Hamas is a paramilitary terrorist organization and it has a large and advanced arsenal of weapons from various sources. Hamas smuggles improvised weapons from Iran via Sinai or through the Mediterranean Sea to the Gaza Strip, and it also self-produces munitions in local laboratories and workshops under Iranian guidance.
At the beginning of the war, Hamas was organized as a fighting force on both sea and land, in battalion and divisional frameworks of about 20,000–25,000 combatants, some of them trained (including in Iran), well equipped, and embedded in a network of combat, command and control tunnels at various depths and approximately 500–700 km long. This force was equipped with tens of thousands of light weapons, such as Kalashnikov assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, and large amounts of grenades, IEDs, and explosive devices. One source for producing those explosive devices is the IDF’s munitions that failed to detonate, as an investigative article in the New York Times recently revealed. It is known that some of the IDF’s munitions are old or expired, with a failure rate of around 15%. These sources also include large quantities of “dumb” bombs that are scattered throughout bombed-out areas of Gaza. For example, a 750-pound bomb (about 340 kg) that has not exploded can arm a considerable amount of rockets. According to the article, most of Hamas’s explosive devices in the “Swords of Iron” war were created from unexploded IDF munition, such as in the incident when Hamas detonated an explosive device, killing 10 IDF soldiers in December.
On October 7, the Hamas battalions were equipped with anti-tank weapons of the largest scale. These weapons included a variety of RPG rocket launchers and different types of deadly Kornet missiles, which pose a threat to tanks and other armored vehicles as well as to buildings where IDF forces are stationed. In terms of aerial threats, it is estimated that at the beginning of the war, Hamas had about 18,000–30,000 rockets and inaccurate missiles. Most of them are short-range—up to 10 km, medium range—up to 40 km, and a few are long-range—up to 160–250 km. Hamas also has an unknown number of UAVs and drones for photography, attack, or suicide aircrafts. After four months of fighting, Hamas had lost about 9,000–10,000 combatants and another 10,000 have been wounded and have left the circle of combat. In fact, about 75% of the regimental cadres have been eliminated; camps and headquarters, workshops and military production plants above and below ground have been destroyed; and the chain of command has largely been eliminated. Currently, Hamas’s fighting is carried out sporadically, as friction, and is not organized. The rockets and missile fire has also decreased significantly and is random and at a very limited scope than it was at the beginning of the fighting, due to the systematic destruction of the missiles, rockets, and production infrastructure, as well as the tight ground hold that prevents freedom of movement for the launching squads.
Hamas is a paramilitary terrorist organization and it has a large and advanced arsenal of weapons from various sources. Hamas smuggles improvised weapons from Iran via Sinai or through the Mediterranean Sea to the Gaza Strip, and it also self-produces munitions in local laboratories and workshops under Iranian guidance.
At the beginning of the war, Hamas was organized as a fighting force on both sea and land, in battalion and divisional frameworks of about 20,000–25,000 combatants, some of them trained (including in Iran), well equipped, and embedded in a network of combat, command and control tunnels at various depths and approximately 500–700 km long. This force was equipped with tens of thousands of light weapons, such as Kalashnikov assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, and large amounts of grenades, IEDs, and explosive devices. One source for producing those explosive devices is the IDF’s munitions that failed to detonate, as an investigative article in the New York Times recently revealed. It is known that some of the IDF’s munitions are old or expired, with a failure rate of around 15%. These sources also include large quantities of “dumb” bombs that are scattered throughout bombed-out areas of Gaza. For example, a 750-pound bomb (about 340 kg) that has not exploded can arm a considerable amount of rockets. According to the article, most of Hamas’s explosive devices in the “Swords of Iron” war were created from unexploded IDF munition, such as in the incident when Hamas detonated an explosive device, killing 10 IDF soldiers in December.
On October 7, the Hamas battalions were equipped with anti-tank weapons of the largest scale. These weapons included a variety of RPG rocket launchers and different types of deadly Kornet missiles, which pose a threat to tanks and other armored vehicles as well as to buildings where IDF forces are stationed. In terms of aerial threats, it is estimated that at the beginning of the war, Hamas had about 18,000–30,000 rockets and inaccurate missiles. Most of them are short-range—up to 10 km, medium range—up to 40 km, and a few are long-range—up to 160–250 km. Hamas also has an unknown number of UAVs and drones for photography, attack, or suicide aircrafts. After four months of fighting, Hamas had lost about 9,000–10,000 combatants and another 10,000 have been wounded and have left the circle of combat. In fact, about 75% of the regimental cadres have been eliminated; camps and headquarters, workshops and military production plants above and below ground have been destroyed; and the chain of command has largely been eliminated. Currently, Hamas’s fighting is carried out sporadically, as friction, and is not organized. The rockets and missile fire has also decreased significantly and is random and at a very limited scope than it was at the beginning of the fighting, due to the systematic destruction of the missiles, rockets, and production infrastructure, as well as the tight ground hold that prevents freedom of movement for the launching squads.