During the month of May, local elections were held in Lebanon—after several postponements—for the first time since 2016. The holding of the elections at this time, under new leadership, marks another step in President Aoun’s attempt to renew governance throughout the country and reflect progress toward a new era. Ahead of and during the elections, the new government and security agencies made notable efforts to ensure that they would take place lawfully and safely, and indeed, in the vast majority of municipalities, they were held without unusual incidents or significant violence. The results contained no surprises. Therefore, their main significance lies in their very occurrence, which signals an attempt to return to proper administration in the country.
The elections were held in four rounds, based on geographic division:
May 4 – Mount Lebanon Governorate
May 11 – Northern Lebanon and Akkar Governorate
May 18 – Baalbek, the Beqaa, and Beirut
May 24 – Southern Lebanon and Nabatieh
The voting results reflected, as in the past, the sectarian division and clan-based voting for dominant families. The reformist movements that emerged in recent years failed to gain local support. Voter turnout was slightly lower than in the previous elections, and in Southern Lebanon, turnout was especially low—even compared to the 2016 elections.
Hezbollah attributed great importance to the elections, aiming to demonstrate that it maintains public support. The organization made considerable efforts among the Shiite population to encourage voter turnout. However, it refrained from running independently and instead participated through a joint list named “Development and Loyalty,” alongside its sister Shiite movement, Amal, with pre-determined municipal heads and council members. This list won, as expected, a sweeping majority of municipalities in Shiite areas: in Southern Lebanon, Baalbek, Al-Hermel, and Shiite neighborhoods in Beirut (in half the municipalities in the Shiite areas of Southern Lebanon and in a significant portion of the councils in Baalbek Governorate, no elections were held at all due to the absence of opposing candidates to the Shiite joint list). Therefore, Hezbollah can claim that it preserved its support base.
In the major cities, the results reflected Lebanon’s familiar sectarian division. For example, in Beirut (21% turnout), a Christian mayor was elected (from a united list of all coalition parties). In Tripoli, a Sunni mayor was elected (following a contest between two Sunni lists and with no influence from the Islamist-jihadist movements active in the city). In Tyre, the Shiite joint list won, and in Sidon, a list from the Sunni Future Movement won. In the Christian areas, as expected, representatives of the three major parties won: the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb (Phalanges), and the Free Patriotic Movement—which won many municipalities and demonstrated that it still holds sway among the Christian public and maintains connections with leading families.
During the month of May, local elections were held in Lebanon—after several postponements—for the first time since 2016. The holding of the elections at this time, under new leadership, marks another step in President Aoun’s attempt to renew governance throughout the country and reflect progress toward a new era. Ahead of and during the elections, the new government and security agencies made notable efforts to ensure that they would take place lawfully and safely, and indeed, in the vast majority of municipalities, they were held without unusual incidents or significant violence. The results contained no surprises. Therefore, their main significance lies in their very occurrence, which signals an attempt to return to proper administration in the country.
The elections were held in four rounds, based on geographic division:
May 4 – Mount Lebanon Governorate
May 11 – Northern Lebanon and Akkar Governorate
May 18 – Baalbek, the Beqaa, and Beirut
May 24 – Southern Lebanon and Nabatieh
The voting results reflected, as in the past, the sectarian division and clan-based voting for dominant families. The reformist movements that emerged in recent years failed to gain local support. Voter turnout was slightly lower than in the previous elections, and in Southern Lebanon, turnout was especially low—even compared to the 2016 elections.
Hezbollah attributed great importance to the elections, aiming to demonstrate that it maintains public support. The organization made considerable efforts among the Shiite population to encourage voter turnout. However, it refrained from running independently and instead participated through a joint list named “Development and Loyalty,” alongside its sister Shiite movement, Amal, with pre-determined municipal heads and council members. This list won, as expected, a sweeping majority of municipalities in Shiite areas: in Southern Lebanon, Baalbek, Al-Hermel, and Shiite neighborhoods in Beirut (in half the municipalities in the Shiite areas of Southern Lebanon and in a significant portion of the councils in Baalbek Governorate, no elections were held at all due to the absence of opposing candidates to the Shiite joint list). Therefore, Hezbollah can claim that it preserved its support base.
In the major cities, the results reflected Lebanon’s familiar sectarian division. For example, in Beirut (21% turnout), a Christian mayor was elected (from a united list of all coalition parties). In Tripoli, a Sunni mayor was elected (following a contest between two Sunni lists and with no influence from the Islamist-jihadist movements active in the city). In Tyre, the Shiite joint list won, and in Sidon, a list from the Sunni Future Movement won. In the Christian areas, as expected, representatives of the three major parties won: the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb (Phalanges), and the Free Patriotic Movement—which won many municipalities and demonstrated that it still holds sway among the Christian public and maintains connections with leading families.