and Lebanon; and continued activities attributed to Israel against the nuclear program and against the transfer of weapons to Syria and Hezbollah, as well as at sea and in the cyber realm. In the coming year Iran could face a strategic decision – a return to the nuclear deal while arresting progress on the program, or alternatively, tension and conflict with some in the international arena and progress toward becoming a “nuclear threshold state.” Facing Iran’s nuclear program, Israel is in a strategic quandary: the various possible scenarios, whether a partial agreement or continued foot-dragging or a breakdown in the negotiations, are negative for Israel. This backdrop highlights the need to maintain an intimate dialogue with the United States administration and formulate a comprehensive strategy for the coming years that includes a credible military threat and multi-faceted pressure on Iran; elimination of the  advanced components of the nuclear program, if necessary; an extensive campaign between wars to curb Iran’s regional entrenchment, and not only in the Syrian realm; and use of the Abraham Accords to create a regional and international alliance to restrain Iran and strengthen deterrence against it. Conversely, a public conflict with Washington would weaken Israel and play into Iran’s hands: the statements about preparing a military option would not appear credible, might erode deterrence, and could push Washington to pursue an even worse agreement. From Israel’s perspective, the following are preferable: a return to the agreement that buys Israel time to prepare an alternative; maintained freedom of operation in the regional arena; continued obstruction of aspects of the nuclear program; and coordination with the United States on future developments.

The changes on the northern front, particularly the ongoing Iranian efforts to consolidate its presence there (even though this has been obstructed to some extent), the precision missiles and rockets project in Lebanon, and the worsening economic crisis in Lebanon and Syria highlight Israel’s need to adjust its policy to address the unfolding challenges more effectively. Israel’s campaign between wars continues to lead the efforts to stop Iran, but clearly this policy does not provide a full response to the challenges, particularly the growing threat of the precision missiles project in Lebanon. Consequently, this policy is both increasingly tenuous and volatile, and may well lead to escalation and expansion of the conflict to additional fronts. As part of an updated response, Israel must integrate both hard and soft power efforts, including a more active role by the United States and regional players in the effort to achieve an arrangement for the Syrian theater. The Biden administration should be encouraged to coordinate both efforts with Russia regarding the Iranian threat from Syria, and efforts with France and Saudi Arabia to formulate a recovery plan for Lebanon to help stabilize the country, while reducing Hezbollah’s influence there. Beyond this, it is essential for Israel to devise operational capability against the precision project in Lebanon, and from a broader perspective, to formulate a revised strategic objective for scenarios of a future large-scale war against the Iranian-Shiite axis on the northern front – Lebanon, Syria, and western Iraq.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the organization entrusted with verifying that Iran is observing the requirements of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) to the letter. Its quarterly reports to the Security Council are, at present, the basis for the determination by many nations that Iran is complying with the deal. However, a closer look at the performance of the IAEA and the issued reports reveals that not all is well in areas such as verification of the absence of activities in the development of the nuclear explosive mechanism; the search for undeclared nuclear-related activities; and the necessary transparency in IAEA reports regarding Iran’s nuclear activities and plans. It is essential that the parties to the deal recognize these shortcomings, and impress upon the IAEA the imperative to change its implementation of its mandate.