The change of leadership in Syria opens a new arena of regional interest and competition, where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may once again find themselves in rivalry with Turkey and Qatar and in competition with each other.
The Saudis and Emiratis reluctantly accept the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa, just as they recently accepted Assad’s regime. However, while Riyadh demonstrates pragmatism in its relations with the new regime—and was the first destination for the new Syrian foreign minister’s visit abroad—Abu Dhabi seems more apprehensive about his orientation.
The success of the new Syrian regime and the stabilization of the country are important to them, partly because it would make it harder for Iran to restore its presence in Syria. At the same time, they seek to prevent Syria from becoming a part of an Islamic axis led by Turkey and Qatar, which could undermine their stability and jeopardize their status. Senior Advisor to the President of the UAE Anwar Gargash openly expressed Abu Dhabi’s concern about the new rulers’ affiliation with al-Qaeda and noted that the Middle East has experienced the “brutality” of such Islamist forces.
The Saudis and Emiratis have experience dealing with Islamist forces in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Sudan. However, for now, the main arena for their influence remains economic: rebuilding war-torn Syria is estimated to cost around half a trillion dollars. Al-Sharaa desperately needs foreign investments, especially after the cessation of Russian–Iranian aid. While Turkey and Qatar have an advantage due to their previous ties with the new regime, Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess the economic power that can serve as a counterbalance.
Indeed, shortly after the new regime took control in Syria, senior officials from both sides met, and it was reported that Saudi Arabia began supplying oil to Syria instead of Iran. Qatar agreed to rehabilitate the ports damaged by Israel as well as the energy industries. For their part, the Turks announced they would reconsider an old plan to establish a natural gas pipeline across Syria, connecting Qatar to Turkey and reducing gas transportation costs from Gulf states to Europe, which is eager to replace its dependence on Russian gas.
The development of these initiatives may influence the regional alignment and the policies of the Islamist regime, as well as the regional balance of power. Additionally, they may impact Israel, particularly regarding a gas pipeline that could compete with Israeli gas exports. However, like the other plans, these initiatives remain far from realization, depending on the stability of the new Syria.
The change of leadership in Syria opens a new arena of regional interest and competition, where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may once again find themselves in rivalry with Turkey and Qatar and in competition with each other.
The Saudis and Emiratis reluctantly accept the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa, just as they recently accepted Assad’s regime. However, while Riyadh demonstrates pragmatism in its relations with the new regime—and was the first destination for the new Syrian foreign minister’s visit abroad—Abu Dhabi seems more apprehensive about his orientation.
The success of the new Syrian regime and the stabilization of the country are important to them, partly because it would make it harder for Iran to restore its presence in Syria. At the same time, they seek to prevent Syria from becoming a part of an Islamic axis led by Turkey and Qatar, which could undermine their stability and jeopardize their status. Senior Advisor to the President of the UAE Anwar Gargash openly expressed Abu Dhabi’s concern about the new rulers’ affiliation with al-Qaeda and noted that the Middle East has experienced the “brutality” of such Islamist forces.
The Saudis and Emiratis have experience dealing with Islamist forces in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Sudan. However, for now, the main arena for their influence remains economic: rebuilding war-torn Syria is estimated to cost around half a trillion dollars. Al-Sharaa desperately needs foreign investments, especially after the cessation of Russian–Iranian aid. While Turkey and Qatar have an advantage due to their previous ties with the new regime, Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess the economic power that can serve as a counterbalance.
Indeed, shortly after the new regime took control in Syria, senior officials from both sides met, and it was reported that Saudi Arabia began supplying oil to Syria instead of Iran. Qatar agreed to rehabilitate the ports damaged by Israel as well as the energy industries. For their part, the Turks announced they would reconsider an old plan to establish a natural gas pipeline across Syria, connecting Qatar to Turkey and reducing gas transportation costs from Gulf states to Europe, which is eager to replace its dependence on Russian gas.
The development of these initiatives may influence the regional alignment and the policies of the Islamist regime, as well as the regional balance of power. Additionally, they may impact Israel, particularly regarding a gas pipeline that could compete with Israeli gas exports. However, like the other plans, these initiatives remain far from realization, depending on the stability of the new Syria.