The triple targeted killing realizes the goal of taking initiative and not being dragged into an operation just because tempers are high and because there was a terrorist attack or rocket fire. In Gaza, it is important to launch an operation that at the outset yields a significant achievement – such as in this case, namely, three Islamic Jihad operatives. The most senior of the three was Jihad al-Ghannam, the commander of the southern sector, responsible for recruitment and other areas, a veteran terrorist, and well-known in the organization.
The second militant was Khalil Bahtini, the commander of the northern sector, who in the past was responsible for the rocket fire. He belonged to the younger generation, and therefore was more proactive and activist in the field of rocket fire. Finally, Tareq Ezz al-Din, who apparently worked to ignite other Palestinian and resistance arenas and forge the connection between them sought by the Islamic Jihad, was killed.
This is the third operation aimed at Islamic Jihad, and the big question is whether this time as well Hamas will not join in. Hamas’s external leadership has threatened it will enter the fray, but this remains to be seen. The circumstances resemble those of exactly two years ago – then as well there were tensions leading up to Jerusalem Day, and it was decided not to act preemptively. This time, the violent energy that was supposed to build up until Jerusalem Day has been released proactively, and that is a very positive development.
If Hamas remains out of the picture, we can expect an operation similar in form and duration to previous operations. Hamas’s inclusion could prompt fire from the northern front as well and a significant lengthening of the operation.
Cities with mixed Arab and Jewish populations and the West Bank constitute another arena that demands attention, and despite the low chance that it will join the hostilities, it is more sensitive. Here too, Hamas wields much influence, and a lot depends on its decision on whether or not to join.
The triple targeted killing realizes the goal of taking initiative and not being dragged into an operation just because tempers are high and because there was a terrorist attack or rocket fire. In Gaza, it is important to launch an operation that at the outset yields a significant achievement – such as in this case, namely, three Islamic Jihad operatives. The most senior of the three was Jihad al-Ghannam, the commander of the southern sector, responsible for recruitment and other areas, a veteran terrorist, and well-known in the organization.
The second militant was Khalil Bahtini, the commander of the northern sector, who in the past was responsible for the rocket fire. He belonged to the younger generation, and therefore was more proactive and activist in the field of rocket fire. Finally, Tareq Ezz al-Din, who apparently worked to ignite other Palestinian and resistance arenas and forge the connection between them sought by the Islamic Jihad, was killed.
This is the third operation aimed at Islamic Jihad, and the big question is whether this time as well Hamas will not join in. Hamas’s external leadership has threatened it will enter the fray, but this remains to be seen. The circumstances resemble those of exactly two years ago – then as well there were tensions leading up to Jerusalem Day, and it was decided not to act preemptively. This time, the violent energy that was supposed to build up until Jerusalem Day has been released proactively, and that is a very positive development.
If Hamas remains out of the picture, we can expect an operation similar in form and duration to previous operations. Hamas’s inclusion could prompt fire from the northern front as well and a significant lengthening of the operation.
Cities with mixed Arab and Jewish populations and the West Bank constitute another arena that demands attention, and despite the low chance that it will join the hostilities, it is more sensitive. Here too, Hamas wields much influence, and a lot depends on its decision on whether or not to join.