Ankara's decision, in accordance with the Montreux Convention (1936), to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea to the passage of warships is not likely to affect the capabilities of the Russian navy significantly in relation to combat in Ukraine. The reason is that unless Turkey itself becomes a side in warfare, Russian battleships deployed in other arenas have the right to return to their base in the Black Sea. The Turkish move may affect the passage of warships to other arenas in which Russia is involved, such as Syria. The move also has symbolic significance in the context of the international effort to bring an end to the fighting in Ukraine. The decision was made in part due to increased tensions between Russia and the West, as well as Russian damage to several civilian ships in the Black Sea.
However, Ankara is still straddling the fence. The Turkish government has expressed its desire to mediate between the parties and publicly condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, but it does not share in the effort to impose economic sanctions on Russia and has not closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Similar to its policy regarding the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, the goal of the practical measures accompanying the condemnation is to make sure they do not bring about a breakdown in Turkey-Russia relations. Likewise similar to Israeli considerations, Ankara is worried that a crisis in relations with Moscow will lead Russia to punitive measures against Turkey in Syria.
Turkey, which is in the midst of an economic crisis, also depends on Russian goodwill in areas vital to its economy. The many Russian tourists vacationing in Turkey constitute a significant source of income for the country, and Russia is a major supplier of natural gas to Turkey (one third of the Turkish import) and wheat (two thirds of the Turkish import). At the same time, Ukraine is also a significant supplier of wheat to Turkey and much of its tourism is likewise a source of income for Turkey.
One positive aspect for Ankara could be that there is evidence of the success of the Turkish UAVs that Ukraine possesses in the war against Russian forces (although Ukraine has only 20 Bayraktar UAVs). Following the success of Turkish UAVs in clashes with militias and weaker militaries in Libya, Armenia, and Ethiopia, the blows the Turkish UAVs have delivered to the Russian army, which is considered a stronger force, provide good publicity as well as even a commercial success for Turkey, which can claim its product has passed another test. However, part of the process of producing Turkish drones depends on engines from Ukraine, and the war in the country could hamper the production of Turkish weapons as well.
If the trend of increasing unity within NATO continues in the wake of recent developments, as many anticipate, it could also have a positive impact on Turkey, which is a member in the alliance. Nevertheless, it is likely the underlying problem of tensions over the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey since 2016 will continue to pose a significant challenge.
Ankara's decision, in accordance with the Montreux Convention (1936), to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea to the passage of warships is not likely to affect the capabilities of the Russian navy significantly in relation to combat in Ukraine. The reason is that unless Turkey itself becomes a side in warfare, Russian battleships deployed in other arenas have the right to return to their base in the Black Sea. The Turkish move may affect the passage of warships to other arenas in which Russia is involved, such as Syria. The move also has symbolic significance in the context of the international effort to bring an end to the fighting in Ukraine. The decision was made in part due to increased tensions between Russia and the West, as well as Russian damage to several civilian ships in the Black Sea.
However, Ankara is still straddling the fence. The Turkish government has expressed its desire to mediate between the parties and publicly condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, but it does not share in the effort to impose economic sanctions on Russia and has not closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Similar to its policy regarding the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, the goal of the practical measures accompanying the condemnation is to make sure they do not bring about a breakdown in Turkey-Russia relations. Likewise similar to Israeli considerations, Ankara is worried that a crisis in relations with Moscow will lead Russia to punitive measures against Turkey in Syria.
Turkey, which is in the midst of an economic crisis, also depends on Russian goodwill in areas vital to its economy. The many Russian tourists vacationing in Turkey constitute a significant source of income for the country, and Russia is a major supplier of natural gas to Turkey (one third of the Turkish import) and wheat (two thirds of the Turkish import). At the same time, Ukraine is also a significant supplier of wheat to Turkey and much of its tourism is likewise a source of income for Turkey.
One positive aspect for Ankara could be that there is evidence of the success of the Turkish UAVs that Ukraine possesses in the war against Russian forces (although Ukraine has only 20 Bayraktar UAVs). Following the success of Turkish UAVs in clashes with militias and weaker militaries in Libya, Armenia, and Ethiopia, the blows the Turkish UAVs have delivered to the Russian army, which is considered a stronger force, provide good publicity as well as even a commercial success for Turkey, which can claim its product has passed another test. However, part of the process of producing Turkish drones depends on engines from Ukraine, and the war in the country could hamper the production of Turkish weapons as well.
If the trend of increasing unity within NATO continues in the wake of recent developments, as many anticipate, it could also have a positive impact on Turkey, which is a member in the alliance. Nevertheless, it is likely the underlying problem of tensions over the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey since 2016 will continue to pose a significant challenge.