The decision of the political-security cabinet for the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, followed by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement, has provoked angry reactions in Cairo. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry has accused Netanyahu of thwarting efforts to achieve a ceasefire and being responsible for the expected escalation of war in the region.
The harsh Egyptian criticism reflects Cairo’s desire to stop the war and its frustration with failed efforts to mediate a ceasefire, as well as the importance it attaches to the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing.
In the previous decade, the border between Sinai and Gaza transformed from a source of rampant terrorism in northern Sinai into a lever of political and economic influence that helped Cairo stabilize the security situation in its territory, while offering incentives and deterrents to Hamas. The Rafah crossing was opened more broadly for the passage of goods, people, humanitarian aid, and construction materials, but apparently also for weapons and/or dual-use materials that helped strengthen Hamas militarily.
Egypt opposes Israel’s remaining in the route for several reasons: fears that a temporary Israeli presence will become permanent and erode Egypt’s position; a demand for the implementation of the disengagement agreements as stipulated in the military annex to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, limiting the scope of IDF forces in the route to four battalions; an aspiration for the Palestinian Authority to return to the Rafah crossing subject to the “crossings agreement”; fear of shooting spilling over into Egypt and increasing friction between the IDF and the Egyptian security forces.
Public opinion also plays a role in Egypt’s considerations: it fears being seen as an accomplice in promoting the new border arrangements in the Gaza Strip, especially as it is not yet clear what goals Israel seeks in the “day after the war”—occupation of Gaza and a permanent Israeli presence or evacuation and a possible return of the Palestinian Authority.
The solution to the current crisis and the establishment of stable and secure arrangements in the Gaza Strip require both Jerusalem and Cairo to set aside their political and populist considerations. They need to leverage the fruitful dialogue that has existed for many years between the security establishments of the two countries in order to restore trust and advance the many strategic interests they share.
The decision of the political-security cabinet for the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, followed by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement, has provoked angry reactions in Cairo. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry has accused Netanyahu of thwarting efforts to achieve a ceasefire and being responsible for the expected escalation of war in the region.
The harsh Egyptian criticism reflects Cairo’s desire to stop the war and its frustration with failed efforts to mediate a ceasefire, as well as the importance it attaches to the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing.
In the previous decade, the border between Sinai and Gaza transformed from a source of rampant terrorism in northern Sinai into a lever of political and economic influence that helped Cairo stabilize the security situation in its territory, while offering incentives and deterrents to Hamas. The Rafah crossing was opened more broadly for the passage of goods, people, humanitarian aid, and construction materials, but apparently also for weapons and/or dual-use materials that helped strengthen Hamas militarily.
Egypt opposes Israel’s remaining in the route for several reasons: fears that a temporary Israeli presence will become permanent and erode Egypt’s position; a demand for the implementation of the disengagement agreements as stipulated in the military annex to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, limiting the scope of IDF forces in the route to four battalions; an aspiration for the Palestinian Authority to return to the Rafah crossing subject to the “crossings agreement”; fear of shooting spilling over into Egypt and increasing friction between the IDF and the Egyptian security forces.
Public opinion also plays a role in Egypt’s considerations: it fears being seen as an accomplice in promoting the new border arrangements in the Gaza Strip, especially as it is not yet clear what goals Israel seeks in the “day after the war”—occupation of Gaza and a permanent Israeli presence or evacuation and a possible return of the Palestinian Authority.
The solution to the current crisis and the establishment of stable and secure arrangements in the Gaza Strip require both Jerusalem and Cairo to set aside their political and populist considerations. They need to leverage the fruitful dialogue that has existed for many years between the security establishments of the two countries in order to restore trust and advance the many strategic interests they share.