On January 11, the Russian Army’s Chief of Staff, four-star general Valery Gerasimov, was appointed to command the joint Russian forces in the "special military operation" (the official Russian definition of the war in Ukraine). Three deputies were also appointed, one of whom is four-star general Sergei Surovikin, who normally serves as the commander of the air and space forces, and three months ago was himself appointed as the commander of the Russian joint forces of the operation (for the first time publicly since the beginning of the war; until then the public command comprised generals who commanded different fronts separately). Surovikin was indeed “demoted” in his war position, but at the field level he remains as he was - subordinate to the Chief of Staff.
There are two possible leading explanations for this appointment:
1. A bureaucratic arrangement with regard to management of war efforts to improve the cooperation between the forces and the various branches (to the point of thinking about "broader moves"). This follows the ostensible learning from past mistakes and an attempt to optimize synchronization and coordination between the various forces (both the various forces and the troops whose subordination to the General Staff is unclear – armies of the Donbas republics and all mercenary groups, such as Wagner).
2. A struggle between the centers of influence in the security elites, and in particular between the classic military establishment (Defense Minister Shoigu, Gerasimov, and several other generals) and the owner of the private military company Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who in recent months has positioned himself as the most effective commander of the war. Gerasimov’s appointment comes against the background of an ongoing public struggle between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense, including criticism of the management of the combat efforts, to the point of disputes about the credit due to Wagner soldiers in the combat centers. In addition, Surovikin is seen as a Prigozhin ally in the General Staff (one of the few that Prigozhin did not criticize) - and he was the one who was pushed out of his position.
The truth may be somewhere in the middle. In this move, Putin shows that he is returning control to the senior command in order to maintain a unified chain of command (the commander of the air force and the commander of the ground force – are his deputies for the campaign) as well as to offset the strengthening of an anti-establishment actor. Is there a fundamental change here compared to the past? Yes, but first and foremost under the direct responsibility of the Chief of Staff, who from now on will himself be accountable to the President.
On January 11, the Russian Army’s Chief of Staff, four-star general Valery Gerasimov, was appointed to command the joint Russian forces in the "special military operation" (the official Russian definition of the war in Ukraine). Three deputies were also appointed, one of whom is four-star general Sergei Surovikin, who normally serves as the commander of the air and space forces, and three months ago was himself appointed as the commander of the Russian joint forces of the operation (for the first time publicly since the beginning of the war; until then the public command comprised generals who commanded different fronts separately). Surovikin was indeed “demoted” in his war position, but at the field level he remains as he was - subordinate to the Chief of Staff.
There are two possible leading explanations for this appointment:
1. A bureaucratic arrangement with regard to management of war efforts to improve the cooperation between the forces and the various branches (to the point of thinking about "broader moves"). This follows the ostensible learning from past mistakes and an attempt to optimize synchronization and coordination between the various forces (both the various forces and the troops whose subordination to the General Staff is unclear – armies of the Donbas republics and all mercenary groups, such as Wagner).
2. A struggle between the centers of influence in the security elites, and in particular between the classic military establishment (Defense Minister Shoigu, Gerasimov, and several other generals) and the owner of the private military company Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who in recent months has positioned himself as the most effective commander of the war. Gerasimov’s appointment comes against the background of an ongoing public struggle between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense, including criticism of the management of the combat efforts, to the point of disputes about the credit due to Wagner soldiers in the combat centers. In addition, Surovikin is seen as a Prigozhin ally in the General Staff (one of the few that Prigozhin did not criticize) - and he was the one who was pushed out of his position.
The truth may be somewhere in the middle. In this move, Putin shows that he is returning control to the senior command in order to maintain a unified chain of command (the commander of the air force and the commander of the ground force – are his deputies for the campaign) as well as to offset the strengthening of an anti-establishment actor. Is there a fundamental change here compared to the past? Yes, but first and foremost under the direct responsibility of the Chief of Staff, who from now on will himself be accountable to the President.