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The biggest global trend is that the world is becoming not only flat but also fragile. The world has been hit by a sequence of “global pandemics” caused by different types of pathogens – including 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, and the Covid-19 crisis. The world is more interconnected than ever and this removes the buffers or “surge protectors,” thereby creating a much more fragile world.
For each “pandemic,” we saw minor warnings before a major crisis erupted. In 1993, there was a fairly unsuccessful terror attack on the World Trade Center, which was followed by the devastating al-Qaeda attack in 2001. In 1998, a hedge fund in Connecticut built up $1 trillion dollars in leverage and then melted down and almost took the rest of Wall St. with it, and one decade later there was a full-blown financial crisis. In 2002, there was a respiratory coronavirus which erupted from China into Southeast Asia, and then of course we saw that in 2020 we had a global pandemic unlike anything seen in the past century.
Today we are witnessing many warning signs regarding climate change: forest fires, warming of oceans, and polar ice caps melting. The worrying thing about this phenomenon is that there is no such vaccine or herd immunity for climate change.
The world is flatter than ever before, as we make it increasingly interconnected. That makes it more difficult to prevent crises in one region from spreading to another. For example, between December 2019 and March 2020 there were 3,200 direct flights from China to the U.S., including 50 direct flights from Wuhan. Therefore, the world is not just flat but it is increasingly fragile. Unless we take steps to prevent instability in one node of the world from spreading throughout the whole global system, we will see more warning lead up to a full blown crisis.
When it comes to climate change, we are literally removing physical buffers such as rain forests, mangroves, and polar ice caps. This is weakening our resilience to coping with environmental challenges.
The Biden administration appears poised to return to the U.S.’s traditional multilateral approach to the world. The only way to prevent future pandemics is through global cooperation because the world we live in has become so interconnected. Returning to the Paris Climate Accords and engaging with allies on other multilateral initiatives are encouraging signs from the new administration.
Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs of India, has spoken at the INSS 14th Annual conference.
Jaishankar addressed the new incoming US administration: “As the new administration takes office in Washington D.C, it is natural that the world would reflect on the changes that it protects. Those following American politics, agree that its policy and initiatives would focus on rebuilding and revival. Therefore, we have already heard President Biden strengthening the necessity of formulating policies, addressing the building of American middle class. Similarly, his closest advisors have spoken of a new US industrial strategy to address the distortions of the current trading system.”
“If there is a message for the world it is to go beyond politics and recognize what are the real shifts in American thinking. The United States has been actively and continuously engaged in commitments abroad for almost two decades.” Jaishankar added “that solutions to current conflicts are arrived at broader consultations.”
According to Jaishankar, Climates change, pandemics and terrorism should be the priorities of the incoming administration’s new global agenda. He added that “strengthening multilateralism is also imperative if such issues are to be addressed effectively. Reforming the architectures and even the working of international organizations is in our common interest. Where climate change is concerned and America returned to ponding global commitments will be vitally welcomed.” Jaishankar also praised two major international initiatives: The international solar alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.
As for the Middle East situation, Jaishankar argued the region “has witnessed remarkable events in recent months. The Abraham accords have opened up possibilities that could have not been imagined earlier. The international community has vital stakes in the stability and the prosperity of this region.”
Jaishankar also addressed the contribution of India to the COVID-19 pandemic: “As a country that provided, during this pandemic, medical supplies and equipment to more than 150 nations, many of them as grants, India supports greater coordination among responders. Even as we have begun mass vaccinations at home, Indian vaccines supplies to our immediate neighbors have started. This has expected to cover other partner countries in the coming days.”
Addressing the issue of global terrorism, Jaishankar argues that “for too long it has been treated as a problem of only those directly impacted, allowing safe harbors for terrorism and overlooking states’ sponsorship is becoming increasingly dangerous with each passing day. In a more capable and technology-driven world, these trends have only multiplied further. Creating a global consensus on this issue must be a priority,” he added.
Finally, according to Jaishankar “the world has also become far more digital. Transformation sharply accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Opportunities for digitalization comes with their own vulnerabilities. These, too, are natural domains for greater international exchanges and cooperation. Similarly, the requirement for more trusted and resilience supply chains is being clearly felt. De-risking the global economy is one of the big takeaways from the COVID experience. There is a scope for a fresh thinking and more partnerships”
The INSS 14th Annual International Conference featured a panel discussion titled “The World between Trump and Biden,” moderated by Amb. Daniel Shapiro, a former US ambassador to Israel and now Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. Participating: Ted Deutch, a Democratic member of the US Congress; Danielle Pletka, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former Republican Party adviser; Prof. Boris Makarenko, President and CEO of Russia’s Center for Political Technologies; Nathalie Tocci of Italy’s Istituto Affari Internazionali and adviser to the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs; and Amb. Dr. Eyal Propper, Director of China Studies at INSS.
The Biden Administration and the International Community
Ted Deutch emphasized that President Biden has inherited a global environment characterized by disorder, with China gaining power and Russia in a confrontational pose, and trans-national trends like the coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis. He said that the Biden administration intends to enhance dialogue with allies in the international sphere and demonstrate its commitment to them. Attesting to this are the new administration’s decisions to return to the (Paris) Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, and its renewed recognition of the importance of NATO. At the same time, it is also clear to the administration that there is no going back to the pre-Trump status quo, given the global changes since that era. That being the case, the administration can be expected to take a tough stand on China and Russia.
Danielle Pletka suggested that that the Biden administration confronts the same essential challenges confronted by the Trump administration. She is particularly concerned by Russian advances in the Middle East, which she believes should be addressed in stronger tones. At the same time, she believes that the Trump administration left the Biden administration much leverage vis-à-vis foreign policy.
Boris Makarenko assessed that the Biden era will not see significant change in Russia-US relations, which continued to deteriorate during President Trump’s term. Furthermore, the issue of US policy vis-a-vis Russia was perhaps one of the few issues on which there was bipartisan consensus during the Trump presidency. As he put it, Russia is ready to work with any US president and bring about a renewal of cooperation on any issue, as required, but it does not anticipate a similar approach from the United States. In his view, Russia ascribes importance to renewing the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which is due to expire soon. A move toward extending the deal should be a common interest to the two countries within the framework of measures to ensure the preservation of the nuclear disarmament regime. With that said, even if there are agreements on that issue, there is skepticism regarding the possibility of broadening this to include other issues on the two countries’ agenda.
Eyal Propper emphasized that tensions between the United States and China can be expected to continue into the Biden term, mainly because they are not directly connected to events during the Trump administration’s term but stem from the strategic contest between the two countries that began during previous presidencies. China has gained strength and become far more competitive in recent years. Against this backdrop, the Biden administration will find that China has high self-regard and believes the lesson it has learned from the conduct of the Trump administration is that it should trust only itself and is sufficiently powerful to do so.
Nathalie Tocci welcomed the willingness of the Biden administration to renew cooperation with European allies and stressed that the European position regarding Russia and China is currently leaning to a harder libe. While agreement with the new administration can be expected on matters to do with Russia, disputes are possible on the Chinese issue given the uncompromising position evinced by the United States so far.
The Iran Issue
Ted Deutch noted that cooperation with Israel and Gulf states will continue during Biden’s term, and that President Biden wants to curb Iran’s nuclear program and has already declared that he would ease sanctions only after it returns to compliance with the deal. He said that Biden seeks to lengthen the deal’s duration and strengthen it, in addition to limiting Iran’s surface-to-surface missile project and restraining its regional activities. Danielle Pletka stipulated that when it comes to the Iran issue, the administration should focus on crafting a response to the whole gamut of threats posed by Iran. The main problem with the nuclear deal (JCPOA) was that it addressed only the nuclear issue, under the assumption that this could be divorced from the other issues. The Biden administration should reach agreements not only with US allies in Europe but also with its friends in the Middle East, in order to achieve understanding and together craft measures that would provide responses not only to Iran’s nuclear program but to the entirety of its provocative actions. She argued that if the United States pursues a nuclear deal 2.0 without taking the other issues into account, the risk would be that a future Republican president will act similarly to Trump and, in turn, rescind that deal. What is required is a stable and comprehensive deal that addresses all issues. Boris Makarenko pointed out Russia is an important international actor when it comes to the Iran issue, and is serious about its intent to work toward resolving the issue – such that, if the United States returns to the deal, the two countries can cooperate on that issue. Eyal Propper stressed that the Chinese are interested in a US return to the deal and believe the Biden administration should not set preconditions for doing so. If the Chinese have faith in the new administration, they will cooperate with it – including in pressing the Iranians to keep up their end of the bargain. All of this would be done to advance Chinese interests. Nathalie Tocci estimated that Iran would be one of the first issues discussed by the new administration and European powers. Biden is clear on his intentions regarding a return to the nuclear deal if Iran accedes to his demands, “but rhetoric is easier than implementation.” In her view, the main mission of European powers, together with the United States, in the anticipated dialogue with Iran will be to map out the sequence of actions required to bring about a renewal of the nuclear deal, in hope that the process yields concrete results before the June 2021 presidential elections in Iran.
The Abraham Accords
Ted Deutch emphasized that the normalization accords between Israel and Arab states constitute a strategic shift and offer a broad basis for opportunities down the line. Biden and his team recognize this and intend to pursue the process – inter alia, within the context of efforts to restrain Iran’s regional conduct. It should be understood that from the Biden administration’s standpoint, the process does not boil down to arms sales – as President Trump was wont to emphasize – so much as to the importance of promoting the interests of the United States and of the regional actors. Danielle Pletka stated that the Abraham Accords offer the Biden administration abundant opportunities. Among factors that would affect their implementation will be the tack the administration takes in relations with Saudi Arabia, given criticism of the kingdom’s conduct among elements of the Democratic Party. The administration should make policy on the basis of what Trump achieved, with an emphasis on the joint understanding about the threat posed by Iran and the Palestinian issue no longer constituting an obstacle to the advancement of Israel’s relations with Gulf states.
Speaking at the 14th Annual Conference of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Mass, stated that the year 2020 was an unforgettable year. Even in the beginning of 2021 “the battle against the Covid pandemic is far from over.” Alongside the challenges of fighting the virus, Minister Maas mentioned the latest events on Capitol Hill prior to Joe Biden’s presidential inauguration: “The storming of the US Capitol highlighted once more the dangerous dividing lines running through many of our societies.”
Alongside the challenges of the past year, Minister Maas mentioned “moments of hope” in reference to the historic signing of the normalization agreements between Israel and the Emirates. He also mentioned an official meeting held shortly after the historic signing, which took place in Berlin between Maas, Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi, and his Emirate counterpart, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed. The meeting took place at a significant historical venue – at the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe. According to Maas, “We met in Berlin at the Holocaust Memorial, which forever reminds us of the murder of Europe’s Jews committed by Germans…we showed our Emirati friends where the State of Israel comes from, and why its security matters so much, to Israelis, but also to us – Germans.”
Minister Maas further argued that the normalization agreements are proof that reconciliation and cooperation can be reached. “But they require courage,” he added, and “more bold steps are needed to conclude what was started with the agreement.” He stated that the main goal should be to achieve peace and cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. However, peace and cooperation with the Arab world will not be achieved without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A “lasting peace,” according to Maas, can be achieved only through a ‘two-state-solution.’ Hence, the normalization agreements, the new US administration, and the upcoming elections in Israel and in the Palestinian territories all call for “fresh thinking.”
Regarding the two-state solution, Maas stated that Europe is neither blind nor naive. It is fully aware that the chances of a two-state solution are diminishing due to violence, but also due to continuing building of new settlements in the West Bank. At the same time, the status quo is fragile and does not satisfy the principal parties. An independent Palestinian state is crucial for the future of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, and the annexation plan of parts of the West Bank is, according to the German Minister, “dangerous” for Israel, as well to any future peace agreement and Israel’s relations with its closest neighbors. “Annexation must stay off the table- no matter what the upcoming elections in Israel may bring,” says Maas.
In addition, in order to resume a meaningful and pragmatic dialogue between the two sides, a first important step will be “a commitment to refrain from any harmful unilateral actions and stronger cooperation with the Palestinians in battling COVID-19.”
The German Minister also addressed the Iranian challenge, stating that Tehran’s “reckless behavior” in recent weeks has made it clear as to how important it is to prevent Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. “The best tool for doing so remains the JCPOA,” he claimed, since this agreement allows “more transparency than we ever had before.” In addition to addressing the nuclear issue, Iran’s “dangerous” missile program and its “aggressive behavior” in the region must be addressed as well. All this will be achieved first through addressing the nuclear issue via the JCPOA.
As for the new US administration, Mass stated that Joe Biden and Kamala Harris have made it clear that reconciliation measures are now a top priority, both within the American society, as well as in relations with democratic societies around the world.
In conclusion, Maas referred to the success of the Israeli vaccination project, which currently inspires many around the world, as well as the launching of the direct flights between Israel and Abu Dhabi. This, he says, could not have been dreamed of until a year ago. He further emphasized that “when people meet each other and start talking – anything is possible…whether the global lockdown leads to a breakdown or a breakthrough- lies in our hands.”
Missiles from Iraq to Tel Aviv; a terrorist attack against Israelis in Dubai; and at a certain point, Hezbollah joins the attacks against Israel – this is what the Iranian response to the chain of attacks against it over the past year may look like. How will Israel respond? The following are insights from a simulation conducted at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Although most players in the region do not want a wide-scale war, their code of conduct requires a response to any event, and since the dominant language in the region is the language of force, dynamics of uncontrolled escalation may unfold and lead to a war in the north.
During the INSS 14th Annual International Conference, a war game was held simulating a multi-arena regional security escalation between Iran and the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states.
Participating in the INSS simulation, which was moderated by INSS Deputy Director Brig. Gen. (ret.) Itai Brun, were: Maj. Gen. (res.) Nitsan Alon, as Israel; General (ret.) John Allen, President of the Brookings Institution, as the United States; Sima Shine, head of the Iran program at INSS as Iran; Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, President of the Emirates Policy Center, as the UAE and the Gulf states; Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, as Russia; and other experts.
The starting point of the simulation is a series of actions against Israeli, United States, and regional targets in the Middle East, apparently directed by Iran. Over the past year Iran has suffered a series of blows related to both the nuclear program and its entrenchment in Syria. Tehran chose not to respond at the end of the Trump administration for fear of an American attack, and found the change of administration the right time for a response.
According to the scenario, the events in the Middle East unfolded following the killing of 38 Shiite militia activists in Iraq the previous week. This event compounded the threats and the open Iranian account with Israel and the United States following the assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and senior nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. A special alert was announced in Israel and the Gulf states. Then, according to the scenario, a sequence of events one day claimed the lives of 16 Israelis and injured many more.
The escalation against Israel began at 4:30 a.m., when six missiles were fired from western Iraq toward Israel. One missile penetrated the Israeli air defense system and struck a high-rise building in Tel Aviv. Six Israelis were killed in the direct hit, and 30 people were injured. At the same time, an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fired rockets at the US embassy compound in Baghdad, killing an American soldier.
Elsewhere in the region different acts of aggression occurred. The previous evening, a series of simultaneous shooting attacks occurred on the marina promenade in Dubai and in the Bahrain Center City mall in Bahrain. It seems that the attacks were aimed at tourists, especially Israelis. Ten Israelis, eight Americans, and eight locals were killed in the attacks. Earlier in the day, Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi forces fired missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia, hitting, among other places, refineries in the Red Sea city of Jeddah. Aerial rescue efforts began between Israel and the Gulf, in an attempt to evacuate all Israelis as quickly as possible.
In response to the events, Israel decided to retaliate with airstrikes against Iranian infrastructure and Iranian forces in Syria in Iraq, while preparing a second wave of attacks against Iran itself.
The United States sent messages to Iran condemning the attacks. As part of its multilateral approach, the US held consultations with main partners in the nuclear deal, Russia and China, on an appropriate US response to the events. The United States warned Iran that continued attacks by pro-Iranian militias against American forces would be met immediately by a massive US air strike against Iranian militias. Washington expressed support for Israel and its airstrikes, and promised the US was ready to provide immediate assistance to the UAE and Bahrain in the fight against terrorism and missile defense. American forces in the Gulf were placed on the highest alert.
Iran, which wanted to prevent attacks on its territory, sent a message to the United States that if the response to the events was limited, Iran would not attack again. Iran also turned to Moscow to mediate between Tehran and Washington. Iran decided that if the Israeli response would not take place in the territories under Iranian sovereignty and the death toll from attacks was relatively low, Tehran would agree to calm the situation.
The UAE representative stressed that the Emirates’ ultimate goal is to prevent another attack on its sovereign territory. The Emirates called on the UN Security Council to condemn the attacks and launch an international inquiry into its perpetrators. At the same time, it coordinated positions with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against Houthi targets and called for recognizing the Houthis as a terrorist organization, as well as enforcing the arms embargo on Yemen.
Russian Representative Fyodor Lukyanov noted that escalation in the Middle East poses a danger that Russia would lose what it has achieved in the region since 2015, especially in Syria, and therefore President Putin would take advantage of his unique position and connections with all the leaders in the Middle East and exercise massive diplomacy vis-à-vis the hawks and at the same time establish a channel of dialogue with the Biden administration.
Hezbollah, despite wanting to avoid involvement in this event because of internal Lebanese considerations, chose nonetheless to intervene, as it understood its role to serve as a buffer between Iran and the Zionist enemy. Moreover, Hezbollah sought to achieve as many symbolic victories as possible to strengthen its status, such as placing the Hezbollah flag in a locality in northern Israel.
In Syria, Assad, decided that Damascus would condemn the attacks but refrain from intervening. However, he did not have the power to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from using Syrian territory to attack Israel.
Israel’s response to the incidents was a widespread attack on Iranian targets in Syria and Iraq, which resulted in Iranian and Hezbollah casualties. In response, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel, first in an attempt to limit the conflict and not fire missiles at cities south of Haifa. A number of Israeli civilians were killed in the atatck. In response, Israel attacked a number of targets in Lebanon, including targets used by Hezbollah’s missile precision project in the capital, which resulted in the deaths of thirty Lebanese civilians. Consequently, Hezbollah decided to expand its range of fire at Tel Aviv, an attack that resulted in 12 deaths in the center’s metropolis.
Iran tried to restrain Hezbollah from engaging in a large-scale war with Israel, as the organization’s main goal is to act as a deterrent in the face of an Israeli intention to attack the Iranian nuclear project, but did not stop it from acting against Israel.
Insights from the Simulation
All the actors wanted to avoid a broad escalation and estimated that they could keep the events contained in the format of “battle days” (in which there are extensive Israeli attacks, but the Israeli home front also suffers casualties). However, the simulation also highlighted that in reality a dynamic of escalation and widespread confrontation can emerge.
Israel looked for an opportunity to promote regional cooperation, and in its view, Iran played into its hands with its broad response against targets in the region. The event also provided an opportunity to coordinate with the Biden administration and prove to it Iran’s true character, and that it is not possible to return to the JCPOA without addressing the negative regional involvement of Iran and its proxies. Perhaps it was also an opportunity to persuade the administration not to ease sanctions on Iran.
United States: The Biden administration is committed to Israel’s security as well as to the Abraham Accords. The new administration tried to avoid expanding the conflict, clinging to the goal to contain and deter Iran. To reassure the regional partnerships, the administration announced that Iran would have no nuclear weapons, and that it would assist in missile defense and with the presence of aircraft carriers in the Gulf.
Iran faced a dilemma between the commitment to respond to recent attacks against it and its interests, and the desire to avoid a large-scale war, and especially attacks against targets in its territory. It preferred to respond once and even suffer another attack on its assets and agents in Syria and Iraq rather than face further escalation.
The UAE, endowed primarily with tools from the international battlefield, appealed to the UN Security Council to condemn and set up an international commission of inquiry. It chose not to use military tools against Iran, but against the Houthi Iranian emissaries. The main goal was to prevent further attacks on targets in the Gulf states.
Russia: Putin saw the escalation as an opportunity to position himself as a key regional and international player, with the advantage that he could talk to all the actors. The event provided Russia with an opportunity for dialogue with the Biden administration. Another interest was to remove Syria from the fighting circle, reduce its damage, and probably preserve the Assad regime. The Russian representative clarified that it is easier for them to talk to Israel so that it would not destroy Syria, and less with the Iranians (“relations with them are very tricky”) so that they would not make Syria a major battlefield.
Hezbollah found it difficult to deny being a major force in the resistance camp and therefore sought a pretext to attack Israel, such that it would not incur too severe a response. But when it failed to control the escalation, it sought to achieve the image of victory, striking a valuable target in Tel Aviv, or occupying a settlement in the north. The simulation illustrated the tension between Iran (which did not want a major escalation) and Hezbollah (which wanted to get the best out of the escalation for itself). Iran does not want Hezbollah to be undermined, as it is intended as a deterrent and response in the case of an attack against nuclear sites in Iran itself, but has refrained from curbing it. The tension reflects Hezbollah’s independent interests, despite its dependence and subordination to Iran.
None of the players cared about the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, and it is difficult to apply a regional and international mechanism to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.
In the end, Iran was not directly attacked during the simulation, a threshold that everyone preferred to avoid. The simulation reflects Israel’s difficulty in directly harming Iran and its dependence on the United States in this matter. Considering the entry of the new US administration into power, it had no interest in a direct confrontation with Iran.
The simulation was summarized by former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Gadi Eisenkot, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice Tzipi Livni:
Eisenkot: “No Israeli government can contain such an event even at the risk of deteriorating into a broad escalation; an attack on Hezbollah’s precision array in Lebanon will cause extensive damage and inevitably lead to escalation”
Livni: “It is difficult today to rely on a regional or international mechanism to end fighting; this framework should belong to Israel, through a significant response.”
At the INSS 14th Annual International Conference, a review of the simulation was conducted by INSS Managing Director Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, with the participation former IDF Chief of Staff and INSS senior research fellow Lt. Gen. (ret.) Gadi Eisenkot; US General (ret.) John Allen, now President of the Brookings Institution; and former Israeli Foreign Minister and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni.
In the review, Brig. Gen. (res.) Dekel said that during a visit by senior INSS figures to the UAE, it was made clear to them that there was no place to “dream of air force planes taking off from the Emirates to attack Iran,” which caused him to wonder how the Abraham Accords contribute to Israel in the field of security cooperation. To this, former Chief of Staff Eisenkot replied that the pragmatic Sunni states in the Gulf and Israel have a common interest in preventing Iranian nuclear capability and regional hegemony, and therefore this cooperation under an American umbrella is very important – while maintaining significant Israeli capabilities to operate independently in Iran. He noted that coordination during a security event is very important, but the preliminary coordination, which includes intelligence sharing and building common understandings of how to act properly, is even more important. He further added that the simulation events, which ended “with a weak response,” have very negative consequences for the countries in the region regarding future confrontation with Iran.
In the simulation, the regional coalition led by the United States preferred to attack the Iranian proxies over an attack on Iranian territory and thus met Iranian expectations. Eisenkot clarified that Israel must maintain complete independence and freedom of action, especially in the close circle of Syria and Lebanon, and in the more distant circles. He noted that there is an opportunity for the future, “to build a common modus operandi among regional powers that will increase deterrence against Iran.”
Both Eisenkot and Tzipi Livni claimed that it was very difficult to see a situation in which the Israeli response would not be decisive, when missiles fired at Tel Aviv caused 16 deaths. They contended that there is no Israeli government that can contain such an event and avoid a powerful response, even at the risk of deteriorating to a wider escalation.
Asked whether Israel should take advantage of the escalation with Hezbollah to address the threat of precision missiles in Lebanon, Eisenkot replied that Hezbollah has deployed its missile array, including those with precision capabilities, in the heart of civilian settings. Therefore, “any attack will result in extensive collateral damage.” He added that if Israel wanted to surprise Hezbollah with a broad attack on the precision systems it would not be able to wait for the evacuation of the civilian population. He estimated that war would also cause heavy damage to the Israeli home front, since despite the capabilities of Israeli air defenses, it would not be possible to guarantee complete defense.
Both Eisenkot and Livni agreed that the Iranian threat and the normalization agreements constitute a significant opportunity for regional cooperation in American leadership.
General (ret.) John Allen said in reference to the scenario that “it would be a serious mistake” for the Iranians to attack at the dawn of the new US administration, which wants to find a new formula for a nuclear deal with Iran and establish a new relationship with it, and therefore this would be the “height of misjudgment” on the part of the Iranians.
Asked why the United States preferred to attack the Iranian proxies in the simulation rather than Iran, which sent them, he replied that “the United States will not hesitate to respond against Iranian targets and not just against its militias. Retaliation is a tier of a broader American strategy. If the Iranians attacked again through their proxies, we would certainly make them pay a price for their terrorist activities in the region by attacking their assets.”
He further estimated that there would be no return to the previous nuclear agreement, but that an up-to-date and improved agreement would be required.
As for the influence that the public in Israel has on decision makers in security situations, Livni stated that there is no doubt that the public still wants to see a military confrontation that ends in a clear victory, such as the victory of the Six Day War, but “there is no government today that can provide that, not because it does not have the capacity, but because it is a completely different kind of event.”
As for the policy of the new Biden administration, Livni estimated that a US demand from Israel not to respond to the incident in a way that the region would deteriorate into war would be an opportunity for Israel to bring to the table its interests on the Iranian issue and demand changes in an enhanced nuclear deal with Iran, as well as in terms of precision missiles and Iranian terrorist activity in the region.
The State of National Security
Recent findings of the National Security Index show that in the past year, as with previous recent years, most of the public believed that Israel’s national security situation was relatively good, and would continue to be so in the future. A substantial portion of the public agreed with the proposition that “the State of Israel is a ‘villa in the jungle.’” Furthermore, support for the survivalist-determinist narrative of “we will forever live by the sword” fell from 64 percent at the end of 2019 to 52 percent last year.
Trust in State Institutions
One of the central issues on the agenda in the past year was the level of confidence in the state’s institutions. The index’s findings show that the public’s lack of trust in the Israeli government, which was low even before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, intensified thereafter. The most recent National Security Index showed that the Israeli government enjoyed a mere 25 percent confidence level among the public. The Israel Police also met with relatively low confidence (34 percent) amid declining ratings in recent years. On the other hand, while public confidence in the security organizations – the Israel Defense Forces, the Mossad, and the Israel Security Agency – declined compared to previous years, it was still relatively high (about 80 percent). A more complex picture arises from specific questions designed to probe the security organizations’ ratings. The police earned relatively low marks for its contribution to public order and the containment of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as for its concern for civil liberties. Its average score was 5 of out 10. The ISA and the IDF scored high (around 8.5) for strong operational performance and advanced technological capability. The ISA scored lower (6.9) on its contribution to the preservation of democratic governance – its mandate, by law. In effect, trust in the IDF’s operational capacity is greater than overall trust. The public’s faith in IDF operational capabilities is consistent, and last year too, an absolute majority of the public was convinced that the IDF is ready for military conflict. The response to a new question that was added this year showed that most of the public believes the IDF should assist the national effort during national crises such as the coronavirus. Only a minority believed that it should not have been involved – or alternatively, that it should be in charge of the crisis management.
External (Security) Challenges and Threats
Over the years, the majority of the public has consistently felt that Israel can successfully cope with the security threats it faces, including: terrorist attacks, serious harm to the home front in the case of a military conflict, simultaneous escalation on the northern and southern fronts and in the West Bank, and Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons. The most recent index indicated a high sense of confidence in the state’s ability to cope with these threats, although there was a decline in this confidence from previous years.
As for the severity of the external threats, it seems that the quiet that has prevailed on the northern front in the past year, unlike in recent years, explains why that arena is no longer perceived as the most significant threat. This is also the case regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, as in previous years, in 2020 only a small portion of the public ranked these threats as very significant. In contrast, a nuclear Iran is perceived as the most significant threat facing Israel at the current time. In the more than five years since the nuclear deal between Iran and world powers was reached, a nuclear Iran was not seen as a severe threat; in 2020, however, it returned to rank as the top threat. Furthermore, a significant portion of the public supported taking action against the threat, expressing support for military action against Iran if it becomes clear that it is renewing its nuclear activity, preferably in coordination with the United States. Support for military proactivity, sometimes even at the cost of risking an escalation to war, was also evident regarding Iran’s arming Hezbollah with precision missiles. It is possible that the support for military proactivity is related, albeit partially, to the sense of security in the ability to cope with defense challenges, as well as to the high level of confidence in the defense forces. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most of the public supported the two-state solution, and an even higher percentage supported solutions entailing various versions of separation. Only a very small minority supported the creation of one state and the continuation of the status quo. However, a significant portion of the public – a percentage that has grown this year – does not believe that the two-state is attainable.
Internal-Societal Threats
Before the coronavirus pandemic, Index findings showed that the public is troubled by internal threats no less than by external threats. However, at the present time it appears that the public is significantly more worried about internal threats, and only a minority is more worried about the external threats. Furthermore, in contrast with the high sense of confidence regarding the state’s ability to cope with the external threats successfully, the confidence regarding its ability to cope with internal threats is lower and marked by a significant decline in relation to the last few years. For example, the public is worried about the state’s ability to cope with corruption in the government system and with polarization between different sectors of society. Indeed, the majority of the public believes that following the coronavirus crisis there must be a change in the state’s priorities such that economic and societal issues are prioritized over the defense budget. Furthermore, most of the public (70 percent) believed that the state can successfully cope with the coronavirus crisis.
The Coronavirus Crisis: Individual Ramifications
Most of the public was very troubled by the economic and health ramifications of the pandemic. Their sense of personal vulnerability was also high, but there is a gap between the level of anxiety and actual harm. From responses to the question “To what extent are you troubled or not troubled by the coronavirus crisis?” it emerges that most of the public was especially troubled by the economic ramifications (77 percent) and the health ramifications (70 percent). Responses to the question “To what extent have you been harmed or unharmed by the coronavirus crisis?” show that a significant portion (41 percent) of the public reported having suffered economic harm, and 39 percent reported having suffered psychological harm, while only 16 percent reported having suffered harm to their health. It also emerged that certain sectors – mainly young adults and disadvantaged communities – suffered greater economic harm.
Political Values
From responses to the question “What is the value most important to you?” it emerges that “a Jewish majority in the country” continued to be the most important value to most of the public (43 percent), but that there has been a significant increase in support for the “democratic state” value after it ranked low for years (rising from 19 percent in 2019 to 35 percent last year). The responses to many questions show that most of the public is troubled by the democracy aspect and there is also a rise in the percent of those agreeing with the proposition that Israeli democracy is in danger (60 percent last year, compared to 44 percent in 2018). While the number of those who deemed themselves troubled was significantly higher among the political center or left than it was among those from the right, among rightists too there was a significant number of respondents who were troubled by democracy aspects. The importance of “democracy” features in many questions. An especially large majority agreed that “Israeli society is a democratic society,” “the State of Israel must not be a non-democracy,” “only the democratic process allows us to manage disputes without violence,” “there is no contradiction between Jewish values and democratic values,” and more. That said, it appears that every side of the political map regards democracy from a different angle. Thus, for example, the public is divided on the question of whether “the current government harms democracy.” Attitudes on the justice system are also a source of dispute. A significant portion (40 percent) agreed that “it is the justice system that harms democracy”.
Solidarity in Israeli Society
Similar to the 2019 findings (before the pandemic), in 2020 the majority of the public believed that the sense of solidarity in Israeli society has weakened. It further emerges that there is intolerance toward others and a fear that one’s own group will be muzzled. Thus, for example, a large portion of the public identified with the statement “groups that I do not agree with set the agenda,” “the group that I belong to is being silenced,” “in Israel, groups with lifestyles different from mine are growing stronger and will in the future prevent me from preserving my way of life,” and a significant portion even voiced worry that “if I voice my political views, I will pay a personal price.”
As the distribution of the political map between the right and left has shifted over the past decade, the majority of the public believe that the main cause of the weakening of the sense of solidarity is the tension between political wings. Other sources of tension – between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jewish Israelis, between rich and poor, and between Jews and Arabs in Israel – rank far behind and are not considered by a significant portion of the public to be the main causes of the decline in solidarity.
At the same time, there appears to be a desire for cohesion and solidarity. Most of the public agreed that this year too, that “all of Israel are responsible for one another,” that Jews will always help one another in times of trouble (80 percent), and that their “common ground with most Jews in Israel is greater than the differences.”
In conclusion, the National Security Index finds that religious identity – and, even more, political identity – has the salient impact on the public’s positions regarding some of the core security and statecraft issues. However, the Israeli public shares common narratives, led by “we can rely only on ourselves” (82 percent), and “the existence of Israel is a natural, historic right of the people of Israel in the land of Israel” (91 percent).
More Details to Follow
