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INSS Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin presented the main points of the annual strategic assessment for Israel for 2021 at the 14th Annual International Conference.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yadlin opened his review by underscoring the State of Israel’s overarching objectives: “to strengthen Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure, prosperous, and just state that is at peace with its neighbors.” He went on to describe the national security balance as it developed in 2020.
In the positive column of Israel’s national security balance sheet for 2020 were several important developments. The Abraham Accords were signed – “a historic breakthrough in relations between Israel and Arab countries – the potential for a warm peace, with no Palestinian veto.” He added that “this year was also relatively quiet on Israel’s borders, since Israel’s direct enemies were hit relatively hard by the COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying economic crisis.” Yadlin recalled that early in 2020 Qasem Soleimani was killed and late in the year Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was killed – two generals in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who, respectively, led the efforts that are most threatening to Israel: Iranian entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon and proxy warfare throughout the Middle East, and its military nuclear program.
At the same time, in 2020 the national security balance deteriorated on five levels: (1) there is an ongoing political crisis in Israel, which deeply undermines public trust in government institutions, social solidarity, and national resilience; (2) the COVID-19 pandemic has created a multidimensional crisis – health, economic and societal – that amplified the damage caused by the political crisis; (3) although Iran did not withdraw from the nuclear agreement, it has violated it systematically, and at the end of 2020 was closer to the nuclear threshold than at the start of the year; (4) there is ongoing erosion of Israel’s qualitative military edge – vis-à-vis Iran, which is acquiring technologies that were previously only available to Israel; and vis-à-vis Arab states in the region, which can acquire high quality arms from the United States pursuant to the Abraham Accords, and beyond; and (5) the end of the Trump administration marks the end of four years in which Israel had full political backing from the United States: the policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, Trump’s pro-Israel peace plan, and a shift in the region’s political paradigm.
Yadlin stressed that due to Israel’s political paralysis, there is no approved budget, and there have been frequent ministerial changes in the Defense Ministry (four ministers in two years, and the fifth is on the way). In addition, “Israel’s military buildup effort has suffered, defense doctrines and defense policy are outdated, and the IDF has been operating without an approved multi-year plan.”
In view of these developments, Yadlin stressed that “at the outset of 2021, Israel must set itself some important objectives: (1) internal economic and social recovery once we can see the light at the end of the pandemic tunnel; (2) assessments of further Iranian nuclear progress and entrenchment in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; (3) a response to the escalating challenge of Hezbollah, particularly in the context of the precise missile project; (4) establishment of solid, robust relations with the Biden administration and preservation of the strong strategic alliance with the United States; (5) expansion of the circle of peace and normalization between Israel and its neighbors; and (6) strengthened military and technological advantages.
Against this background, Yadlin listed the Institute’s main policy recommendations:
- The Military Threat from Iran and its Allies
- Against Iran’s efforts to achieve military nuclear capability, Israel must prepare for expected talks between the Biden administration and the international community with Iran, and define its essential interests in the framework of a deal that improves the 2015 JCPOA. Strengthening the agreement should focus on a significant extension of the sunset clauses, “anytime, anywhere” inspections, and greater restrictions on research and development. There is also a need for a “parallel agreement” between Israel and the US on joint policy against Iran in its regional activity, and a coordinated strategy to handle its creeping nuclearization. At the same time, Israel must retain a credible military option against Iran and reach an understanding with the US regarding the conditions for military action to frustrate Iran’s progress to a nuclear weapon.
- Israel must continue to act against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, and against the precision missile project Iran is advancing in Lebanon and the region. As part of the “campaign between wars,” methods, theaters, and the rate of operations and the interface between them must be reviewed continuously.
- The IDF must be prepared, by force buildup and operative defensive and offensive plans, for the possibility of war on two fronts – the “northern war,” as the main benchmark threat, and the southern war, as the secondary threat, after many years in which the Israel and the Israeli public were familiar with conflicts on one front: the Gaza Strip or Lebanon. It is important to correct public expectations about the features of a future war and its possible outcomes. At the same time, there must be a political and security effort to prevent the war.
- The International and Regional Arena
- Israel should formulate a policy that is adapted to the new United States administration and adopt an approach toward it that is non-confrontational, and takes into consideration the ideology, values, and red lines of both sides. It is important to talk with the Biden administration in order to limit possible disagreements and find common interests (with the emphasis on the challenges posed by Iran and Hezbollah, Israel’s relations with China, preservation of the United States’ technological superiority and Israel’s qualitative edge, and reference to the Palestinian issue).
- Israel should adapt its policy to the current era of great power competition in the COVID and post-COVID eras, strive for a “technological innovation alliance” with the United States, and manage its relations with China, in coordination with the US administration and while taking American sensitivities into consideration. It is necessary to improve risk management with respect to China. Regarding Russia, Israel should keep the channels of communication open, to help maintain the freedom of operation that Moscow permits Israel in Syria, and to the extent possible, also the de-confliction with it – despite different interests and opposing positions in relation to Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinian issue. In addition, Israel should attempt to improve its relations with the European countries.
- Israel must act to expand the normalization trend with pragmatic Arab and Muslim countries, chief among them Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The processes with Sudan and Morocco have not been completed, and it is important to ensure that in return for what they received from the United States they do indeed normalize relations. Now that Israel has already played the “suspending the annexation card,” it is important to integrate Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority into regional partnerships, and leverage normalization to repair relations with Jordan. Turkey is not a military threat, and with the challenges it poses regarding Israel’s support of the Temple Mount and its support for Hamas, it maintains extensive economic relations with Israel. Relations with Turkey should leverage the position of the Biden administration in order to improve the relations between the countries.
- The Palestinian Arena
- The Palestinians’ traditional leverage and means of pressuring Israel have lost some of their power: Arab support for the Palestinians has weakened, and they have been denied veto power over normalization between Israel and Arab countries. Within the Palestinian arena itself there is some recognition that the violent struggle against Israel is not effective and even harmful. However, the Palestinians may well try to renew the “political intifada” and promote their campaign against Israel in the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- It is Israel’s interest to maintain the Jewish and democratic character of the State of Israel and avoid deterioration into a one-state reality. Therefore, Israel should try to revive the political process and advance a political arrangement with the Palestinians. If progress in this direction is not possible, Israel should formulate and implement a policy that maintains options and improves conditions for future progress without compromising on security issues. Under the current circumstances, Israel should strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and strive toward “transitional arrangements” that create the conditions for a two-state reality (INSS Plan). It is important to leverage the change of administrations in the United States and regional normalization for renewing the political process with the Palestinians, which – even if it does not succeed – will grant legitimacy to transitional arrangements and will aid in their implementation.
- While emphasizing that the Palestinian Authority is Israel’s partner for dialogue, Israel should designate Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip for the time being and achieve a long-term ceasefire with it, in return for improving the condition of Gaza’s civilian population and infrastructure, while making efforts to curb Hamas’s military buildup. If Israel is nevertheless drawn into a conflict, the IDF must inflict a very heavy blow on the organization’s military wing and the other terrorist organizations.
- And in the Internal Arena
- High priority must be given to professional and decentralized management of all aspects of the COVID-19 crisis – health, economic, societal. It is imperative that as soon as possible after the elections a state budget is prepared, with a concentrated national effort for economic and social recovery, to bring the various sectors closer together, and establish a mechanism and patterns of action to deal with complex crises that are not purely security-related. Israel must do its best to reinforce public trust in the government, law enforcement, the courts, the police, and the IDF.
- The IDF is suffering from the political crisis and uncertainty over resources, so that it is unable to plan and prioritize its force buildup activities and preparations for future challenges. The IDF needs a multi-year plan within the budgetary limitations of the COVID-19 crisis. Israel must implement a procurement plan with the US aid, since vital decisions in this context have been postponed for three years. It is important to distance the IDF and the entire security establishment from the political struggle in Israel.
- Israel’s qualitative military edge is a core component of its security. It is vital to agree with the United States on rules and plans to maintain this qualitative military and technological edge, and to reinforce Israel’s relative edge in the cyber realm and artificial intelligence; advanced communications infrastructures must be promoted all over the country, with the emphasis on linking the periphery to the center.
- World Jewry: The growing gap between Israel and the Jewish communities around the world, which are a strategic asset for Israel, requires the renewed formulation of a shared vision and honest dialogue to bring about an improvement in the relationship and to increase mutual trust. Following the deep crises that Jewish communities abroad have experienced in recent years – dilemmas of identity, identification with the State of Israel, assimilation, antisemitism, and increasing violence, as well as financial decline – Israel, as the national home of the Jewish people, must take steps that reflect its responsibility for their situation and their destiny.
In conclusion, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yadlin stressed:
“Israel is a strong state that enjoys the standing of a regional power in every important dimension: military, intelligence, economic, technological, and human capital. However, the COVID-19 crisis has exposed many vulnerabilities: a deep and ongoing political crisis, which is reflected in several successive governments that did not complete their terms and in frequent, recurring election campaigns; paralysis of the government’s work, as the government operates without a long-term vision and without a budget; an opaque and ineffective decision making process; a decline in public trust in the leadership; deepening gaps between the different ‘tribes’ in Israeli society; and the undermining of solidarity and civilian identification with the state and with one another. In particular, the current crisis has expanded the gaps between strong and weak demographics and deepened inequality.
“It is necessary to deal with the internal dimension of Israel’s national security challenges, without harboring the illusion that the external challenges have disappeared. The probability that the State of Israel will encounter an external challenge in 2021 is not low. Iran has a score to settle with Israel, and it is possible that Tehran will take aggressive action based on the assessment that the new US administration will ease the pressure on it. Nor has the Palestinian problem disappeared, and the weakening of Palestinian leverage and influence, in the shadow of the decline of its leadership, could actually spur the Palestinians to adopt a strategy of working toward a single state, which is dangerous for Israel. Thus while Israel’s deterrence is strong on all fronts and its enemies do not want to go to war against it, the chance of a deterioration that spirals out of control still exists and requires maintaining a high level of readiness.
“The strategic confusion in Israel at the current time – and in this context the failure to formulate and update the security concept and economic and social policies, and to repair and strengthen the governmental and legal systems – demands that think tanks and civil society remain committed to providing the professional and political system and the public with up-to-date concepts, insights, and policy recommendations that better address the threats and seize opportunities to strengthen the State of Israel’s national security.”
At the INSS 14th Annual International Conference there was a panel discussion “Looking Inward: How to Heal Israel,” moderated by Amalya Duek and including Adv. Emi Palmor, Dr. Carmit Padan, Dr Lia Moran-Gilad, Shira Greenberg Gelbwaser, and Prof. Siegal Sadetzki.
Prof. Sadetzki noted that she was not surprised about the centrality and impact of public health issues on the national situation as a whole, and that the Health Ministry prepared for similar emergency scenarios, as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO).
Ms. Greenberg-Gelbwaser noted that in retrospect it appears the lockdowns imposed by the government managed to balance economic and health considerations, in a way that activity was limited in the areas with the highest rates of infection, which are characterized by low productivity, and allowed in areas with high productivity, which greatly influences GDP. She indicated that in the future, a dialogue should be held between government ministries, from a broad perspective, in order to make the best decisions possible.
Adv. Palmor referred to the violation of democracy and noted that it also permeates the field of public health and the economy. When the basic authority on which democracy is built is questioned, and in particular in a polarized society and at a time of widespread crisis of trust, this leads to a lack of cooperation from parts of the Israeli public. This is expressed, inter alia, in assaults on police officers, failure to close educational institutions, violations of mandatory quarantine, and undermined police authority to enforce the guidelines.
Dr. Padan referred to social solidarity in Israel and noted that the lack of concern for others, expressed in gatherings and violations of the guidelines, reflects a reversal of solidarity and mutual concern. Israeli society was lacking in solidarity even before the pandemic, and in order to rebuild it, there must be a new framework defining the common social good, which can be embraced by all parts of Israeli society. The ideal of the common social good, which was previously embodied in military service, has eroded, and society has not yet defined a new organizing principle. Prof. Sadetzki suggested that the lack of social cohesion stems not only from sectoral problems and the difficulty in uniting. Early in the pandemic, Israeli society demonstrated high social cohesion, reflected in part in the observance of the guidelines on Passover and on Memorial Day events. The widespread violations nowadays, which reflect the lack of social cohesion, also stem from the guidelines themselves, and from the question how much the public perceives them as clear, uniform, and justified. Dr. Moran-Gilad believed that the belligerent framing to deal with the pandemic harmed social solidarity and deepened polarization, as it led to the labeling of certain communities as “enemies” and “disease spreaders,” giving masculine connotations to the fight against the virus.
Ms. Greenberg-Gelbwaser noted that Israel entered the crisis in relatively good economic condition and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%, and spent money to help the economy recover, as has been done in other countries. Government assistance, for the most part, was provided in accordance with the recommendations of the professionals, in a focused and differential manner to the sectors most affected by the crisis. In this context, she noted that the impact on growth in Israel in the past year was lower than the impact on OECD countries, and stood at 3.3%. In addition, the fiscal space is critical to Israel, which can also experience local geopolitical crises, and a long-term goal of lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio must be set. Adv. Palmor stressed the role of the professional echelon regarding other areas affected by the pandemic, such as increasing violence against women and the harm to child development programs, so that they are addressed in the next budget. Ms. Greenberg-Gelbwaser noted that the crisis has heightened the need to reduce economic inequality in the country, and that the next budget should address the vulnerable populations, who have experienced more significant harm, so that they can integrate in the labor market with higher productivity. Prof. Sadetzki believed it is necessary to strengthen the health and education systems in order to better cope with the new upcoming routine, and that this move would have a long-term effect that would influence them to be better built from a system-wide perspective.
Dr. Padan agreed with Prof. Sadetzki that Israel’s ability to deal with the coronavirus crisis not only depends on social cohesion. A comparative view shows that many countries have dealt with the crisis by similar organizational means – closing borders and conducting epidemiological investigations. The significant challenge lies in implementing three main social moves –lockdowns, compliance with guidelines, and physical or social isolation.This requires a change in public behavior, which is achieved primarily through public trust in leadership. When there is trust, these social moves can be realized more smoothly.
Dr. Padan concluded that there is an inseparable link between the social situation and national security. National security expresses the relationship between the external and internal threats facing the state, and its ability to deal with them successfully. The coronavirus pandemic has affected a number of social parameters in Israel, with a drastic decline in public trust in the leadership; the political crisis manifested in the run-up to the fourth election, and the prevailing assumption that crisis management is guided by narrow political considerations; severe economic damage, particularly in deciles 3-6, which have deepened ecomonic inequality in Israel; and emotional difficulties and burnout among about 40 percent of the population. These elements harm the fabric of life of the Israeli public and the economy, and weaken the State of Israel’s ability to deal with the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore harm national security.
Tweets –
Prof. Sadetzki: The Health Ministry prepared for similar emergency scenarios.
Ms. Greenberg-Gelbwaser: In retrospect it appears that the lockdowns imposed by the government managed to balance economic and health considerations.
Adv Palmor: When the basic authority on which democracy is built is questioned, this leads to a lack of cooperation from parts of the Israeli public.
Dr. Moran-Gilad: The belligerent framing in dealing with the pandemic harmed social solidarity and deepened polarization.
Prof. Sadetzki: The widespread violations also stem from the guidelines themselves, and from the question of how much the public perceives them as clear, uniform, and justified.
Ms. Greenberg-Gelbwaser: Government assistance, for the most part, was provided in accordance with the recommendations of the professionals, in a focused and differential manner to the sectors affected by the crisis.
Dr. Padan: There is an inseparable link between the social situation and national security. National security reflects the relationship between the external and internal threats facing the state, and its ability to deal with them successfully.
The COVID-19 crisis, for Israel and for decision makers, was something of a “gray rhino” – we knew that we would be hit with an epidemiologic incident of this sort. It approached us rapidly, but we did not wake up in time, and it attacked and continues to attack us. All the researchers and epidemiologists envisioned that a pandemic would occur – the question was: when. They drafted plans and established committees, but did not amass the necessary resources and capabilities to grapple with the crisis.
A host of other “rhinos” are galloping toward us, and we prefer to look aside and not prepare for them appropriately. We have decided to look with you at the following “rhinos”: autonomous enclaves that are not governed; extreme climate change; an earthquake; and uncontrolled development of artificial intelligence (AI).
The INSS 14th Annual International Conference featured a conversation between Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran and Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin, OC Homefront Command.
\Maj. Gen. Gordin opened by describing his feelings about the move from combat command positions to the Homefront Command:
“The first feeling is one of strength. I have had the privilege of heading the command during a significant and intensive period that saw a broad operation of the framework, and that creates a sense of very great power – of a strong, robust system – because we are talking about an emergency event that is unprecedented in terms of the command’s activation. Most of all, the sense of strength stems from the dedicated people, most of them reservists, who have already been serving for many long days, operating in the civilian sphere with very high devotion – and, in some cases, having lost jobs as a result of this service. That fills you with a sense of satisfaction and great capacity.”
“In parallel, there has been a great sense of humility, on at least three levels. The first level is the humility that comes with a new and unfamiliar system, one in the civilian sphere, with different cultures and a different DNA that must be learned. The second results from being in a situation where you take action and do not always succeed, which can generate frustration but constantly requires adjusting operations to action. The third comes from the fact that not everything is in our hands: Responsibility for the health of Israel’s residents is on the health system and the HMOs; responsibility for enforcement is on the Israel Police and, to a small degree, the local authorities. I can go on about the various responsibilities. And here, too, it is possible to feel much frustration because things are not under your control – or to cooperate and create a common objective and work for the sake of effectiveness.”
In addition, “The feeling, ultimately, is one of satisfaction, the sense that the entire command has had significant influence over much of the country, the citizens of Israel, and how the citizenry copes with this civil emergency.”
Regarding the main, positive lessons from the Homefront Command activity during the coronavirus crisis, Gordin said: “The first and almost the most significant has been the cooperation with the local authorities. Our joint work with them is one of the most significant factors in terms of the ability to impact on the civilian sphere. The simplest example is in our relaying, to the local authorities, of all data on coronavirus morbidity, such that we provided an apparatus that enables observation in the local authorities of the morbidity situation on a per-neighborhood or per-street level, enabling them in turn to take more effective precise action regarding those very spaces within each authority.” He added: “The second thing that was very significant, in my experience, was the building of bridges with sectors that are not in the mainstream of Israeli society. For example, we set up a control center in East Jerusalem that assists the municipality in networking and directing anti-pandemic activities in East Jerusalem. Another example is in the fact that quite a few haredim (ultra-Orthodox) told us of their wish to take part in active reservist duties. We trained them for Homefront Command duties within the community.” He went on to say: “The third thing that I am proud of in the way that the command works is the ability to change and adapt during this pandemic.”
Regarding obstacles or problems the command encountered, Gordin said: “The most significant impediment or difficulty in managing the crisis has been its duration. The State of Israel is accustomed to dealing with acute and brief crises. The protracted nature of this crisis causes unprecedented difficulty. The second impediment the command has faced in contending with the coronavirus crisis has been in the fact that the command’s staff structure is reservist-based. On the one hand, this has the advantage of know-how and continuity vis-à-vis the area of responsibility being preserved. On the other, a service that entails an abundance of reservist days per year poses a very big challenge. Furthermore, sometimes uncomfortable encounters with an angry public arise, which creates difficulty and is very burdensome. We are working to provide psychological support to those engaged in assistance. Another difficulty has been in regard public trust and cooperation with the directives.”
Regarding lessons about Homefront Command readiness, Gordin said: “The coronavirus pandemic is teaching us that the Homefront Command is a strong command that is prepared to face the challenge of an emergency, wherever it might arise. If we activate relevant methods and means in the civilian sphere, we will be able to deliver appropriate action. Will all tools be ready at our disposal? I don’t know. The Alon taskforce for cutting the chains of infection is an example of know-how that did not exist in the command, or in the country, and was built up very quickly – in three months – with a broad and effective capacity for cutting the chains of infection. We are constantly honing this tool. We are constantly working to improve the effectiveness of the systems.”
Regarding cooperation with the Health Ministry, Gordin said: “We work in very significant cooperation with the Health Ministry. There is some friction and dispute along the way, but I think that ultimately the cooperation is very broad. For example, the regional health offices conduct investigations under the auspices of the Alon taskforce, interfacing with investigators on the ground, local authorities, and soldiers.”
Regarding the main lesson regarding the role of the IDF – and, in that framework, the Homefront Command – in civilian crises, Gordin said: “Today it is absolutely clear that in any war, the civilian sphere/home front will be the war’s second front. There we will encounter fewer of the enemy, but more of what the enemy puts into effect. In this sense, the home front challenge will be very great. Garnering achievements in this sphere, which constitutes the second front during wartime, requires that we cooperate with local authorities, an apparatus that links everyone up with government ministries and also that we enlist and mobilize the gamut of communal resources. To my mind, the only body that receives the trust of the citizenry and of all national apparatuses is the IDF, including the Homefront Command. I think that after we mobilized to help with the coronavirus crisis, citizens will certainly expect us to appear and assist in crisis situations.”
On the most difficult decision that required deliberation, focus, and response, Gordin said: “The decision to set up the Alon taskforce was very significant. I needed quiet in order to understand what the proper solution to the problem was. This is also true for the decision to broaden the response within the local authorities. That decision required a great deal of deliberation and persuasion as well.”
The second day of the INSS 14th Annual International Conference concluded with senior INSS researchers fielding viewers’ questions as part of a “Tap the Expert” panel. The panel participants were INSS Deputy Director for Research and Analysis Brig. Gen. (ret.) Itai Brun and Col. (ret.) Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, head of the INSS Law and National Security Program. The session was moderated by INSS Managing Director Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel.
Is Israel preparing for the possibility that the coronavirus will be with us for years to come? What needs to be done so that we can cope with this pandemic over time? To what extent will it change our way of life and how we should cope?
Pnina Sharvit Baruch responded that we should proceed on the basis of two possible scenarios. The first is that the vaccine will prove effective and the pandemic will disappear in the foreseeable future; the second is that the pandemic will persist, with variants emerging and vaccine efficiency proving limited in duration. As time passes, the second scenario does not look unreasonable, so the country would do well to prepare for it. The Israeli public and decision makers should address the long-term changes this would entail, and forge a reality in which life does not come to a halt – while both continuing to contend with other problems facing us and working both to reduce the spread of the pandemic and attend to public health.
Pnina presented several guiding principles for contending with the situation, while observing social distancing, and striving to bridge the gap in public trust in the leadership: respect individual rights – constraining individual liberties only when this is unavoidable, and in the most limited manner possible; strike a balance between the risk to public health and other risks – economic, social, psychological, and educational; exercise decency and uniformity, and avoid unclear distinctions in the imposition of restrictions; explain the logic of restrictions clearly and transparently; strive for simplicity and consistency; impose restrictions that can be enforced and maintained over the required period; grant each individual freedom of choice when the objective of the curb is to protect him or her; treat different sectors appropriately; be considerate of special needs; reassess regularly and frequently the consequences of the restrictions.
Does the protracted failure to manage the public health crisis mean similar failure is to be expected in the management of a national security crisis?
Itai Brun responded that this question can be addressed on two levels: vis-à-vis decision makers and the wider public. Regarding decision makers, it seems that in the national security realm there is an established and well-oiled apparatus that is ready to tackle crises in the strategic, operational, and tactical spheres with a clear doctrine. However, difficulties in the coronavirus decision making processes reflect a broader phenomenon. In the halls of national security, the political-security cabinet, and the IDF Chief of General Staff’s cabinet, there is increasing difficulty to apprehend reality clearly and make decisions. Political, technological, social, and economic calculations have entered these spaces, and the difficulty evinced in managing the coronavirus, in making and implementing decisions, is liable to recur during a national security crisis as well. A significant challenge has been posed by the multitude of realities that are given voice in the various narratives, in the need to clarify the problem, analyze it, and find an appropriate solution.
The question that arises vis-à-vis the public is whether it would respond to a national security crisis as it has to the coronavirus crisis, or would be more compliant. While it is true that Israeli society has undergone changes and can no longer be mobilized like it was in past wars, it is important to consider the belligerent context and the need to fight – mainly if it is a war of no-alternative that has been forced on us. Campaign duration also affects the disposition of the public, but as we saw during the second intifada, the Israeli public can maintain high levels of discipline over extended periods. The socio-economic crisis is not the worst in the country’s history and is similar to the crises currently besetting other Western democracies. That being the case, the main difficulty that can be expected in the next national security crisis would appear to be in the decision making realm.
The coronavirus pandemic laid bare internal faults that affect national security and Israel’s ability to deal with external threats. Would it be right to transfer funds from defense to domestic realms – economy, welfare, education, health?
According to Itai, the conference sought to address this question and propose a common framework that would enable a discussion of the external and internal threats. When such a framework arises, it will enable a balance of needs and budgets that are apportioned accordingly. As was noted in the INSS 2021 Strategic Survey, the State of Israel must prioritize internal problems in terms of both attention and resources.
Is the ongoing coronavirus crisis endangering Israeli democracy?
Pnina responded that Israeli democracy is currently experiencing several crises beyond the coronavirus, including a political-constitutional crisis, with the coronavirus enhancing some of the risks. The handling of the pandemic has dealt a blow to fundamental liberties, and there is potential for great damage, but the checks and balances system and oversight by authorities have succeeded in balancing the damage. The pandemic has underscored the importance of watchdogs and gatekeepers. The presence of professional office-holders who are not political appointees and who are beholden to the public rather than to whomever appointed them, serves as an internal guard against the government’s abuse of power. There are additional sentinels that are not within the executive branch, like the Knesset, which has served during the crises as an oversight agency and influenced decision making with the help of the parliamentary committees. So too the courts, which serve as an important force for preserving democracy: the existence of an independent judicial system is critical for the preservation of democracy.
Can we anticipate phenomena such as those seen in the United States, e.g., a mob storming the Knesset or not accepting the outcome of the elections? How influential are those crafting public perceptions?
Citing his experiences as a former intelligence officer, Itai said the objective is not to predict the future but to think about it in a manner that helps in preparing accordingly. That said, there is a phenomenon whereby the basic infrastructure for a clear apprehension of reality and ensuing decision making has been undermined. In a liberal Western democracy, the marketplace of ideas and the ability to debate are a national infrastructure no less important than the energy, water, and cyber infrastructures. Events on Capitol Hill were a wake-up call that demonstrated how words can sway a multitude and foment action. The public must understand that such things can happen, and have happened in the past, but that the social-media echo chamber amplifies the ability to communicate with similarly minded people and generate action.
Is the country changing, and is the situation we are witnessing vis-à-vis the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) a testimony to the loss of solidarity and common purpose?
Pnina Sharvit Baruch responded that while rifts in Israeli society are not a new phenomenon, it is clear that there is a rising challenge to social solidarity. The coronavirus has underscored the difficulty vis-à-vis haredi society, which is not a new issue but has expanded over the years as the haredi population has grown and kept itself segregated. There are many haredim who have been and continue to be painstaking about coronavirus regulations, and are careful about their wellbeing, but that there are rabbis who ignore the rules, to the concomitant endangerment of those who observe the regulations. The coronavirus has shown that it is not possible to continue ignoring what happens in haredi society. By contrast, when it comes to Arab society, the coronavirus has created opportunities for closing ranks.
Udi Dekel summarized the observations and recommendations that arose during the conference:
- A re-ordering of priorities is needed, with a view to reviving the economy, society, and welfare.
- There is a discernable need to reduce centralization in the government, with authorities delegated to the local/communal echelons.
- Job security is the main economic challenge. It is crucial that the crisis be exploited to upgrade the job market and increase productivity.
- A national crisis-management apparatus (outside the military framework) must be created, with around-the-clock functioning and a planning division that would build up readiness for coming crises.
- The government, police, and justice system must act determinedly to impose law and order in ungoverned enclaves (haredi communities, Arab towns, Negev Bedouin, “hilltop youth”).
- Education, and its speedy adaptation to prevailing conditions, should be given primacy – certainly if we are forced to live in the presence of the coronavirus over a long term.
- Technology has carried Israel’s economy and maintained its standing, both regional and international. It is important to build up Israel’s relative advantage in the cyber and AI realms. Similarly, technology should be used to reduce rifts and enable accessibility.
- Governance – institutional capacity for implementation; necessitates stable rule in terms of the economy, legal system, and judicial system. The successive elections in Israel do not enable any problem to be thoroughly addressed.
- Needed is a leadership that can make decisions, implement them, and survive.
