Hezbollah’s promised military response to the assassination of its chief of staff is being delayed, but it shouldn’t be assumed that Hezbollah will refrain from an unusual and surprising military move as a response, as all the organization’s spokespersons continue to promise.
The delay was initially due to the need to coordinate with Iran to determine the response and its timing. Hezbollah’s main dilemma is choosing a military move that will be perceived as significant and deterrent, while also being one that Israel can contain in such a way that its response will not escalate into a full-scale war. Additionally, because of the intense American efforts to secure a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah does not want to be seen as a factor that could undermine this effort, as achieving a ceasefire would allow the organization to halt its attacks in the north, as it has been promising for months.
For Hezbollah, there is a vital need to respond not only because of Nasrallah’s clear commitment to a response at Fuad Shukr’s funeral but also to restore the organization’s image of strength, as well as Iran’s entire axis—as a deterrence against Israel. In Nasrallah’s view, the response to the assassination should follow a separate path from the “war of attrition” on the northern border, ongoing since October 8, 2023, and intended to support Hamas’s war in Gaza.
In the two weeks since the assassination, Hezbollah has continued its daily attacks in the north, adhering to the established equations it has followed for the past ten months. It does so despite the heavy price it continues to pay as a result of the IDF’s actions, including destruction of infrastructure; loss of operatives (since Shukr’s assassination, 25 Hezbollah members have been killed); growing internal criticism of the organization; concern that the organization is dragging Lebanon into a war it does not want and that would severely damage the country; and international pressure to avoid a response. At the same time, Hezbollah has intensified its psychological warfare on social media against the IDF (for deterrence) and the Israeli public (to instill fear and despair). Notably, there has been an unusual exposure of a large underground facility containing weapons and ammunition ready for immediate use.
In conclusion, it appears that Hezbollah has not given up on retaliating for the assassination and is determined to carry out an operation that surpasses its previous actions and that may lead to an escalation. However, the ongoing effort to obtain a hostage deal, Iran’s hesitations regarding the response, and concerns over a widespread Israeli attack may affect the nature of the retaliation. As a result, the strength and timing of Hezbollah’s response may differ from its initial plans. For Israel, this means it is required to remain vigilant and prepared, as well as to consider the possibility of “surprises.”
Hezbollah’s promised military response to the assassination of its chief of staff is being delayed, but it shouldn’t be assumed that Hezbollah will refrain from an unusual and surprising military move as a response, as all the organization’s spokespersons continue to promise.
The delay was initially due to the need to coordinate with Iran to determine the response and its timing. Hezbollah’s main dilemma is choosing a military move that will be perceived as significant and deterrent, while also being one that Israel can contain in such a way that its response will not escalate into a full-scale war. Additionally, because of the intense American efforts to secure a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah does not want to be seen as a factor that could undermine this effort, as achieving a ceasefire would allow the organization to halt its attacks in the north, as it has been promising for months.
For Hezbollah, there is a vital need to respond not only because of Nasrallah’s clear commitment to a response at Fuad Shukr’s funeral but also to restore the organization’s image of strength, as well as Iran’s entire axis—as a deterrence against Israel. In Nasrallah’s view, the response to the assassination should follow a separate path from the “war of attrition” on the northern border, ongoing since October 8, 2023, and intended to support Hamas’s war in Gaza.
In the two weeks since the assassination, Hezbollah has continued its daily attacks in the north, adhering to the established equations it has followed for the past ten months. It does so despite the heavy price it continues to pay as a result of the IDF’s actions, including destruction of infrastructure; loss of operatives (since Shukr’s assassination, 25 Hezbollah members have been killed); growing internal criticism of the organization; concern that the organization is dragging Lebanon into a war it does not want and that would severely damage the country; and international pressure to avoid a response. At the same time, Hezbollah has intensified its psychological warfare on social media against the IDF (for deterrence) and the Israeli public (to instill fear and despair). Notably, there has been an unusual exposure of a large underground facility containing weapons and ammunition ready for immediate use.
In conclusion, it appears that Hezbollah has not given up on retaliating for the assassination and is determined to carry out an operation that surpasses its previous actions and that may lead to an escalation. However, the ongoing effort to obtain a hostage deal, Iran’s hesitations regarding the response, and concerns over a widespread Israeli attack may affect the nature of the retaliation. As a result, the strength and timing of Hezbollah’s response may differ from its initial plans. For Israel, this means it is required to remain vigilant and prepared, as well as to consider the possibility of “surprises.”