Since the resumption of fighting on the Lebanese border following the end of the ceasefire in Gaza (December 1), there has been an intense daily mini-war between Hezbollah and the IDF. During this period, Hezbollah took responsibility for over 150 attacks against Israeli targets in the area near the border. In tandem, the IDF too has raised the level of its operation, which includes a number of attacks every day, several times greater than those by Hezbollah, some of which even penetrated deep into the territory of southern Lebanon. The IDF harms the organization's presence along the border, causing considerable damage to its infrastructure and its operatives (as of December 25, Hezbollah announced the death of 125 of its operatives).
The escalation on the ground and the accompanying threats by Israel regarding its readiness to expand the fighting prompted increased efforts to achieve a ceasefire by political means. These have been led by the United States, with efforts to restrain both sides while striving to prevent a wide regional war that would complicate it as well, and France, the only Western country that maintains direct contacts with Hezbollah. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is the main anchor for the political dialogue with the parties because of the support for it by the Lebanese government and the fact that its implementation will provide an answer to the Israeli demand for the withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani River.
However, so far there has been no progress on the diplomatic track, and none is expected in the near future. The levers of political pressure on Hezbollah, which declares its intention to continue fighting as long as Israel continues the war against Hamas in Gaza, are extremely limited. It is difficult to see how Hezbollah, which is firmly rooted among the Shiite population in this area, can be pushed out of southern Lebanon by agreement, or how it can be persuaded to agree to improve the enforcement measures of Resolution 1701, without far-reaching permutations in its favor, which there is no chance that Israel will accept (such as the proposal attributed in the media to US mediator Amos Hochstein, which included an Israeli concession on disputed areas along the border). At the same time, Israel claims that the IDF strikes are bearing fruit, and that Hezbollah has begun to reduce the presence of Radwan forces along the border, although it is clear that in his upcoming speech (January 3), Nasrallah (who has refrained from speaking publicly for over a month) is expected to focus on the organization's achievements.
The conclusion that emerges is that in order to bring about a change in reality in favor of the return of the population evacuated from the Israeli communities to their homes in the north as soon as possible, the IDF must persist in its military activity in order to push the organization's operatives further away from the border and continue to harm Hezbollah’s capabilities and its supporters among the residents of southern Lebanon. The main factors that influence Hezbollah are a sense of real threat to its status and forces, as well as domestic pressures, especially from its supporters in southern Lebanon, once the harm inflicted on them is intolerable.
Since the resumption of fighting on the Lebanese border following the end of the ceasefire in Gaza (December 1), there has been an intense daily mini-war between Hezbollah and the IDF. During this period, Hezbollah took responsibility for over 150 attacks against Israeli targets in the area near the border. In tandem, the IDF too has raised the level of its operation, which includes a number of attacks every day, several times greater than those by Hezbollah, some of which even penetrated deep into the territory of southern Lebanon. The IDF harms the organization's presence along the border, causing considerable damage to its infrastructure and its operatives (as of December 25, Hezbollah announced the death of 125 of its operatives).
The escalation on the ground and the accompanying threats by Israel regarding its readiness to expand the fighting prompted increased efforts to achieve a ceasefire by political means. These have been led by the United States, with efforts to restrain both sides while striving to prevent a wide regional war that would complicate it as well, and France, the only Western country that maintains direct contacts with Hezbollah. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is the main anchor for the political dialogue with the parties because of the support for it by the Lebanese government and the fact that its implementation will provide an answer to the Israeli demand for the withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani River.
However, so far there has been no progress on the diplomatic track, and none is expected in the near future. The levers of political pressure on Hezbollah, which declares its intention to continue fighting as long as Israel continues the war against Hamas in Gaza, are extremely limited. It is difficult to see how Hezbollah, which is firmly rooted among the Shiite population in this area, can be pushed out of southern Lebanon by agreement, or how it can be persuaded to agree to improve the enforcement measures of Resolution 1701, without far-reaching permutations in its favor, which there is no chance that Israel will accept (such as the proposal attributed in the media to US mediator Amos Hochstein, which included an Israeli concession on disputed areas along the border). At the same time, Israel claims that the IDF strikes are bearing fruit, and that Hezbollah has begun to reduce the presence of Radwan forces along the border, although it is clear that in his upcoming speech (January 3), Nasrallah (who has refrained from speaking publicly for over a month) is expected to focus on the organization's achievements.
The conclusion that emerges is that in order to bring about a change in reality in favor of the return of the population evacuated from the Israeli communities to their homes in the north as soon as possible, the IDF must persist in its military activity in order to push the organization's operatives further away from the border and continue to harm Hezbollah’s capabilities and its supporters among the residents of southern Lebanon. The main factors that influence Hezbollah are a sense of real threat to its status and forces, as well as domestic pressures, especially from its supporters in southern Lebanon, once the harm inflicted on them is intolerable.