Saudi Arabia and France led last week’s UN General Assembly initiative to promote the recognition of a Palestinian state. The two countries are deepening their partnership beyond the Palestinian issue, in ways that serve mutual interests. Their joint diplomatic move on the Palestinian question illustrates the depth of coordination between them; its success could whet their appetite to expand involvement in other arenas relevant to Israel.
The roots of the rapprochement between Riyadh and Paris lie in France’s recognition, more than a decade ago, of Saudi Arabia’s central role in the region and the economic and strategic potential of the kingdom and its oil-producing neighbors. Since the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017, the trend has deepened, and ties tightened especially after 2021, due to Macron being among the few Western leaders willing to meet with Mohammed bin Salman following the Khashoggi murder—thus opening the door to political and practical cooperation.
Since then, mutual visits and declarations of a “shared vision for regional stability” have been accompanied by expanded security cooperation—arms sales, training, intelligence coordination—and intensified dialogue on various regional issues. A major step came in 2024 with the publication of a strategic partnership roadmap and the signing of a memorandum of understanding to establish the Strategic Partnership Council, providing a comprehensive framework for deepening relations beyond energy.
Paris is careful to emphasize a certain independence from Washington’s positions, especially on the Iranian nuclear issue, and is perceived by Riyadh as a pragmatic partner that is less sensitive to human rights issues. Another Saudi advantage is the absence of French demands to limit the kingdom’s ties with China—demands that accompany its relations with the United States.
Economically, Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” creates broad opportunities for cooperation with French companies and institutions in renewable energy, tourism, transportation, and technology. In July 2025, an agreement was signed in Paris to strengthen collaboration in cyber, counterterrorism, and crime prevention—a step that is tied to Saudi preparations for hosting Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup.
In the broader context, Riyadh leverages its closeness to Paris to signal to Washington that it has alternatives, aiming to elicit American flexibility. The Riyadh–Paris axis thus rests on overlapping security, economic, and political interests, on tight political dialogue, and on mutual willingness to show flexibility. Even if a ceiling still exists for this partnership, the trend is one of deepening and expansion.
Saudi Arabia and France led last week’s UN General Assembly initiative to promote the recognition of a Palestinian state. The two countries are deepening their partnership beyond the Palestinian issue, in ways that serve mutual interests. Their joint diplomatic move on the Palestinian question illustrates the depth of coordination between them; its success could whet their appetite to expand involvement in other arenas relevant to Israel.
The roots of the rapprochement between Riyadh and Paris lie in France’s recognition, more than a decade ago, of Saudi Arabia’s central role in the region and the economic and strategic potential of the kingdom and its oil-producing neighbors. Since the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017, the trend has deepened, and ties tightened especially after 2021, due to Macron being among the few Western leaders willing to meet with Mohammed bin Salman following the Khashoggi murder—thus opening the door to political and practical cooperation.
Since then, mutual visits and declarations of a “shared vision for regional stability” have been accompanied by expanded security cooperation—arms sales, training, intelligence coordination—and intensified dialogue on various regional issues. A major step came in 2024 with the publication of a strategic partnership roadmap and the signing of a memorandum of understanding to establish the Strategic Partnership Council, providing a comprehensive framework for deepening relations beyond energy.
Paris is careful to emphasize a certain independence from Washington’s positions, especially on the Iranian nuclear issue, and is perceived by Riyadh as a pragmatic partner that is less sensitive to human rights issues. Another Saudi advantage is the absence of French demands to limit the kingdom’s ties with China—demands that accompany its relations with the United States.
Economically, Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” creates broad opportunities for cooperation with French companies and institutions in renewable energy, tourism, transportation, and technology. In July 2025, an agreement was signed in Paris to strengthen collaboration in cyber, counterterrorism, and crime prevention—a step that is tied to Saudi preparations for hosting Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup.
In the broader context, Riyadh leverages its closeness to Paris to signal to Washington that it has alternatives, aiming to elicit American flexibility. The Riyadh–Paris axis thus rests on overlapping security, economic, and political interests, on tight political dialogue, and on mutual willingness to show flexibility. Even if a ceiling still exists for this partnership, the trend is one of deepening and expansion.