Prolonged War on One of Israel’s Fronts

Key Findings

The proportion of those selecting this scenario rose from 23% in the previous wave to 27% in the current wave, and concurrently, the perceived likelihood of its occurrence also increased— from 50% to 59%. 57% expect high or very high damage should it occur (55% in the previous wave, with no statistically significant difference). In the July survey, 20% of the full public sample assess the State’s preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Should this threat occur, the anticipated damage is particularly pronounced regarding financial security and standard of living (63%), emotional and social resilience (63%), and sense of personal security (62%).

Selected as One of the Three Most Threatening Scenarios over the Next Five Years

Public – July 2026 Public – February 2026 Experts – February 2026

Selected as the Single Most Significant Threat

Public – July 2026 Public – February 2026 Experts – February 2026

Likelihood of the Scenario Occurring within the Next Five Years

High or Very High Likelihood Moderate Likelihood Low or Very Low Likelihood Don’t Know

Public – July 2026

59%28%9%

Public – February 2026

50%32%15%

Experts – February 2026

59%25%16%

Anticipated Damage to the State of Israel if the Scenario Occurs

High or Very High Damage Moderate Damage Little or No Damage Don’t Know

Public – July 2026

57%33%7%

Public – February 2026

55%33%10%

Experts – February 2026

64%31%

Public – July 2026

How Prepared Is Israel Currently to Cope with This Scenario?

Full Public Sample

High or Very High Preparedness 32%

Moderate Preparedness 44%

Low or Very Low Preparedness 20%

Don’t Know 3%

Public – July 2026

Expected Degree of Impact across Different Domains

High or Very High Impact Moderate Impact Low or No Impact Don’t Know

Functioning of State Authorities

46%29%22%

Sense of Personal Security

62%24%12%

Financial Security and Standard of Living

63%22%13%

Emotional and Social Resilience

63%24%12%