Undermining the State’s Democratic Character
Key Findings
This scenario was selected by 31% of the public as one of the three main threats, a similar proportion to the previous wave (34%), while 15% identified it as the single most significant threat. 37% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high, and 68% believe that if it occurs, the damage caused will be high or very high, with no statistically significant change compared to the previous wave. Perceived preparedness to cope with this scenario is among the lowest: 55% of the full public sample assess the State’s preparedness as low or very low. Although the scenario is perceived by the public as a significant threat, it is even more prominent among experts: in the previous wave, 67% selected it as one of the three main threats, and 45% cited it as the single most significant threat.
The anticipated damage is high and relatively uniform across all four domains examined (59%–62%).
Selected as the Single Most Significant Threat
Likelihood of the Scenario Occurring within the Next Five Years
Public – July 2026
Public – February 2026
Experts – February 2026
Anticipated Damage to the State of Israel if the Scenario Occurs
Public – July 2026
Public – February 2026
Experts – February 2026
Public – July 2026
How Prepared Is Israel Currently to Cope with This Scenario?
Full Public Sample
Public – July 2026