Over the past few months the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has assumed a new guise. The attacks in the West Bank and the attempts to escalate the situation have increased, and the mood in the refugee camps and the large cities in the northern West Bank encourages motivation for the struggle and aspirations for revenge. Many Israelis living in the northern West Bank pay for this with their lives. and the sophisticated operations carried out frequently by the security establishment to prevent terrorist organization and activity are effective for short periods of time only.
In contrast to the reality on the eve of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, in which terrorism was organized and to a large extent also directed by organizations such as the Fatah Tanzim, which was linked to Arafat's Palestinian Authority, now local organizations are challenging the Palestinian Authority because of its adherence to security coordination and its opposition to any harm to Israel or Israelis. They gain sympathy, increase the anger of the population toward the PA, and benefit from the guidance, encouragement, and assistance of the opposition organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which echo their actions from afar, as part of the new strategy of moving the conflict from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.
The background to this situation is the emerging understanding among the Palestinians, whereby dominant ministers within the Israeli government strive to resolve the conflict and not to manage it, to bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and not coordinate with it, to take over Area C, and even to expel Palestinians from their land. They wonder how the Palestinian Authority continues to adhere to a policy of coordination and cooperation when the Israeli disregard for it is so public and blatant. In turn, they add to the PA’s weakness and loss of relevance.
The fact that the Israeli security establishment sends a message that the reality is different and does not justify military operations as in the past is interpreted as a message whereby the military option is not enough and that additional channels of action must be found. These messages are not hidden from the eyes of the Palestinians. They recognize the tension between the two levels and fear a decline in the dominance of the Israeli security establishment, which, in the decision making process, is considered to understand better than others the complexity of the conflict.
Therefore, the Palestinians follow every decision taken by the Israeli government on the Palestinian issue, every statement by Ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir, and prepare for an era of sumud (steadfastness), at whose core is coping through terror and revenge against what they define as "a new Nakba," that is, an Israeli attempt to remove them from their land.
Over the past few months the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has assumed a new guise. The attacks in the West Bank and the attempts to escalate the situation have increased, and the mood in the refugee camps and the large cities in the northern West Bank encourages motivation for the struggle and aspirations for revenge. Many Israelis living in the northern West Bank pay for this with their lives. and the sophisticated operations carried out frequently by the security establishment to prevent terrorist organization and activity are effective for short periods of time only.
In contrast to the reality on the eve of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, in which terrorism was organized and to a large extent also directed by organizations such as the Fatah Tanzim, which was linked to Arafat's Palestinian Authority, now local organizations are challenging the Palestinian Authority because of its adherence to security coordination and its opposition to any harm to Israel or Israelis. They gain sympathy, increase the anger of the population toward the PA, and benefit from the guidance, encouragement, and assistance of the opposition organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which echo their actions from afar, as part of the new strategy of moving the conflict from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.
The background to this situation is the emerging understanding among the Palestinians, whereby dominant ministers within the Israeli government strive to resolve the conflict and not to manage it, to bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and not coordinate with it, to take over Area C, and even to expel Palestinians from their land. They wonder how the Palestinian Authority continues to adhere to a policy of coordination and cooperation when the Israeli disregard for it is so public and blatant. In turn, they add to the PA’s weakness and loss of relevance.
The fact that the Israeli security establishment sends a message that the reality is different and does not justify military operations as in the past is interpreted as a message whereby the military option is not enough and that additional channels of action must be found. These messages are not hidden from the eyes of the Palestinians. They recognize the tension between the two levels and fear a decline in the dominance of the Israeli security establishment, which, in the decision making process, is considered to understand better than others the complexity of the conflict.
Therefore, the Palestinians follow every decision taken by the Israeli government on the Palestinian issue, every statement by Ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir, and prepare for an era of sumud (steadfastness), at whose core is coping through terror and revenge against what they define as "a new Nakba," that is, an Israeli attempt to remove them from their land.