The end of the temporary ceasefire in Gaza (December 1) also marked the resumption of fighting on the Lebanese border, in line with the principle established by Nasrallah regarding the correlation between Israel's actions against Gaza and Hezbollah's attacks against Israel. The fighting in the north continues from the point where it ended at the beginning of the truce, with similar and limited characteristics in terms of the means of warfare and the geographical scope, but with high intensity. This indicates the possibility of further escalation in view of the commitment by the organization's leadership that Hezbollah will continue to pressure the IDF in the north as long as it continues its war in Gaza, and that a broad attack on Hamas will lead to the expansion of its activities against Israel.
In parallel, the domestic pressure on Hezbollah is increasing due to the fear of Lebanon being dragged into a wide-scale war, which mirrors the warnings from Western elements against the continuation of the fighting and its escalation. In the Lebanese system, the reliance on UN Security Council Resolution 1701 as an anchor for restoring peace along the border is evident, while the opposition to Hezbollah even demands its full implementation. This involves pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River and disarming it. At the same time, there is an evident effort by international and regional parties to influence Hezbollah not to engage in a wide-scale war that will seriously damage Lebanon.
In response, Hezbollah is working vigorously to prevent any possibility of a settlement that would harm its status and its freedom of action within Lebanon and vis-à-vis Israel. As the fighting continues, it makes sure to coordinate with its partners in the axis of resistance (mainly Iran and Hamas); guarantees compensation to the Lebanese citizens affected by the fighting in Israel; works to prevent the implementation of Resolution 1701 or the adoption of changes to it which would harm it; and thwarts all attempts by the external mediators (the French Le Drian, the American Hochstein, and the envoys from Qatar and Saudi Arabia) to promote a solution that combines providing a response to the political vacuum in Lebanon (the appointment of a president, which has been delayed for over a year) and aid to Lebanon's economy and the peaceful restoration of the border with Israel based on Resolution 1701.
From Israel's point of view, in the absence of a political solution in the near future, a re-examination of the IDF's current strategy in fighting against Hezbollah, which is essentially reactive and proportionate, is required.
The end of the temporary ceasefire in Gaza (December 1) also marked the resumption of fighting on the Lebanese border, in line with the principle established by Nasrallah regarding the correlation between Israel's actions against Gaza and Hezbollah's attacks against Israel. The fighting in the north continues from the point where it ended at the beginning of the truce, with similar and limited characteristics in terms of the means of warfare and the geographical scope, but with high intensity. This indicates the possibility of further escalation in view of the commitment by the organization's leadership that Hezbollah will continue to pressure the IDF in the north as long as it continues its war in Gaza, and that a broad attack on Hamas will lead to the expansion of its activities against Israel.
In parallel, the domestic pressure on Hezbollah is increasing due to the fear of Lebanon being dragged into a wide-scale war, which mirrors the warnings from Western elements against the continuation of the fighting and its escalation. In the Lebanese system, the reliance on UN Security Council Resolution 1701 as an anchor for restoring peace along the border is evident, while the opposition to Hezbollah even demands its full implementation. This involves pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River and disarming it. At the same time, there is an evident effort by international and regional parties to influence Hezbollah not to engage in a wide-scale war that will seriously damage Lebanon.
In response, Hezbollah is working vigorously to prevent any possibility of a settlement that would harm its status and its freedom of action within Lebanon and vis-à-vis Israel. As the fighting continues, it makes sure to coordinate with its partners in the axis of resistance (mainly Iran and Hamas); guarantees compensation to the Lebanese citizens affected by the fighting in Israel; works to prevent the implementation of Resolution 1701 or the adoption of changes to it which would harm it; and thwarts all attempts by the external mediators (the French Le Drian, the American Hochstein, and the envoys from Qatar and Saudi Arabia) to promote a solution that combines providing a response to the political vacuum in Lebanon (the appointment of a president, which has been delayed for over a year) and aid to Lebanon's economy and the peaceful restoration of the border with Israel based on Resolution 1701.
From Israel's point of view, in the absence of a political solution in the near future, a re-examination of the IDF's current strategy in fighting against Hezbollah, which is essentially reactive and proportionate, is required.