The war in Gaza began as Arab countries were strengthening their economic and diplomatic ties with Turkey and Iran. The motives behind this détente remain unchanged, with a tactical need to reduce tensions and focus on domestic affairs. The war further justified the rapprochement, as it prevented potential harm to the regional players. As Israel’s isolation in the region increases following the war, the rest of the region is strengthening their ties.
As a result, these Arab countries have chosen to remain neutral and not take sides in the war, especially as long as Hamas has not been defeated. Their aim is to dismantle Hamas in order to undermine the Iranian axis and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, they fear the potential increase in unrest and regional instability. These regimes are encouraged by the strong support the United States provides to Israel and hope for a similar response if they come under attack.
Just as the “pragmatic” Arab countries view détente as strategically beneficial, they also maintain relations with Israel, despite the perceived decline in Israel’s “equity” and its diminished security and political power compared to the past. The calls from the Arab street to sever relations with Israel have also led these countries to distance themselves from Israel and show solidarity with the Palestinians. However, despite the fear of unrest, which could lead to destabilization, Saudi Arabia is keeping the door open for a conditional normalization with Israel, as the Saudis don’t want to be seen by the United States as rejecting peace and are also seeking various incentives in return.
Before October 7, Israel almost had an agreement with Saudi Arabia. Similar to the regional détente, the motivations of the parties involved in normalization have remained the same. What has changed since the war is the price that the parties are required to pay—Israel in terms of significant concessions to the Palestinians, and the Saudis in their involvement in managing and reconstructing Gaza. It’s in Israel’s interest to include a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia as part of the Saudi involvement in the Palestinian arena and its commitment to managing and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip. Israel should change its current approach and seize this opportunity.
The war in Gaza began as Arab countries were strengthening their economic and diplomatic ties with Turkey and Iran. The motives behind this détente remain unchanged, with a tactical need to reduce tensions and focus on domestic affairs. The war further justified the rapprochement, as it prevented potential harm to the regional players. As Israel’s isolation in the region increases following the war, the rest of the region is strengthening their ties.
As a result, these Arab countries have chosen to remain neutral and not take sides in the war, especially as long as Hamas has not been defeated. Their aim is to dismantle Hamas in order to undermine the Iranian axis and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, they fear the potential increase in unrest and regional instability. These regimes are encouraged by the strong support the United States provides to Israel and hope for a similar response if they come under attack.
Just as the “pragmatic” Arab countries view détente as strategically beneficial, they also maintain relations with Israel, despite the perceived decline in Israel’s “equity” and its diminished security and political power compared to the past. The calls from the Arab street to sever relations with Israel have also led these countries to distance themselves from Israel and show solidarity with the Palestinians. However, despite the fear of unrest, which could lead to destabilization, Saudi Arabia is keeping the door open for a conditional normalization with Israel, as the Saudis don’t want to be seen by the United States as rejecting peace and are also seeking various incentives in return.
Before October 7, Israel almost had an agreement with Saudi Arabia. Similar to the regional détente, the motivations of the parties involved in normalization have remained the same. What has changed since the war is the price that the parties are required to pay—Israel in terms of significant concessions to the Palestinians, and the Saudis in their involvement in managing and reconstructing Gaza. It’s in Israel’s interest to include a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia as part of the Saudi involvement in the Palestinian arena and its commitment to managing and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip. Israel should change its current approach and seize this opportunity.