About a week after the start of the incidents along the Lebanese border that began at Hezbollah’s initiative in the wake of the IDF activity in Gaza, a further escalation in the scope and intensity of the incidents is evident, along with an increase in the number of casualties (October 14-15). Hezbollah continues to allow the Palestinian elements to operate against Israel from southern Lebanon. In the background, coordination continues between Hezbollah and its partners in the “resistance front,” headed by Iran (whose Foreign Minister is visiting the region) and the leaderships of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It seems that Hezbollah's main goal, beyond showing solidarity with the Palestinians and demonstrating its willingness to take part to advance Iran's interests, is to influence Israel's military activity in the Gaza Strip, and first and foremost to deter the IDF from ground entry into Gaza by signaling that this could lead to the opening of another front in the north.
Despite the escalation in recent days, Hezbollah's attacks are still localized and contained, and the organization continues to adhere to the response equation against the IDF. For example, the organization is careful to claim that its shooting is aimed mainly at military targets and takes care that the number of casualties on both sides is equal. An example of this is Hezbollah’s attack on the cameras and technical equipment installed on the Israeli fence in response to several attacks by the IDF on Hezbollah observation towers along the border.
The nature of Hezbollah's activities reflects Nasrallah's desire to maintain the rules of the game below the threshold of war. This is due to a series of restraining factors familiar from the past: the difficult situation in Lebanon; the severe damage expected following the IDF response, and the Iranian desire to preserve its strength. New considerations were added to these factors following the war in Gaza: the loss of the element of surprise; the IDF's readiness and preparedness for any scenario following the mass mobilization of reserves and the evacuation of communities (Israel announced the evacuation of 28 communities near the fence); and the unequivocal demonstration of support by the United States alongside Israel, while threatening Hezbollah and Iran not to join the war.
Nonetheless, it is expected that Hezbollah will strive to maintain a “hot zone” in the north throughout the war, and there may be further escalations in the military conflict along the Lebanese border, depending on the development of the campaign in the south – and especially if and when the IDF launches a ground incursion into Gaza. Thus, at this stage, the possibility of the opening of another broad front in the north at the initiative of one of the parties or as a result of continued deterioration cannot be ruled out entirely.
About a week after the start of the incidents along the Lebanese border that began at Hezbollah’s initiative in the wake of the IDF activity in Gaza, a further escalation in the scope and intensity of the incidents is evident, along with an increase in the number of casualties (October 14-15). Hezbollah continues to allow the Palestinian elements to operate against Israel from southern Lebanon. In the background, coordination continues between Hezbollah and its partners in the “resistance front,” headed by Iran (whose Foreign Minister is visiting the region) and the leaderships of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It seems that Hezbollah's main goal, beyond showing solidarity with the Palestinians and demonstrating its willingness to take part to advance Iran's interests, is to influence Israel's military activity in the Gaza Strip, and first and foremost to deter the IDF from ground entry into Gaza by signaling that this could lead to the opening of another front in the north.
Despite the escalation in recent days, Hezbollah's attacks are still localized and contained, and the organization continues to adhere to the response equation against the IDF. For example, the organization is careful to claim that its shooting is aimed mainly at military targets and takes care that the number of casualties on both sides is equal. An example of this is Hezbollah’s attack on the cameras and technical equipment installed on the Israeli fence in response to several attacks by the IDF on Hezbollah observation towers along the border.
The nature of Hezbollah's activities reflects Nasrallah's desire to maintain the rules of the game below the threshold of war. This is due to a series of restraining factors familiar from the past: the difficult situation in Lebanon; the severe damage expected following the IDF response, and the Iranian desire to preserve its strength. New considerations were added to these factors following the war in Gaza: the loss of the element of surprise; the IDF's readiness and preparedness for any scenario following the mass mobilization of reserves and the evacuation of communities (Israel announced the evacuation of 28 communities near the fence); and the unequivocal demonstration of support by the United States alongside Israel, while threatening Hezbollah and Iran not to join the war.
Nonetheless, it is expected that Hezbollah will strive to maintain a “hot zone” in the north throughout the war, and there may be further escalations in the military conflict along the Lebanese border, depending on the development of the campaign in the south – and especially if and when the IDF launches a ground incursion into Gaza. Thus, at this stage, the possibility of the opening of another broad front in the north at the initiative of one of the parties or as a result of continued deterioration cannot be ruled out entirely.