At the end of US President Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia, it is easier to point to Saudi achievements than to American gains – certainly in the short term.
In the Saudi view, the President's visit and the convening of Arab leaders in its territory gives it a significant political achievement that it will seek to leverage to improve its status & the status of its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is returning to center stage. This has a symbolic but also a practical aspect.
The main message President Biden sought to convey at the summit of leaders (GCC + 3) was that the United States is regaining its leadership role and even its role in regional mediation. The message strengthens the US-Arab partnership at the expense of China and Russia, who have sought to strengthen their hold on the region in recent years. This American message was met with skepticism on the part of the Arab regimes who are not convinced of the strategic change the United States seeks to present. It is uncertain they are persuaded that Washington has internalized their strategic distress, especially with regard to Iran, and that it is willing to invest in it. As they see it, this is an immediate US interest in the form of the need to moderate the price of oil.
In this context as well, the answer that the President received from the leaders of the Gulf states was partial and vague: we will increase oil production in accordance with the situation in the markets and the Opec+ decisions, to which we are committed. In general, the Gulf states have no interest in raising their oil production – they have dramatically increased oil revenues, which translates into lower deficits and economic prosperity in their countries.
The Saudis sought to jumpstart and rebuild their relations with the United States, while increasing security cooperation and accepting American guarantees in the Iranian context, as a condition for their cooperation in restraining China and possibly in increasing cooperation with Israel. In any event, they hold on to a sense of growing assets vis-à-vis the United States and a perception – albeit misguided –that the latter needs them more than they need it.
At the end of US President Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia, it is easier to point to Saudi achievements than to American gains – certainly in the short term.
In the Saudi view, the President's visit and the convening of Arab leaders in its territory gives it a significant political achievement that it will seek to leverage to improve its status & the status of its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is returning to center stage. This has a symbolic but also a practical aspect.
The main message President Biden sought to convey at the summit of leaders (GCC + 3) was that the United States is regaining its leadership role and even its role in regional mediation. The message strengthens the US-Arab partnership at the expense of China and Russia, who have sought to strengthen their hold on the region in recent years. This American message was met with skepticism on the part of the Arab regimes who are not convinced of the strategic change the United States seeks to present. It is uncertain they are persuaded that Washington has internalized their strategic distress, especially with regard to Iran, and that it is willing to invest in it. As they see it, this is an immediate US interest in the form of the need to moderate the price of oil.
In this context as well, the answer that the President received from the leaders of the Gulf states was partial and vague: we will increase oil production in accordance with the situation in the markets and the Opec+ decisions, to which we are committed. In general, the Gulf states have no interest in raising their oil production – they have dramatically increased oil revenues, which translates into lower deficits and economic prosperity in their countries.
The Saudis sought to jumpstart and rebuild their relations with the United States, while increasing security cooperation and accepting American guarantees in the Iranian context, as a condition for their cooperation in restraining China and possibly in increasing cooperation with Israel. In any event, they hold on to a sense of growing assets vis-à-vis the United States and a perception – albeit misguided –that the latter needs them more than they need it.