Initial insights following the elimination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul:
1. Contrary to popular perception in various countries following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US has once again proven its ability and determination to continue to eliminate senior figures in the Salafi jihadist terrorist organizations (ISIS and their affiliates). This is the case even though they are ostensibly under the radar of public opinion in the West, since they are active mainly in “outlying areas” and have not carried out terrorist attacks with many casualties in the West for a long time.
2. The Americans demonstrated the intelligence and operational capability that enabled the elimination of Zawahiri, despite the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the lack of physical presence in the area. In 2019 in Syria, the Americans killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Islamic State, and killed his successor in February of this year.
3. The elimination of Zawahiri in Kabul at the home of Siraj Haqqani, the Minister of Internal Security in Afghanistan and one of the leading Taliban figures and al-Qaeda supporters, exposed for all to see that the Taliban hosted al-Qaeda and its leader, Zawahiri, contrary to its commitment to the United States in the 2020 Doha Agreement, which was the basis for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan a year and a half later.
4. It was claimed that Haqqani's son and son-in-law were killed in the operation. It remains to be seen if and how the Taliban will respond to the American attack on Kabul, beyond condemning the attack on the “law-abiding sovereign state” and the violation of international rules.
5. Questions regarding the identity and influence of Zawahiri's successor on the organization and the organization's response to the elimination of its leader remain open. The natural candidate for successor is Saif al-Adel, the organization's top operations man and the last survivor of the older generation of al-Qaeda leaders. Al-Adel was imprisoned for several years in Iran, released in 2015, and subsequently lived there under Iranian protection. It is not clear if he later moved to Afghanistan or remained in hiding in Iran. It is possible the organization will prefer to choose another veteran successor to run it and reorganize its ranks. If Al-Adel is the chosen successor he may take the organization toward greater operational activity in accordance with his professional and personal background.
6. In the current uncertainty surrounding the identity of the successor, it is difficult to envision the organization’s future direction. In recent years it has concentrated its activities mainly in “outlying countries” (Sahel, Africa, South and Southeast Asia). Despite the rhetoric that the US and the West remain the principal adversary, they have actually not been the focus of al-Qaeda activity in recent years. It is possible the successor will try to leverage the incident of the attack on Zawahiri in the heart of Afghanistan to fight back, but if this is indeed the organization's intention, its ability to realize it at this stage is in doubt – even though the organization and its affiliates must not be underestimated as to their ability to act against American and other Western targets within their countries. At the same time, the organization did not directly take revenge for the elimination of bin Laden, which was more important and significant than the recent incident.
Initial insights following the elimination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul:
1. Contrary to popular perception in various countries following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US has once again proven its ability and determination to continue to eliminate senior figures in the Salafi jihadist terrorist organizations (ISIS and their affiliates). This is the case even though they are ostensibly under the radar of public opinion in the West, since they are active mainly in “outlying areas” and have not carried out terrorist attacks with many casualties in the West for a long time.
2. The Americans demonstrated the intelligence and operational capability that enabled the elimination of Zawahiri, despite the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the lack of physical presence in the area. In 2019 in Syria, the Americans killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Islamic State, and killed his successor in February of this year.
3. The elimination of Zawahiri in Kabul at the home of Siraj Haqqani, the Minister of Internal Security in Afghanistan and one of the leading Taliban figures and al-Qaeda supporters, exposed for all to see that the Taliban hosted al-Qaeda and its leader, Zawahiri, contrary to its commitment to the United States in the 2020 Doha Agreement, which was the basis for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan a year and a half later.
4. It was claimed that Haqqani's son and son-in-law were killed in the operation. It remains to be seen if and how the Taliban will respond to the American attack on Kabul, beyond condemning the attack on the “law-abiding sovereign state” and the violation of international rules.
5. Questions regarding the identity and influence of Zawahiri's successor on the organization and the organization's response to the elimination of its leader remain open. The natural candidate for successor is Saif al-Adel, the organization's top operations man and the last survivor of the older generation of al-Qaeda leaders. Al-Adel was imprisoned for several years in Iran, released in 2015, and subsequently lived there under Iranian protection. It is not clear if he later moved to Afghanistan or remained in hiding in Iran. It is possible the organization will prefer to choose another veteran successor to run it and reorganize its ranks. If Al-Adel is the chosen successor he may take the organization toward greater operational activity in accordance with his professional and personal background.
6. In the current uncertainty surrounding the identity of the successor, it is difficult to envision the organization’s future direction. In recent years it has concentrated its activities mainly in “outlying countries” (Sahel, Africa, South and Southeast Asia). Despite the rhetoric that the US and the West remain the principal adversary, they have actually not been the focus of al-Qaeda activity in recent years. It is possible the successor will try to leverage the incident of the attack on Zawahiri in the heart of Afghanistan to fight back, but if this is indeed the organization's intention, its ability to realize it at this stage is in doubt – even though the organization and its affiliates must not be underestimated as to their ability to act against American and other Western targets within their countries. At the same time, the organization did not directly take revenge for the elimination of bin Laden, which was more important and significant than the recent incident.