Morr Link

In August 2017, the Israeli-German comedian and activist Shahak Shapira spray-painted tweets containing hate speech on the pavement in front of Twitter’s European headquarters in Hamburg. Shapira had previously reported those tweets to Twitter because of their harmful content. The social media network, however, refused to delete them, citing its free speech policy. The tweets Shapira painted on the street and sidewalk contained messages such as “Let’s unite and gas some Jews again. Those were good times,” “Another bunch of Kanaken [a German slur for people from the MENA region] arrived. Did they miss the exit to Auschwitz???,” or “Niggers are a plague.”1 Since social media networks emerged two decades ago, the spread of antisemitic, racist, misogynistic, homophobic, or otherwise hateful content on them has been a cause for concern.2 Social media platforms opened new paths for spreading hate as users benefit from the (perceived) anonymity and, thus, the (perceived) immunity from legal repercussions.

Following the October 7 attack, there has been a significant surge in antisemitic expressions in Arab discourse. It involved the demonization of Jews in religious terms, the propagation of conspiracy theories alleging, among other things, the existence of Jewish control over global media, and narratives that deny or distort the scope and nature of the war crimes committed by Hamas.

Compounding the uncertainty regarding the future of Gaza on the day after the war, there are significant gaps between Israel and Egypt. How can these gaps be bridged?

How has the war in Gaza affected Israel-Morocco relations, and what should be done to protect these important bilateral relations?

Ever since Israel’s normalization agreement with Morocco was signed within the framework of the Abraham Accords, relations between the countries have developed rapidly. Nonetheless, a major obstacle remained: Israeli recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Now that this controversial obstacle has been removed, the question arises: does Israel’s move yield more benefit or damage?

The Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP27), held in Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2022, cast a spotlight on Egypt and its commitment to environmental reform. Yet while previous indications of potential cooperation between Israel and Egypt on environmental issues appeared promising, only some initiatives have so far reached the implementation stage. Although Israel and Egypt share many environmental interests, the dialogue between them is limited; notwithstanding the logic of joining forces and tackling joint environmental issues together, actual collaboration has not yielded the necessary response to the urgent needs. A study of three areas—water and food security, blue economy, and gas and renewable energies—indicates that shared mutual interests by themselves are not enough to expand the environmental ties between Israel and Egypt, and a further set of supporting conditions is needed to help overcome the impeding obstacles. This article examines Egyptian and Israeli environmental policies and explores past and current environmental collaboration between the two countries. It analyzes the elements affecting the development of this collaboration and proposes policy recommendations toward its further expansion.