In parallel with the war in Gaza, this past week saw a significant increase in fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Lebanese border. Hezbollah has expanded the fighting by increasing the scope of its attacks (although it continues to operate mainly against military targets); extending the range of launched rockets; and using new means (launching bombs carrying a large amount of explosive material and expanding the use of attack UAVs), as Nasrallah boasted in his speech of November 11. Nasrallah was propelled to escalate both because of the criticism leveled at him (following his speech on November 3), mainly from Hamas and its supporters, for Hezbollah's limited contribution to the fight against the IDF in Gaza, and because of the need to respond to the IDF's actions on the Lebanese border, which have exacted a heavy price from the organization, with at least 72 dead from among its ranks and damage to its infrastructure. The charge of the IDF hitting uninvolved civilians even led to the organization's admission of firing rockets at a civilian target in Israel for the first time (November 6).
In its responses, Israel contributes to the expansion of the conflict by deepening the range of attacks on the organization's infrastructure (up to a distance of 40 km) and by threatening the severe consequences expected for Lebanon should a broad war erupt. Such threats have been sounded by the political and military leaderships, including the Minister of Defense, who hinted at the possibility of an Israeli initiative to start a war, when he said at the press conference (November 11): "If you hear that we attacked in Beirut, you will understand that Hezbollah has crossed the red line."
Despite the escalation on the ground, for now it appears that Nasrallah continues to strive to keep the fighting below the threshold of war, as can be understood from between the lines in his most recent speech. Nasrallah explained once again that the fighting in the north is intended to serve Hamas and pin the IDF force to the north, as a secondary arena and as an additional component of the overall pressure from all partners in the axis of resistance for the benefit of the struggle against Israel. Meantime, Nasrallah maintains ambiguity regarding what he envisions for the future and strives to preserve the strategy of equations that he propounds.
On the other hand, the risk for Israel of an unplanned deterioration in the north, in addition to the need to change the reality along the border by pushing Hezbollah back to allow the evacuated population to return to their homes, requires that an urgent decision be made. The security cabinet and the military and political establishments must now deal with the possibilities of changing the way the military operates on the northern front, and at the same time, consider ways to advance the political framework required to create a new reality along the Lebanese border, and not wait for "the day after" of what is expected to be a long war in Gaza.
In parallel with the war in Gaza, this past week saw a significant increase in fighting between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Lebanese border. Hezbollah has expanded the fighting by increasing the scope of its attacks (although it continues to operate mainly against military targets); extending the range of launched rockets; and using new means (launching bombs carrying a large amount of explosive material and expanding the use of attack UAVs), as Nasrallah boasted in his speech of November 11. Nasrallah was propelled to escalate both because of the criticism leveled at him (following his speech on November 3), mainly from Hamas and its supporters, for Hezbollah's limited contribution to the fight against the IDF in Gaza, and because of the need to respond to the IDF's actions on the Lebanese border, which have exacted a heavy price from the organization, with at least 72 dead from among its ranks and damage to its infrastructure. The charge of the IDF hitting uninvolved civilians even led to the organization's admission of firing rockets at a civilian target in Israel for the first time (November 6).
In its responses, Israel contributes to the expansion of the conflict by deepening the range of attacks on the organization's infrastructure (up to a distance of 40 km) and by threatening the severe consequences expected for Lebanon should a broad war erupt. Such threats have been sounded by the political and military leaderships, including the Minister of Defense, who hinted at the possibility of an Israeli initiative to start a war, when he said at the press conference (November 11): "If you hear that we attacked in Beirut, you will understand that Hezbollah has crossed the red line."
Despite the escalation on the ground, for now it appears that Nasrallah continues to strive to keep the fighting below the threshold of war, as can be understood from between the lines in his most recent speech. Nasrallah explained once again that the fighting in the north is intended to serve Hamas and pin the IDF force to the north, as a secondary arena and as an additional component of the overall pressure from all partners in the axis of resistance for the benefit of the struggle against Israel. Meantime, Nasrallah maintains ambiguity regarding what he envisions for the future and strives to preserve the strategy of equations that he propounds.
On the other hand, the risk for Israel of an unplanned deterioration in the north, in addition to the need to change the reality along the border by pushing Hezbollah back to allow the evacuated population to return to their homes, requires that an urgent decision be made. The security cabinet and the military and political establishments must now deal with the possibilities of changing the way the military operates on the northern front, and at the same time, consider ways to advance the political framework required to create a new reality along the Lebanese border, and not wait for "the day after" of what is expected to be a long war in Gaza.