Insights on BDS further to INSS-BICOM workshop
The following paper has been produced following expert workshops hosted by INSS and
BICOM in Tel Aviv on June 11th, 2015. The workshops drew on experiences from the UK as a
case study, but the aim was to draw out principles that are generalizable across Western
liberal states where the BDS phenomenon can be found.
The phenomenon addressed
The BDS campaign against Israel is a global movement that was popularized in 2005
following a Palestinian Civil Society Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against
Israel. This call is a concerted attempt to impose a pariah status on Israel, ex-communicating
and out-casting it from the international community. The movement, which comprises of
over 170 Palestinian organizations, defines its campaign as nonviolent. It urges Israel to end
the occupation of all Arab lands; recognize the rights of Arab citizens of Israel to full equality;
and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes as stipulated in UN
Resolution 194.
In the UK, BDS activities include vocal demonstrations and protests in campuses, shops
selling Israeli goods, etc. In addition, BDS activists, who are usually highly active political
individuals, also use democratic structures of membership and representative bodies to pass
boycott or divestment policy motions, e.g. in political parties, trade unions, co-ops student
unions, NGOs and sometimes faith groups.
Despite the ongoing BDS campaign, Israel's overall trade with Western states has not been
impacted and boycott resolutions advanced by students groups have not been officially
adopted by universities. It is difficult however to measure the extent to which there is quiet
divestment – such as companies and investors that are thinking twice about doing business
in Israel for fear of attracting public condemnation, or artists and conference organizers who
are hesitant to host Israelis or perform in Israel.
Moreover, BDS and the ensuing delegitimization of Israel pose a strategic threat to Israel in
the long run because of their impact on the middle-ground. Through concerted and
methodological campaigns Israel is equated with apartheid, genocide, ethnic cleansing and
everything evil, which liberal, human-rights conscious individuals believe they should stand
against. One of the most troubling elements of the phenomenon is that criticism over Israeli
policies transforms into a questioning of Israel's very right to exist, unlike in the case of
criticism directed at other states (such as China, Iran, Sudan etc.)
The anti-Israel sentiments of public opinion might have only a limited impact on the official
establishment for the time being, but this gap is not sustainable over time. In the South
African case which the BDS struggle is modeled after, both President Reagan and PM
Thatcher imposed sanctions on South Africa against their own will.
2) Factors which contribute to Israel's deteriorating international legitimacy
The substantial framework
The conflict is not framed as a political conflict between two parties with conflicting
claims, but as a conflict of justice and of basic human rights. The Palestinians are
presented to have just demands for the fulfilment of their fundamental right of selfdetermination
which Israel does not respect. With this framing international
expectations are made only towards Israel.
Israel's legitimation is based on the partition of the land into an Israeli and a
Palestinian state. If Israel does not acknowledge the threshold issue of the two
states for two peoples then its own right to exist is undermined.
The right of the Jews in Israel is seen as conditional: the Jewish people are here as a
compensation for their suffering but that right ceases to exist when the Jewish
people inflict suffering upon another people.
Israel lacks credibility as for its commitment to reach a peaceful resolution of the
conflict, through the implementation of the two-state solution.
There is a need to have a non-violent option of opposing the Israeli occupation and
BDS actions serve this function.
Israel appears to flout its obligations under international law as exemplified by its
disregard for UN resolutions (mainly of the UNHRC and UNGA); International Court
of Justice opinions (the "Separation Wall advisory opinion"), and reports by official
UN rapporteurs and NGOs. Israel's lack of cooperation with UN representatives and
bodies commissioned to draft these reports also serves as substantiation for these
claims.
Israel as a ‘Jewish State’ is severely misunderstood internationally and creates
doubts regarding Israel's democratic values, especially with regard to the status of
the non-Jewish Israeli citizens.
Antisemitism plays an implicit role in the anti-Israel campaign. In some cases
Antisemitism is translated or manifested as anti-Zionism.
Media and social media impact
Israel faces disproportionate media coverage, both in quantitative terms (e.g. the
number of journalists covering Israel, stories filed, length), and in qualitative terms,
i.e. every Israeli problem, perceived or real, is magnified out of proportion. Much
media coverage of Israel is prejudicial, as indicated by three prongs: singling out,
implying double standards and almost always finding the target (i.e. Israel) guilty.
Images of conflict which pour out of Gaza are powerful in shaping the perception of
a mighty Israel vs. a weak Palestine (images of Israel as David and Arabs as Goliath
have been swapped around).
Information Technology (IT) and social media play a central role in amplifying
problematic images and controversial Israeli policies.
3) Irresponsible rhetoric from Israeli position-holders, even if aimed at local audiences,
backfires globally and is used to vilify Israel.
Conveying the Israeli narrative
While the Palestinian narrative is clear and evocative (i.e. Palestinian dispossession,
‘settlements’ and ‘occupation’ have been injected into mainstream discourse), there
is no clear and coherent Israeli narrative.
There has been an intellectual framing of Zionism as racism, apartheid, and
ethnocracy, whereas counter arguments lack depth and succumb to presenting
bullet points instead of serious arguments. This ‘bullet pointing’ and shortening
should come in the context of a coherent intellectual framework
Only by being unimpeachable on commitment to two states and democracy can
Israel buy leverage and political space to attack the other side as being nondemocratic
or opposed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Absence of negotiations with the Palestinians makes a counter response to BDS
much more difficult.
Labelling anti-Israeli statements and actions as anti-Semitism weakens Israeli
arguments in many cases, particularly in the UK.
It is necessary to distinguish between relevant and legitimate criticism – from which
no state is immune – and illegitimate criticism against Israel.
Policy Recommendations – what needs to be done to counter the BDS phenomenon?
The broader policy framework
The credibility of the claim that the State of Israel is liberal, democratic, and committed to a
negotiated two-state solution, is integral to the ability of Israel and its supporters to
promote Israel’s legitimacy as the nation state of the Jewish people and to marginalise the
BDS activists, by exposing their ambivalence to a two-state solution and their weak
democratic credentials. Actions which undermine this claim, whether by statements,
legislation or actual actions on the ground are fuel for BDS activists, and undercut Israel’s
supporters in liberal societies.
Operational structure
1. Israel should establish an official government counter-BDS centre under one
ministry headed by a senior figure. This government structure will be responsible for
ongoing monitoring and evaluating of the threat, and for fleshing out a long term
strategy to deal with BDS on both strategic and tactical levels incorporating tools
such as public diplomacy. Such a government centre will also be a place of guidance
for ministers and other position holders on how to respond to BDS development,
playing a role in sensitizing politicians to messages they communicate both to local
and international audiences.
2. Government research and consultation should be conducted to engage the network
of pro-Israel activists and groups around the world regarding how the Government
of Israel can best utilize their capabilities and support on the one hand, and assist
their activities on the other.
3. A civil society non-government centre monitoring relevant developments in BDS and
tracking counter efforts should be established. This centre will disseminate best
practices and other relevant information regarding BDS-related developments to
organizations working on countering BDS worldwide, with a view to promote
efficiency and avoid double-spending.
4. BDS is a civil society initiative and it should thus be countered on the ground by
Israeli and global civil society efforts. The first circle of defence against BDS is the
Jewish (and other pro-Israeli) communities across the globe. Such communities
should be proactively engaged by Israel. Particular efforts need to be channelled to
cultivating the younger generation which feels a growing apathy towards Israel and
is less willing to be at the forefront of BDS counter-efforts. Simultaneously
supportive non-Jewish groups abroad should be encouraged, based on the rationale
that claims in support of Israel made by this constituency resonate most.
5. Critics of Israeli policy, who are supportive of the right of Israel to exist, should be
harnessed to join the fight against the delegitimizers of Israel who oppose the right
of Israel to exist. This should be done by conducting a dialogue between such critics
and Israeli policy makers, as well as NGOs supporting Israel, in which different
opinions can be expressed.
6. Establishing projects of public diplomacy and ‘soft power’ should be considered. For
example, creating an Israeli equivalent based on the model of the British Council.
(The British Council is a UK publicly funded charity with offices in 100 countries
which promotes British culture, arts and academic and scientific exchange.)
Countering hard-core BDS efforts
7. The establishment of a neutral, non-Jewish body should be promoted on campuses
with the aim of hampering BDS aggressive campaigns by monitoring student conduct
and debates; ensuring academic freedom; eliminating a threatening environment for
all students; promoting freedom of speech and a dignified, civil discourse as well as
a constructive student-culture on campuses.
8. Efforts should be made to identify BDS plans to conduct activities in trade unions
and other organizations, as well as BDS action-plans on campuses. Based on the
knowledge of such intentions, there should be a counter plan to insert pro-Israel
(not necessarily Jewish) activists and activities that will focus on preventing anti-
Israel resolutions (based on substantial arguments regarding prejudice or
discrimination for example).
9. Counter-BDS activities should be based on the determination of the best approach
to the given case, made in conjunction with the local counter-BDS activists, and not
on the basis of a general one-size-fits-all strategy.
10. The funding of BDS should be investigated (particularly by the Israeli establishment)
in order to expose connections to hostile forces or official foreign government
funding, with the end goal of reducing BDS financial resources.
Addressing the moderate minds
11. Israel needs to unmask what BDS proponents really think, emphasizing that they are
not democrats, and do not endorse the two-state solution, thereby splitting the
radical left BDS supporters from the moderate ones.
12. It is useful to emphasize that supporting BDS runs counter to the aim of reaching a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, since it weakens the moderates and strengthens
the extremists on both sides.
13. Israel needs academic counter-research to address international developments in
terms of understanding the Israeli narrative and especially the complexity of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such an intellectual infrastructure should counter the
anti-Zionist intellectual work which the de-legitimization campaign bases itself upon.
As such, the intellectual counter-BDS effort should be easily accessible to the public
at-large. An example of this would be a project for the study of contemporary
antizionism, webcasts, conferences, a book series and academic courses. Such an
academic infrastructure will contribute towards constructing an intellectual firewall
between legitimate criticism of Israel and de-legitimization; and to building a
political firewall between fringe and mainstream through normalising criticism of
Israel.
14. Prejudice towards Israel needs to be exposed and there should be a clear demand to
deal with it as with any other case of discrimination or prejudice (without focusing
on the controversial and antagonistic ‘antisemitism’ argument).
15. Israel government communications must be framed and conveyed, in terms of style,
messaging, language, emphasis, etc., taking into account the target audience. When
targeting moderate minds in the centre ground it is important to convey, in both
tone and substance, the meta-message that Israel is a mature and responsible
liberal democracy. Aggressive militaristic messages or insinuations that Jews or
Israelis are better than others are damaging.
16. Israel needs to frame its positions in a way that explains the compatibility of its
position with international law and human rights, making the case that both Arabs
and Jews have a right to the land and the question is how to share it.
17. Individual relationships are crucial for shaping perceptions about Israel. The most
effective counter efforts have proven to be one-on-one exchange programs which
bring foreign academics, journalists, students, politicians, and so forth to Israel. In
addition sending supporters of Israel to participate in conferences abroad, making
the case for Israel across international platforms, is useful too.