The UAVs, which have been frequently used by the Shiite axis since the beginning of the Swords of Iron War, pose a threat to civilians and to both the IDF forces and their facilities. Their use by Hezbollah has already caused damage to lives and property and may cause significant delays in offensive maneuvers in the future.
Hezbollah has several types of UAVs, including those used for photography, suicide UAVs, attack UAVs, and dummy ones. The difficulty of intercepting various types of UAVs using radar-guided missiles or fighter jets stems from the slow speed of this aircraft, its small dimensions, its low-flight profile and variable routes, its hiding and evasion capabilities while exploiting complex topography, and its low radar cross section.
The IDF deals with UAV weapons in two parallel ways: the first is the offensive way; that is, damage to storage warehouses, launch routes, and operator teams. This is conditional on the continuous development of intelligence collection and decoding capabilities in real time. The second way is defensive and includes several measures that can be activated simultaneously, apart from interceptions using Iron Dome or fighter jets.
The first measure in the defensive category is barrel weapons with a high rate of fire such as M61 Vulcan cannons (Gatling gun) with 6 barrels that have a rate of over 1,000 rounds per minute per barrel, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns made in Germany or the United States, combined with detection systems and control and tracking, or the use of anti-aircraft shoulder missiles such as the “Stinger.”
The second measure is the laser weapon, which is not yet operational. The laser cannon with an estimated power of 100 kilowatts may cause a mechanical failure in the UAV and intercept it. It should be noted that the laser cannon has operational limitations that arise from environmental conditions, limitations of the effective strike distance, and the required staying time to cause damage to the target. For this reason, the laser cannon is not an ultimate solution to the problem, but it is only an additional level in the existing layers of protection.
A third measure currently under operational development in the United States is a cannon that produces microwave radiation at high outputs. The purpose of this radiation is to “cook” the electronic mechanisms of the UAVs. The microwave radiation is dispersed in space so that it can damage swarms of drones—in combination with AI applications for tracking, detection, and identification.
The fourth measure is control of the spectral dimension, which enables control over the communication channels of the UAVs with their operators and their disruption.
In conclusion, the UAV is not a game-changing weapon and its application on the battlefield is not a surprise. This is a technical issue that can be solved by various technological means, some of which are operationally implemented, and some of which will be implemented in the near future, and their economic cost is 40–50 times lower than the current means.
The UAVs, which have been frequently used by the Shiite axis since the beginning of the Swords of Iron War, pose a threat to civilians and to both the IDF forces and their facilities. Their use by Hezbollah has already caused damage to lives and property and may cause significant delays in offensive maneuvers in the future.
Hezbollah has several types of UAVs, including those used for photography, suicide UAVs, attack UAVs, and dummy ones. The difficulty of intercepting various types of UAVs using radar-guided missiles or fighter jets stems from the slow speed of this aircraft, its small dimensions, its low-flight profile and variable routes, its hiding and evasion capabilities while exploiting complex topography, and its low radar cross section.
The IDF deals with UAV weapons in two parallel ways: the first is the offensive way; that is, damage to storage warehouses, launch routes, and operator teams. This is conditional on the continuous development of intelligence collection and decoding capabilities in real time. The second way is defensive and includes several measures that can be activated simultaneously, apart from interceptions using Iron Dome or fighter jets.
The first measure in the defensive category is barrel weapons with a high rate of fire such as M61 Vulcan cannons (Gatling gun) with 6 barrels that have a rate of over 1,000 rounds per minute per barrel, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns made in Germany or the United States, combined with detection systems and control and tracking, or the use of anti-aircraft shoulder missiles such as the “Stinger.”
The second measure is the laser weapon, which is not yet operational. The laser cannon with an estimated power of 100 kilowatts may cause a mechanical failure in the UAV and intercept it. It should be noted that the laser cannon has operational limitations that arise from environmental conditions, limitations of the effective strike distance, and the required staying time to cause damage to the target. For this reason, the laser cannon is not an ultimate solution to the problem, but it is only an additional level in the existing layers of protection.
A third measure currently under operational development in the United States is a cannon that produces microwave radiation at high outputs. The purpose of this radiation is to “cook” the electronic mechanisms of the UAVs. The microwave radiation is dispersed in space so that it can damage swarms of drones—in combination with AI applications for tracking, detection, and identification.
The fourth measure is control of the spectral dimension, which enables control over the communication channels of the UAVs with their operators and their disruption.
In conclusion, the UAV is not a game-changing weapon and its application on the battlefield is not a surprise. This is a technical issue that can be solved by various technological means, some of which are operationally implemented, and some of which will be implemented in the near future, and their economic cost is 40–50 times lower than the current means.