In November 2024, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark accused the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3 of deliberately sabotaging two undersea communication cables in the Baltic Sea: one between Germany and Finland, and another between Sweden and Lithuania. While the ship’s owners cooperated with the Baltic states’ investigation, they claimed the damage was unintentional. Earlier, in October 2023, sabotage was discovered on an Estonian communication cable connecting the country to Sweden and Finland. Estonian authorities suspected a Hong Kong-owned cargo ship in this case. The investigation is still ongoing, with the Chinese side again asserting its innocence.
Similarly, in December 2024, Estonia accused a Russian tank carrier of damaging communication and power cables between Finland and Estonia. These three incidents have raised concerns among regional countries that this Russia may be employed a new strategy to disrupt the communication of nations hostile to Russia or supportive of Ukraine, with Chinese vessels potentially acting under Russian direction.
Alongside these incidents in the Baltic Sea, Taiwan has also accused China of two cases of sabotage in its territorial waters. In February 2023, two undersea cables near Taiwan’s Matsu Islands were severed, eliciting no response from the Chinese side. On January 3, 2025, a communication cable near Keelung City in northern Taiwan was damaged. The Taiwanese coast guard blamed a Hong Kong-owned trade vessel for the incident, but due to weather conditions, the ship couldn’t be inspected. The company denied responsibility, citing insufficient evidence. While the Matsu Islands incident was deemed accidental, Taiwanese officials perceived the latest case as part of a new Chinese strategy to target Taiwan’s communication infrastructure amid escalating tensions.
Undersea cable infrastructure is responsible for transmitting more than 95% of global communications, from internet services to economic data. Preserving its integrity is therefore critical for the continuous functioning of the global economy and the international system as a whole. The recent sabotage incidents highlight how easily this infrastructure can be damaged, prompting the European Union to explore alternative solutions, such as low-earth orbit satellites. Meanwhile, the investigations continue into whether these attacks reflect a deliberate strategy by Russia and China.
In November 2024, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark accused the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3 of deliberately sabotaging two undersea communication cables in the Baltic Sea: one between Germany and Finland, and another between Sweden and Lithuania. While the ship’s owners cooperated with the Baltic states’ investigation, they claimed the damage was unintentional. Earlier, in October 2023, sabotage was discovered on an Estonian communication cable connecting the country to Sweden and Finland. Estonian authorities suspected a Hong Kong-owned cargo ship in this case. The investigation is still ongoing, with the Chinese side again asserting its innocence.
Similarly, in December 2024, Estonia accused a Russian tank carrier of damaging communication and power cables between Finland and Estonia. These three incidents have raised concerns among regional countries that this Russia may be employed a new strategy to disrupt the communication of nations hostile to Russia or supportive of Ukraine, with Chinese vessels potentially acting under Russian direction.
Alongside these incidents in the Baltic Sea, Taiwan has also accused China of two cases of sabotage in its territorial waters. In February 2023, two undersea cables near Taiwan’s Matsu Islands were severed, eliciting no response from the Chinese side. On January 3, 2025, a communication cable near Keelung City in northern Taiwan was damaged. The Taiwanese coast guard blamed a Hong Kong-owned trade vessel for the incident, but due to weather conditions, the ship couldn’t be inspected. The company denied responsibility, citing insufficient evidence. While the Matsu Islands incident was deemed accidental, Taiwanese officials perceived the latest case as part of a new Chinese strategy to target Taiwan’s communication infrastructure amid escalating tensions.
Undersea cable infrastructure is responsible for transmitting more than 95% of global communications, from internet services to economic data. Preserving its integrity is therefore critical for the continuous functioning of the global economy and the international system as a whole. The recent sabotage incidents highlight how easily this infrastructure can be damaged, prompting the European Union to explore alternative solutions, such as low-earth orbit satellites. Meanwhile, the investigations continue into whether these attacks reflect a deliberate strategy by Russia and China.