Despite Israel’s announcement that it would delay the full withdrawal of the IDF from South Lebanon, a movement of thousands of Hezbollah supporters (residents of South Lebanon) began returning to their villages at the end of the 60 days designated as the first stage for implementing the ceasefire. The residents ignored calls from the IDF and the Lebanese Army not to enter the villages, broke through UNIFIL and IDF checkpoints, and clashed with IDF forces in the field. The Lebanese Ministry of Health reported that, following IDF warning shots, 24 people were killed and about 130 were injured. The next day, the movement of residents continued, but on a smaller scale (2 killed, 17 injured), after an agreement was reached between Israel and Lebanon, under US auspices, to delay the full withdrawal until February 18. These developments indicate:
• Hezbollah’s desire, in its current weakened state, to avoid renewing military confrontation with Israel (despite its threats, which weakened over time, that its tolerance for IDF actions in South Lebanon would expire at the end of the 60 days set for withdrawal). These threats were reiterated by the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, in his speech on January 27, where he also opposed the idea of postponing the withdrawal date—but with no change in the organization’s “containment” policy so far.
• Hezbollah’s efforts to find alternative ways to restore its status given its current dire situation. In this case, to present the will of the displaced villagers to return to their homes as a “popular movement” in order to renew Hezbollah’s presence in the field under their auspices and re-establish their support for it as their true protector, while exposing UNIFIL’s inability to protect them against the IDF.
• The urgent need to strengthen the Lebanese Army, which is failing to fulfill its mission under the agreement: to deploy in the areas evacuated by the IDF and prevent any military presence of Hezbollah south of the Litani River. It can be understood why UNIFIL does not wish to confront the civilians, but its impotence in dealing with Hezbollah cannot be accepted, which will ultimately lead the IDF to exercise the freedom of action granted to it under the agreement to act in cases where UNIFIL does not prevent Hezbollah violations.
• The importance of completing the IDF’s withdrawal by February 18 to avoid unnecessary friction with the population of the villages in South Lebanon, to maintain US support for the Israeli position, and to allow the return of displaced Israeli citizens on the date set by the government (March 1).
Despite Israel’s announcement that it would delay the full withdrawal of the IDF from South Lebanon, a movement of thousands of Hezbollah supporters (residents of South Lebanon) began returning to their villages at the end of the 60 days designated as the first stage for implementing the ceasefire. The residents ignored calls from the IDF and the Lebanese Army not to enter the villages, broke through UNIFIL and IDF checkpoints, and clashed with IDF forces in the field. The Lebanese Ministry of Health reported that, following IDF warning shots, 24 people were killed and about 130 were injured. The next day, the movement of residents continued, but on a smaller scale (2 killed, 17 injured), after an agreement was reached between Israel and Lebanon, under US auspices, to delay the full withdrawal until February 18. These developments indicate:
• Hezbollah’s desire, in its current weakened state, to avoid renewing military confrontation with Israel (despite its threats, which weakened over time, that its tolerance for IDF actions in South Lebanon would expire at the end of the 60 days set for withdrawal). These threats were reiterated by the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, in his speech on January 27, where he also opposed the idea of postponing the withdrawal date—but with no change in the organization’s “containment” policy so far.
• Hezbollah’s efforts to find alternative ways to restore its status given its current dire situation. In this case, to present the will of the displaced villagers to return to their homes as a “popular movement” in order to renew Hezbollah’s presence in the field under their auspices and re-establish their support for it as their true protector, while exposing UNIFIL’s inability to protect them against the IDF.
• The urgent need to strengthen the Lebanese Army, which is failing to fulfill its mission under the agreement: to deploy in the areas evacuated by the IDF and prevent any military presence of Hezbollah south of the Litani River. It can be understood why UNIFIL does not wish to confront the civilians, but its impotence in dealing with Hezbollah cannot be accepted, which will ultimately lead the IDF to exercise the freedom of action granted to it under the agreement to act in cases where UNIFIL does not prevent Hezbollah violations.
• The importance of completing the IDF’s withdrawal by February 18 to avoid unnecessary friction with the population of the villages in South Lebanon, to maintain US support for the Israeli position, and to allow the return of displaced Israeli citizens on the date set by the government (March 1).