The agreements reached in the quadrilateral meeting held in Naqoura, attended by representatives from Lebanon, Israel, the United States, and France, reflect a new spirit in Israel–Lebanon relations. This follows the political shift in Lebanon with the appointment of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of the new government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was announced that three joint working groups would be established to discuss: (1) the withdrawal of the IDF from the five points it still holds along the border; (2) the release of Lebanese prisoners captured by the IDF during the war; and (3) the disputed points regarding the permanent border demarcation (the Blue Line set in 2000). Following the meeting, Israel agreed to release five out of the eleven Lebanese detainees in its custody as a goodwill gesture toward President Aoun.
The issues set for discussion are essentially the same ones that Hezbollah cites as key justifications for its existence as an independent military militia, claiming it is necessary for Lebanon’s defense and liberation from the Israeli threat. Since the ceasefire, Hezbollah has focused all its efforts on restoring its military capabilities. The organization has reluctantly allowed the Lebanese state to work toward achieving these goals while also issuing a veiled threat that if it fails, Hezbollah will resume its operations when and how it chooses.
Israel and the new leadership in Lebanon both share a common interest in maintaining the ceasefire and preventing Hezbollah’s recovery, both militarily and within Lebanon’s internal political system. Consequently, extracting Israeli concessions on these issues serves the Lebanese leadership in its internal struggle against Hezbollah. However, from Israel’s perspective, it is crucial not to overlook the limitations of the Lebanese state, which has so far avoided violent confrontations with Hezbollah, as well as the Lebanese army’s limited effectiveness in preventing Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon.
Given these circumstances, it is essential that Israel conditions discussions within the working groups on territorial matters, ensuring that its security needs take precedence. This requires distinguishing between withdrawing from positions seized during the war—feasible in the short term—and the more complex issue of permanently demarcating the land border.
In this context, Israel must:
Condition the IDF’s withdrawal from the five strategic points seized during the war on the Lebanese army completing its deployment throughout the area and demonstrating its ability and willingness to eliminate any other military presence in southern Lebanon. This should be reinforced by ensuring the IDF’s continued freedom of action against existing and emerging threats from Hezbollah.
Insist that the permanent demarcation of the land border, which entails Israeli concessions on disputed points, must be part of a comprehensive agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Such an agreement should, first and foremost, include a demand for Hezbollah’s complete disarmament alongside changes in official Israel–Lebanon relations
The agreements reached in the quadrilateral meeting held in Naqoura, attended by representatives from Lebanon, Israel, the United States, and France, reflect a new spirit in Israel–Lebanon relations. This follows the political shift in Lebanon with the appointment of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of the new government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was announced that three joint working groups would be established to discuss: (1) the withdrawal of the IDF from the five points it still holds along the border; (2) the release of Lebanese prisoners captured by the IDF during the war; and (3) the disputed points regarding the permanent border demarcation (the Blue Line set in 2000). Following the meeting, Israel agreed to release five out of the eleven Lebanese detainees in its custody as a goodwill gesture toward President Aoun.
The issues set for discussion are essentially the same ones that Hezbollah cites as key justifications for its existence as an independent military militia, claiming it is necessary for Lebanon’s defense and liberation from the Israeli threat. Since the ceasefire, Hezbollah has focused all its efforts on restoring its military capabilities. The organization has reluctantly allowed the Lebanese state to work toward achieving these goals while also issuing a veiled threat that if it fails, Hezbollah will resume its operations when and how it chooses.
Israel and the new leadership in Lebanon both share a common interest in maintaining the ceasefire and preventing Hezbollah’s recovery, both militarily and within Lebanon’s internal political system. Consequently, extracting Israeli concessions on these issues serves the Lebanese leadership in its internal struggle against Hezbollah. However, from Israel’s perspective, it is crucial not to overlook the limitations of the Lebanese state, which has so far avoided violent confrontations with Hezbollah, as well as the Lebanese army’s limited effectiveness in preventing Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon.
Given these circumstances, it is essential that Israel conditions discussions within the working groups on territorial matters, ensuring that its security needs take precedence. This requires distinguishing between withdrawing from positions seized during the war—feasible in the short term—and the more complex issue of permanently demarcating the land border.
In this context, Israel must:
Condition the IDF’s withdrawal from the five strategic points seized during the war on the Lebanese army completing its deployment throughout the area and demonstrating its ability and willingness to eliminate any other military presence in southern Lebanon. This should be reinforced by ensuring the IDF’s continued freedom of action against existing and emerging threats from Hezbollah.
Insist that the permanent demarcation of the land border, which entails Israeli concessions on disputed points, must be part of a comprehensive agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Such an agreement should, first and foremost, include a demand for Hezbollah’s complete disarmament alongside changes in official Israel–Lebanon relations