In an IDF operation (June 12), Taleb Sami Abdallah, the commander of Hezbollah’s Nasr unit, who was responsible for fighting against Israel in the eastern sector of southern Lebanon, was assassinated along with three other Hezbollah operatives. Abu Taleb, as he was known, is the most senior member of the organization (equivalent to a brigadier general) killed in the past eight months since the war started on the border of Lebanon. His importance can be understood from the lavish funeral he received as well as from the significant step up in Hezbollah’s response to his elimination. The Al-Akhbar newspaper, close to Hezbollah, described the IDF’s action as a severe blow to the organization and a dangerous escalation. The leader of the organization, Hashim Safi al-Din, promised during the funeral that Hezbollah would not hesitate to increase its attacks both in scope and distance, as has indeed already happened: Throughout June 12, Hezbollah attacked on a large scale (about 200 launches, causing damage and fires) and at a longer range than it has previously used (reaching the Lower Galilee—Safed, Rosh Pina, and Tiberias).
Despite the escalation in IDF activity and Hezbollah’s significant and extensive response, which is expected to continue in the coming days, for the time being, it appears that Hezbollah is still careful to maintain the equations of reaction and avoid descending into a wide-scale war. At this stage, the organization has adopted a “war of attrition” strategy, with the intention of continuing it until a ceasefire is achieved in Gaza. Despite the heavy cost to the organization, this war leads to many achievements for Hezbollah and the “resistance front” led by Iran. It helps to preserve Hamas’s survival and guarantees victory and an improved position for the organization at the end of the war both against Israel and within Lebanon. It seems that Nasrallah still wants to avoid a wide-scale war, but he does not shy away from escalating his military activity, assuming that Israel does not intend to start a war. This assumption may turn out to be wrong, given the increasing number of voices in Israel calling for an extensive military operation against Hezbollah and Lebanon, the sense of exhaustion from the high-intensity fighting in Gaza, and the urgent need of the Israeli government to return the evacuated residents in the north to their homes. Beyond that, it is impossible to rule out a scenario of which the two sides are dragged into a wider war, even if the timing is not suitable for them, due to a loss of control over events.
In an IDF operation (June 12), Taleb Sami Abdallah, the commander of Hezbollah’s Nasr unit, who was responsible for fighting against Israel in the eastern sector of southern Lebanon, was assassinated along with three other Hezbollah operatives. Abu Taleb, as he was known, is the most senior member of the organization (equivalent to a brigadier general) killed in the past eight months since the war started on the border of Lebanon. His importance can be understood from the lavish funeral he received as well as from the significant step up in Hezbollah’s response to his elimination. The Al-Akhbar newspaper, close to Hezbollah, described the IDF’s action as a severe blow to the organization and a dangerous escalation. The leader of the organization, Hashim Safi al-Din, promised during the funeral that Hezbollah would not hesitate to increase its attacks both in scope and distance, as has indeed already happened: Throughout June 12, Hezbollah attacked on a large scale (about 200 launches, causing damage and fires) and at a longer range than it has previously used (reaching the Lower Galilee—Safed, Rosh Pina, and Tiberias).
Despite the escalation in IDF activity and Hezbollah’s significant and extensive response, which is expected to continue in the coming days, for the time being, it appears that Hezbollah is still careful to maintain the equations of reaction and avoid descending into a wide-scale war. At this stage, the organization has adopted a “war of attrition” strategy, with the intention of continuing it until a ceasefire is achieved in Gaza. Despite the heavy cost to the organization, this war leads to many achievements for Hezbollah and the “resistance front” led by Iran. It helps to preserve Hamas’s survival and guarantees victory and an improved position for the organization at the end of the war both against Israel and within Lebanon. It seems that Nasrallah still wants to avoid a wide-scale war, but he does not shy away from escalating his military activity, assuming that Israel does not intend to start a war. This assumption may turn out to be wrong, given the increasing number of voices in Israel calling for an extensive military operation against Hezbollah and Lebanon, the sense of exhaustion from the high-intensity fighting in Gaza, and the urgent need of the Israeli government to return the evacuated residents in the north to their homes. Beyond that, it is impossible to rule out a scenario of which the two sides are dragged into a wider war, even if the timing is not suitable for them, due to a loss of control over events.