Posts

Israel took the initiative, surprised Palestinian Islamic Jihad with a successful opening blow, and achieved the operation’s objectives:

• The security establishment met the goals set by the political echelon – eliminating the threat of attack with anti-tank fire at an Israeli target in the area close to the Gaza border; dealing a severe blow to Islamic Jihad and weakening it; and presenting an end that aims to curb other terrorist elements.
• The policy of differentiation was maintained, which seeks primarily to reduce the affinities between the arenas of the Palestinian struggle, although the issue will be put to the test in the future.
• Hamas stayed out of the campaign and was apparently excluded from the ceasefire talks held with Egyptian mediation. This challenged its image as the leader of the “resistance” camp.
• During the operation, the IDF attacked more than 165 PIJ targets: military outposts and positions, pits and rocket-launching squads, rocket and mortar production and assembly workshops, and munitions warehouses. The highlight was the targeted elimination of the organization's senior command in the Strip. There were 44 dead on the Palestinian side, but the collateral damage was minimal.
• The Iron Dome system intercepted about 300 rockets that were on a trajectory to hit targets in Israel, with a success rate of 96 percent.
• Israel dictated the opening date and the conditions for the end of the campaign, and the international legitimacy of its right to self-defense was not harmed.

Islamic Jihad failed to achieve its goals:

• It failed to position itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance and unite the ranks of the resistance elements, and it remained alone in the campaign. It did not gain support in the Arab world, probably due to the attitude toward it as an Iranian proxy.
• It failed to ignite escalation in the other arenas, despite the name it gave to the conflict - “United Zones.” The populations of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, as well as the Arab street in Israel, remained dormant.
• It failed in its attempt to reproduce the moves of Hamas and its intention to achieve an image of “protector of al-Aqsa” by launching rockets toward Jerusalem on Tisha B’Av.
• Barrages of nearly 1,000 rockets were launched toward Israeli territory in two and a half days of fighting, but minor destruction was caused, with no fatalities among Israeli citizens. More than 160 rockets fell in the territory of the Gaza Strip and hurt Palestinians who were not involved.

At the same time, three reservations:

• In asymmetric conflicts, it is not possible to achieve decision in which the enemy will declare that it has been deprived of the ability and/or desire to continue fighting the next day. The achievements of the operation did not improve Israel's situation – both ongoing security and strategic – or alleviate the sense of the absence of a possible solution to the Palestinian problem. Also, Israel's dependence on Egyptian mediation has increased.
• Israel's overall strategy toward the Gaza Strip and Hamas has not changed and the sense of security of Israeli citizens, especially in the Gaza perimeter, is still challenged. The expectation that Hamas – the  responsible party in the Gaza Strip, which benefits from Israel’s policy of expanded benefits and uses it to strengthen its position – will restrain other terrorist elements in order to preserve calm has dissolved.  Hamas emerged intact, and the benefits Israel gives it and its image as the leader in the Palestinian system were not eroded.
• The terms of the ceasefire left open the problem that led to the escalation – the release of PIJ prisoners (Bassam al-Saadi and the hunger striking Khalil Awawdeh). PIJ Secretary General al-Nakhalah announced at the end that “if the enemy is not committed to fulfill the demands to which it agreed, we will consider this a violation of the agreement and resume the campaign.”