The Israeli fear of a convergence of arenas was validated with the launch of cruise missiles and UAVs from Yemen, and their interception by US destroyers in the Red Sea and interceptors on Saudi soil. This thwarted attack by the Houthis demonstrated Iran’s regional “operational concept” and the idea of Iranian hegemony.
This was primarily a show of capability, and not full participation in the fighting. The Houthis are restrained by a number of elements. First, the Yemeni arena is about 2,000 km from Eilat, which dictates mainly the ability to carry out only certain operations in the air and at sea (e.g., impeding freedom of navigation in the Red Sea) and also makes them easier to foil. Second, despite the Houthis' desire to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians and the other “axis” members, the degree of Iranian influence on them is relatively low compared to that which Tehran, for example, has on Hezbollah. In addition, the Houthis have no interest in a major flare-up that would endanger the achievements they scored following the understandings reached with the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the ceasefire that has been in place since April 2022. Furthermore, by their action they risk a sharp US (and Israeli?) reaction against them, which they seek to avoid.
Let there be no mistake: the Houthis are a threat, and given the distance and the complexity of the Yemeni arena, it is difficult to strike back at them. However, the Yemeni theater must be put in proportion. The degree of damage and risk from this theater, which could be reignited with the IDF ground entry into the Gaza Strip, does not compare to the degree of potential damage from Hezbollah, Hamas, and even from additional emissaries of Iran, located in Syria and/or Iraq.
The Houthis can claim a certain achievement in the cognitive realm. In their action, they also “paid a debt” to the axis members and Iran, and especially to Hamas, which may have expected more active participation in the fighting by the other axis members. In addition, the interception of the launches from Yemen illustrates not only the limitations of axis power, but the effectiveness of regional action under the CENTCOM umbrella to confront the threat of missiles and UAVs from Iran and its proxies.
The Israeli fear of a convergence of arenas was validated with the launch of cruise missiles and UAVs from Yemen, and their interception by US destroyers in the Red Sea and interceptors on Saudi soil. This thwarted attack by the Houthis demonstrated Iran’s regional “operational concept” and the idea of Iranian hegemony.
This was primarily a show of capability, and not full participation in the fighting. The Houthis are restrained by a number of elements. First, the Yemeni arena is about 2,000 km from Eilat, which dictates mainly the ability to carry out only certain operations in the air and at sea (e.g., impeding freedom of navigation in the Red Sea) and also makes them easier to foil. Second, despite the Houthis' desire to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians and the other “axis” members, the degree of Iranian influence on them is relatively low compared to that which Tehran, for example, has on Hezbollah. In addition, the Houthis have no interest in a major flare-up that would endanger the achievements they scored following the understandings reached with the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the ceasefire that has been in place since April 2022. Furthermore, by their action they risk a sharp US (and Israeli?) reaction against them, which they seek to avoid.
Let there be no mistake: the Houthis are a threat, and given the distance and the complexity of the Yemeni arena, it is difficult to strike back at them. However, the Yemeni theater must be put in proportion. The degree of damage and risk from this theater, which could be reignited with the IDF ground entry into the Gaza Strip, does not compare to the degree of potential damage from Hezbollah, Hamas, and even from additional emissaries of Iran, located in Syria and/or Iraq.
The Houthis can claim a certain achievement in the cognitive realm. In their action, they also “paid a debt” to the axis members and Iran, and especially to Hamas, which may have expected more active participation in the fighting by the other axis members. In addition, the interception of the launches from Yemen illustrates not only the limitations of axis power, but the effectiveness of regional action under the CENTCOM umbrella to confront the threat of missiles and UAVs from Iran and its proxies.