The national security of a democratic regime derives from a delicate balance in the relations between all government authorities. Whatever the point of balance may be, the central idea is that no authority has absolute power, and that each of the government authorities operates in a wide area, while subtly controlled and supervised by the other government authorities.
In the State of Israel, not only does the executive authority have residual power, but the legislative authority is controlled, to a large extent, by the executive authority. As such, the executive authority is the most powerful among all government branches, and it is not supervised, in any way, by the legislative authority.
Especially in the absence of a constitution, even more so in the absence of reinforced fundamental laws, the existence of independent and effective judicial oversight over the executive authority is necessary. Moreover, in the absence of administrative legislation that establishes standards for the exercise of governmental power by the government, and especially standards for limiting this power, there is no escaping the development of administrative law in a judicial manner, as has been the case in the State of Israel since its establishment. In this context, the standard of reasonableness, and more precisely the standard for the extreme lack of reasonableness, is a critical administrative tool for judicial oversight of the executive authority.
Eliminating the reasonableness standard means the creation of a governmental gravitational field so strong in the executive authority that no individual and/or authority can escape it, and all are swallowed up in it. It is a governmental black hole that concentrates all governmental power, literally, in the hands of the government. Such concentration of power in the hands of one authority in itself undermines the ground under the regime base that underlies the national security of the State of Israel.
The national security of a democratic regime derives from a delicate balance in the relations between all government authorities. Whatever the point of balance may be, the central idea is that no authority has absolute power, and that each of the government authorities operates in a wide area, while subtly controlled and supervised by the other government authorities.
In the State of Israel, not only does the executive authority have residual power, but the legislative authority is controlled, to a large extent, by the executive authority. As such, the executive authority is the most powerful among all government branches, and it is not supervised, in any way, by the legislative authority.
Especially in the absence of a constitution, even more so in the absence of reinforced fundamental laws, the existence of independent and effective judicial oversight over the executive authority is necessary. Moreover, in the absence of administrative legislation that establishes standards for the exercise of governmental power by the government, and especially standards for limiting this power, there is no escaping the development of administrative law in a judicial manner, as has been the case in the State of Israel since its establishment. In this context, the standard of reasonableness, and more precisely the standard for the extreme lack of reasonableness, is a critical administrative tool for judicial oversight of the executive authority.
Eliminating the reasonableness standard means the creation of a governmental gravitational field so strong in the executive authority that no individual and/or authority can escape it, and all are swallowed up in it. It is a governmental black hole that concentrates all governmental power, literally, in the hands of the government. Such concentration of power in the hands of one authority in itself undermines the ground under the regime base that underlies the national security of the State of Israel.