Until yesterday, all Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel—using the “Palestine-2” missile model—had failed. The projectiles were intercepted far from Israeli borders by Israel’s Arrow defense systems and the American THAAD system. As a result, aside from the disruption to Israeli civilians, no physical damage was caused. However, yesterday’s impact near Ben Gurion Airport changed the equation and exposed a well-known truth: In defense, there is no such thing as 100% success.
Unlike previous instances, the Houthis did not specify the missile type used in this latest launch. Still, the Israeli security establishment assesses that it wasn’t a game-changing or advanced missile but rather a technical failure in the interception systems. One possible explanation for the failure is the missile’s limited maneuvering capability, enabled by vector-thrust propulsion technology—giving the warhead a degree of freedom to evade interceptors.
It’s important to remember that the Houthis possess an advanced arsenal of ballistic missiles, mostly of Iranian origin, some of which have been locally modified. Their arsenal includes hundreds of short-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missiles (such as the Emad, Qadr, and Khorramshahr) and dozens of long-range missiles (ranging from 1,700 to 2,000 km), such as the Shahab-3, Sejjil, and Palestine-2—some of which are based on the Iranian Fateh-110 missile and use solid fuel.
In addition, the Houthis possess a cruise missile array (such as the Soumar) and an impressive fleet of loitering suicide drones. The most notable among them are the Samad-3 and Samad-4, classified as autonomous loitering UAVs with payload capacities of 30–40 kg of explosives and an estimated range of 2,000–2,500 km.
The missiles launched from Yemen toward Israel follow a ballistic trajectory, making them interceptable by the Arrow systems and the THAAD system, either near or outside the atmosphere, at altitudes of 100–150 km. It’s worth remembering that the most effective way to intercept ballistic missiles is during the early boost phase or while in midcourse, outside the atmosphere—far from the intended target. These were the types of interceptions recently carried out by the Israeli Air Force.
An interception at a late stage—above Israeli territory—is, of course, preferable to the missile’s warhead reaching its target, especially considering that it may carry hundreds of kilograms of explosives. However, such an interception is not optimal. The high-speed collision between the interceptor and the target missile generates debris or fragments with extremely high kinetic energy, resulting in widespread and random dispersion—some fragments can weigh dozens of kilograms. This is also the reason for the recommended 10-minute stay in protected areas following an alert.
It is important to remember that while Israel has effective multi-layered defense systems, they are not airtight. Strict adherence to safety protocols and Home Front Command instructions, combined with technological superiority, will ensure maximum security for the country’s citizens.
Until yesterday, all Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel—using the “Palestine-2” missile model—had failed. The projectiles were intercepted far from Israeli borders by Israel’s Arrow defense systems and the American THAAD system. As a result, aside from the disruption to Israeli civilians, no physical damage was caused. However, yesterday’s impact near Ben Gurion Airport changed the equation and exposed a well-known truth: In defense, there is no such thing as 100% success.
Unlike previous instances, the Houthis did not specify the missile type used in this latest launch. Still, the Israeli security establishment assesses that it wasn’t a game-changing or advanced missile but rather a technical failure in the interception systems. One possible explanation for the failure is the missile’s limited maneuvering capability, enabled by vector-thrust propulsion technology—giving the warhead a degree of freedom to evade interceptors.
It’s important to remember that the Houthis possess an advanced arsenal of ballistic missiles, mostly of Iranian origin, some of which have been locally modified. Their arsenal includes hundreds of short-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missiles (such as the Emad, Qadr, and Khorramshahr) and dozens of long-range missiles (ranging from 1,700 to 2,000 km), such as the Shahab-3, Sejjil, and Palestine-2—some of which are based on the Iranian Fateh-110 missile and use solid fuel.
In addition, the Houthis possess a cruise missile array (such as the Soumar) and an impressive fleet of loitering suicide drones. The most notable among them are the Samad-3 and Samad-4, classified as autonomous loitering UAVs with payload capacities of 30–40 kg of explosives and an estimated range of 2,000–2,500 km.
The missiles launched from Yemen toward Israel follow a ballistic trajectory, making them interceptable by the Arrow systems and the THAAD system, either near or outside the atmosphere, at altitudes of 100–150 km. It’s worth remembering that the most effective way to intercept ballistic missiles is during the early boost phase or while in midcourse, outside the atmosphere—far from the intended target. These were the types of interceptions recently carried out by the Israeli Air Force.