While the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria occurred at a breathtaking pace, when it comes to the future of Russia’s military bases in the country, all relevant players appear to have taken a pause—except, of course, for Russia itself. According to senior Russian diplomats, Moscow is engaged in intensive talks with the new authorities in Damascus to secure agreements on retaining its two bases in Syria. This is especially notable given the hasty withdrawal of forces belonging to Assad’s other ally, the regime in Tehran.
On December 12, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov reported “constructive” talks with the leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, stating that Russian forces were “invited by the Syrian authorities to fight terrorist organizations, a fight that is not yet over.” The indiscriminate bombings of Syrian civilians by Russian aircraft and the fact that, just a month ago, Russia still defined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization seem to have been conveniently forgotten in Moscow.
Bogdanov’s statement comes amid reports and images showing Russian forces relocating from forward positions in Syria to concentrate at their two main bases—the Tartus naval base (operational since 1971) and the Khmeimim airbase (operational since 2017). The contradiction between these two scenarios—complete evacuation versus retaining the two bases—underscores the unresolved nature, at least for now, of Russia’s presence in Syria. This ambiguity stems from an agreement reached during a meeting in Doha of Iranian, Russian, and Turkish representatives on December 6, which stipulated that rebels must refrain from targeting Russian military forces and their bases. It appears that this agreement has helped Moscow digest the bitter reality of Assad’s fall while mitigating its reputational damage as a result.
For Russia, losing its bases in Syria would represent a severe blow to its geopolitical ambitions. Beyond projecting power in the Middle East and elevating its international status, these bases have served as strategic logistical hubs for Russian operations in African nations, enhancing Moscow’s influence on the continent while undermining Western interests. A full evacuation of its bases would damage Russia’s regional standing and expose its inability to secure its allies or provide them with sustainable governance and economic alternatives.
The continued presence of Russia’s military bases, even in a limited capacity under the new government, poses significant risks to Israel. First, the opening of Middle Eastern airspace for the Israeli Air Force, following Israel’s Operation Arrow of Bashan, will remain incomplete as long as Russia maintains its air defense capabilities in Syria. Second, closer ties between Russia and the new Syrian government could lead to renewed dependency on Russian weapons systems and further intensify its adversarial stance toward Israel, a trend already evident in Kremlin-affiliated media, which accuse “Tel Aviv” of violating international law in Syria while downplaying Turkey’s central role in Assad’s downfall. Even more concerning, Russia may continue its subversive activities with long-standing partners, Iran and Hezbollah. According to recent assessments, advanced Russian weapons seized in Lebanon during Operation Northern Arrows were transferred to Hezbollah directly from the Tartus port. Moscow may resume similar activities under the cover of Syria’s ongoing chaos. Evacuating its bases from Syria would eliminate at least one source of instability and benefit the moderate forces in the region.
While the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria occurred at a breathtaking pace, when it comes to the future of Russia’s military bases in the country, all relevant players appear to have taken a pause—except, of course, for Russia itself. According to senior Russian diplomats, Moscow is engaged in intensive talks with the new authorities in Damascus to secure agreements on retaining its two bases in Syria. This is especially notable given the hasty withdrawal of forces belonging to Assad’s other ally, the regime in Tehran.
On December 12, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov reported “constructive” talks with the leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, stating that Russian forces were “invited by the Syrian authorities to fight terrorist organizations, a fight that is not yet over.” The indiscriminate bombings of Syrian civilians by Russian aircraft and the fact that, just a month ago, Russia still defined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization seem to have been conveniently forgotten in Moscow.
Bogdanov’s statement comes amid reports and images showing Russian forces relocating from forward positions in Syria to concentrate at their two main bases—the Tartus naval base (operational since 1971) and the Khmeimim airbase (operational since 2017). The contradiction between these two scenarios—complete evacuation versus retaining the two bases—underscores the unresolved nature, at least for now, of Russia’s presence in Syria. This ambiguity stems from an agreement reached during a meeting in Doha of Iranian, Russian, and Turkish representatives on December 6, which stipulated that rebels must refrain from targeting Russian military forces and their bases. It appears that this agreement has helped Moscow digest the bitter reality of Assad’s fall while mitigating its reputational damage as a result.
For Russia, losing its bases in Syria would represent a severe blow to its geopolitical ambitions. Beyond projecting power in the Middle East and elevating its international status, these bases have served as strategic logistical hubs for Russian operations in African nations, enhancing Moscow’s influence on the continent while undermining Western interests. A full evacuation of its bases would damage Russia’s regional standing and expose its inability to secure its allies or provide them with sustainable governance and economic alternatives.
The continued presence of Russia’s military bases, even in a limited capacity under the new government, poses significant risks to Israel. First, the opening of Middle Eastern airspace for the Israeli Air Force, following Israel’s Operation Arrow of Bashan, will remain incomplete as long as Russia maintains its air defense capabilities in Syria. Second, closer ties between Russia and the new Syrian government could lead to renewed dependency on Russian weapons systems and further intensify its adversarial stance toward Israel, a trend already evident in Kremlin-affiliated media, which accuse “Tel Aviv” of violating international law in Syria while downplaying Turkey’s central role in Assad’s downfall. Even more concerning, Russia may continue its subversive activities with long-standing partners, Iran and Hezbollah. According to recent assessments, advanced Russian weapons seized in Lebanon during Operation Northern Arrows were transferred to Hezbollah directly from the Tartus port. Moscow may resume similar activities under the cover of Syria’s ongoing chaos. Evacuating its bases from Syria would eliminate at least one source of instability and benefit the moderate forces in the region.