Since the outbreak of the direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—have been watching events unfold with growing concern. Their primary fear is that the current escalation will spill over into their territory, either through direct attacks or indirect damage to sensitive infrastructure, foreign military bases, or trade routes. Although none of these states support Iranian nuclearization and hope that the the Israeli–American strike will cause significant and long-term damage to Iran’s nuclear program, they worry that the cost of such an operation will be an Iranian counterattack targeting them.
In recent years—and even more so since the conflict began—the Gulf states have adopted an independent foreign policy aimed at projecting neutrality and avoiding automatic alignment with any camp. The condemnations voiced against the Israeli strikes in Iran, including by countries that signed the Abraham Accords, do not reflect solidarity with Tehran but rather an attempt to keep the fire away from their borders. These states want to be perceived as uninvolved, fully aware of Iran’s military superiority relative to their own capabilities, as well as their inability to withstand a full-scale attack alone. Accordingly, they have intensified diplomatic activity and mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to de-escalate tensions and maintain a neutral position.
Even before the American strike, the Gulf states urged Washington not to act directly against Iran from bases on their territory, preferring a limited, targeted operation that would not lead to regional escalation. They also conveyed messages to Israel, asking it to refrain from attacking Iran’s oil infrastructure, fearing an Iranian response that could target their own oil facilities. In many respects, the pinpoint American strike met these demands - at least initially.
Alongside diplomatic efforts, the Gulf states are raising their level of security preparedness: reinforcing air defense and interception systems, tightening military coordination with US forces, and preparing their civilian populations for scenarios of regional escalation. However, they understand that despite these preparations, their security ultimately depends on the willingness of the United States to deter Iran, to actively defend their territory in the event of an attack, and issue a clear message of retaliation for any aggression.
The recent events present a serious test for the Gulf states’ dual strategy—of reconciling with Iran on the one hand and deepening partnerships with the West on the other. If Iran chooses to escalate its response and target sites in the Gulf states, these states will be forced to make a strategic decision of whether to continue clinging to neutrality as much as possible or take an active role in shaping the new regional order. The temptation to leverage the situation and reposition themselves as key mediators exists but doing so could provoke Iranian suspicion and intensify the crisis. The Gulf states hope Iran’s response will be calculated, symbolic, and limited—one that preserves Iran’s sense of dignity but avoids dragging the United States into a broad retaliation or triggering a full-scale regional war. As long as such a response holds, the Gulf states will continue to cautiously navigate between Iran and the United States, seeking to remain on the sidelines.
Since the outbreak of the direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—have been watching events unfold with growing concern. Their primary fear is that the current escalation will spill over into their territory, either through direct attacks or indirect damage to sensitive infrastructure, foreign military bases, or trade routes. Although none of these states support Iranian nuclearization and hope that the the Israeli–American strike will cause significant and long-term damage to Iran’s nuclear program, they worry that the cost of such an operation will be an Iranian counterattack targeting them.
In recent years—and even more so since the conflict began—the Gulf states have adopted an independent foreign policy aimed at projecting neutrality and avoiding automatic alignment with any camp. The condemnations voiced against the Israeli strikes in Iran, including by countries that signed the Abraham Accords, do not reflect solidarity with Tehran but rather an attempt to keep the fire away from their borders. These states want to be perceived as uninvolved, fully aware of Iran’s military superiority relative to their own capabilities, as well as their inability to withstand a full-scale attack alone. Accordingly, they have intensified diplomatic activity and mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to de-escalate tensions and maintain a neutral position.
Even before the American strike, the Gulf states urged Washington not to act directly against Iran from bases on their territory, preferring a limited, targeted operation that would not lead to regional escalation. They also conveyed messages to Israel, asking it to refrain from attacking Iran’s oil infrastructure, fearing an Iranian response that could target their own oil facilities. In many respects, the pinpoint American strike met these demands - at least initially.
Alongside diplomatic efforts, the Gulf states are raising their level of security preparedness: reinforcing air defense and interception systems, tightening military coordination with US forces, and preparing their civilian populations for scenarios of regional escalation. However, they understand that despite these preparations, their security ultimately depends on the willingness of the United States to deter Iran, to actively defend their territory in the event of an attack, and issue a clear message of retaliation for any aggression.
The recent events present a serious test for the Gulf states’ dual strategy—of reconciling with Iran on the one hand and deepening partnerships with the West on the other. If Iran chooses to escalate its response and target sites in the Gulf states, these states will be forced to make a strategic decision of whether to continue clinging to neutrality as much as possible or take an active role in shaping the new regional order. The temptation to leverage the situation and reposition themselves as key mediators exists but doing so could provoke Iranian suspicion and intensify the crisis. The Gulf states hope Iran’s response will be calculated, symbolic, and limited—one that preserves Iran’s sense of dignity but avoids dragging the United States into a broad retaliation or triggering a full-scale regional war. As long as such a response holds, the Gulf states will continue to cautiously navigate between Iran and the United States, seeking to remain on the sidelines.