The coup in Sudan is the culmination of the long-running internal power struggles between assorted elements in the military and civilian leaderships, and it is too early to assess where the country is headed. From the Israeli vantage, it seems that the events of recent days are expected at the very least to postpone the signing ceremony of the official peace agreement, which was expected to take place in the coming weeks in Washington, and to slow down further the already tentative normalization process between the countries. In the past year, this process amounted to the repeal of the boycott law of Israel, security delegations, and a single meeting between ministers on both sides.
The Abraham Accords are not at the center of the dispute between rival Sudanese camps, which disagree on various issues even among themselves. Israel can draw some encouragement from the fact that following the coup, the balance of power is now leaning in favor of the military wing, headed by Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, which so far has been the address for most of Israel’s connections to Sudan. This wing is close to the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and is expected to adhere to the peace strategy. On the other hand, the United States – which with Sudan signed the Abraham in January 2021 Accords and was expected to reward it with economic incentives – was quick to announce following the coup a freeze in the $750 million economic aid package and a situation assessment regarding the normalization efforts.
In retrospect, it is unfortunate that Jerusalem and Washington were not able to anchor the initial peace declaration with Sudan in an official agreement over the past year, and weave a memorandum of understanding and cooperation agreements around it, similar to those made some time ago with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Yet even if the coup in Sudan does not ultimately hurt the normalization process, it can serve as a reminder to Israeli decision makers about the risks inherent in agreements with unstable regimes. The Sudanese public, which has suffered for many years under dictatorial rule, does not automatically support any of the government's wings, civilian or military, making it difficult for them to mobilize political and public support for weighty political moves, let alone implement them.
The coup in Sudan is the culmination of the long-running internal power struggles between assorted elements in the military and civilian leaderships, and it is too early to assess where the country is headed. From the Israeli vantage, it seems that the events of recent days are expected at the very least to postpone the signing ceremony of the official peace agreement, which was expected to take place in the coming weeks in Washington, and to slow down further the already tentative normalization process between the countries. In the past year, this process amounted to the repeal of the boycott law of Israel, security delegations, and a single meeting between ministers on both sides.
The Abraham Accords are not at the center of the dispute between rival Sudanese camps, which disagree on various issues even among themselves. Israel can draw some encouragement from the fact that following the coup, the balance of power is now leaning in favor of the military wing, headed by Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, which so far has been the address for most of Israel’s connections to Sudan. This wing is close to the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and is expected to adhere to the peace strategy. On the other hand, the United States – which with Sudan signed the Abraham in January 2021 Accords and was expected to reward it with economic incentives – was quick to announce following the coup a freeze in the $750 million economic aid package and a situation assessment regarding the normalization efforts.
In retrospect, it is unfortunate that Jerusalem and Washington were not able to anchor the initial peace declaration with Sudan in an official agreement over the past year, and weave a memorandum of understanding and cooperation agreements around it, similar to those made some time ago with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Yet even if the coup in Sudan does not ultimately hurt the normalization process, it can serve as a reminder to Israeli decision makers about the risks inherent in agreements with unstable regimes. The Sudanese public, which has suffered for many years under dictatorial rule, does not automatically support any of the government's wings, civilian or military, making it difficult for them to mobilize political and public support for weighty political moves, let alone implement them.