Ten months have passed since the last parliamentary elections in Iraq, and during this period the Iraqi government institutions have been enmeshed in the most complicated political crisis since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and the establishment of the democratic constitution. The attempts to form a new government came to a dead end due to a confrontation that became more and more intense within the "Shiite House," between Muqtada Sadr – who became the leader of the largest faction in the elections and rejects foreign interference in Iraq's internal affairs, especially by Iran – and the "coordination framework," which comprises pro-Iranian representatives and other Shiite politicians, whose common thread is their connection to the Iranian regime.
Sadr announced that he would only agree to the formation of a government based on the support of a majority in parliament and would fight corruption. He rejected outright the proposal of his opponents to establish, as was customary in previous years, a "consensus government" based on the distribution of ministers and positions between parties in order to achieve a consensus among them – a method that has fostered a corrupt ruling elite. It soon became clear that the composition of the current parliament forces Sadr and his opponents to reach some kind of compromise for the purpose of forming the government – but on the other hand, none of the parties are willing to cede their principles. The attempts by Iranian regime representatives, including the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Esmail Qaani, to resolve the crisis through dialogue – came to naught.
In the midst of the crisis, Sadr decided to "break the rules" and turn to a popular protest in order to put pressure on his opponents. First he announced the withdrawal of his faction from parliament, and then also his withdrawal from political life. In parallel, the protest measures of his supporters worsened, culminating in the most violent dynamic of the confrontation: violent incidents and even exchanges of fire in the compound of the government institutions in Baghdad (the Green Zone), between protesters and militia activists headed by Sadr and armed forces that confronted them and reportedly included units of the Iraqi army and activists of the pro-Iranian militias. At the end of the blood-filled day, which also marked other districts, there were dozens of dead, and the winds calmed down only after Sadr called on his supporters to retreat.
The prolonged failure of the talks to form the government and the outbreak of a violent conflict among the members of the Shia community in Iraq – who, as the majority group, were ostensibly supposed to benefit the most from the democratic system – testify to the weakness and internal problems of the Iraqi state today, in the political and security reality created after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. Government institutions have difficulty enforcing the law among parties and militias, and institutional corruption has led the country to an economic depression. The popular longing for reform, which led to a wave of socio-economic protest about three years ago, is the tool with which the Shiite leader Sadr seeks to strengthen his base of support and his position, against his domestic rivals. The result is a deepening of the internal rift among the Shiites in Iraq.
Ten months have passed since the last parliamentary elections in Iraq, and during this period the Iraqi government institutions have been enmeshed in the most complicated political crisis since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and the establishment of the democratic constitution. The attempts to form a new government came to a dead end due to a confrontation that became more and more intense within the "Shiite House," between Muqtada Sadr – who became the leader of the largest faction in the elections and rejects foreign interference in Iraq's internal affairs, especially by Iran – and the "coordination framework," which comprises pro-Iranian representatives and other Shiite politicians, whose common thread is their connection to the Iranian regime.
Sadr announced that he would only agree to the formation of a government based on the support of a majority in parliament and would fight corruption. He rejected outright the proposal of his opponents to establish, as was customary in previous years, a "consensus government" based on the distribution of ministers and positions between parties in order to achieve a consensus among them – a method that has fostered a corrupt ruling elite. It soon became clear that the composition of the current parliament forces Sadr and his opponents to reach some kind of compromise for the purpose of forming the government – but on the other hand, none of the parties are willing to cede their principles. The attempts by Iranian regime representatives, including the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Esmail Qaani, to resolve the crisis through dialogue – came to naught.
In the midst of the crisis, Sadr decided to "break the rules" and turn to a popular protest in order to put pressure on his opponents. First he announced the withdrawal of his faction from parliament, and then also his withdrawal from political life. In parallel, the protest measures of his supporters worsened, culminating in the most violent dynamic of the confrontation: violent incidents and even exchanges of fire in the compound of the government institutions in Baghdad (the Green Zone), between protesters and militia activists headed by Sadr and armed forces that confronted them and reportedly included units of the Iraqi army and activists of the pro-Iranian militias. At the end of the blood-filled day, which also marked other districts, there were dozens of dead, and the winds calmed down only after Sadr called on his supporters to retreat.
The prolonged failure of the talks to form the government and the outbreak of a violent conflict among the members of the Shia community in Iraq – who, as the majority group, were ostensibly supposed to benefit the most from the democratic system – testify to the weakness and internal problems of the Iraqi state today, in the political and security reality created after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. Government institutions have difficulty enforcing the law among parties and militias, and institutional corruption has led the country to an economic depression. The popular longing for reform, which led to a wave of socio-economic protest about three years ago, is the tool with which the Shiite leader Sadr seeks to strengthen his base of support and his position, against his domestic rivals. The result is a deepening of the internal rift among the Shiites in Iraq.