Moderator: Amb. Dr. Oded Eran
ECONOMIC DEBATE: Prof. Stanley Fischer | Prof. François Heisbourg
POLITICAL DEBATE: The Hon. Jane Harman | Prof. Igor Yurgens
ME SECURITY DEBATE: Gen. (ret.) David H. Petraeus | Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin
This panel addressed the implications of the Trump Presidency for domains ranging from global stability to U.S. engagement in the Middle East to the prospects of an Israeli-Palestinian peace.
What was, in your view, the most destabilizing decision this US president took in 2018?
Stanley Fischer (SF): The basic problem was that Trump decided to break the traditional arrangements of the US with its allies, and to break the system of military and economic agreements the US set up after WWII. The world economy does not work without a hegemon. The US was that hegemon, but no longer wants to be. The question is what will replace it. We will soon know what the trade agreement with China will entail, and depending on the outcome we will know to what extent Trump decided to hand over the world economy to China.
Jane Harman (JH): I’m not sure there is a world according to Trump, unless it’s Trump. Whatever he wishes to do, that’s his world. One of the destabilizing actions has been the decision, with no support in his administration or elsewhere (except perhaps in Turkey), was to withdraw from Syria. I would also note the impulsive decision to shut down the government, a colossally dangerous decision which showed the world that the White House and the US Congress are dysfunctional.
David Petraeus (DP): It’s still worth reading the tweets, but then follow the troops, the money and the policy. You may be surprised. For example, NATO is actually better off under Trump than under his predecessor, as the US is spending much more on defense. But when it comes to the destabilizing impact, there is a certain ambivalence about continued US leadership about the post-WWII rules-based order. But it’s an ambivalence, it’s not a certain withdrawal from the world stage. Note, for example, VP Pence’s comments all but announcing a new Cold War. The question is whether the US will go it alone or whether it will have allies and partners in standing up to a country which has given the world reason for grievances (Russia).
Igor Yurgens (IY): From the Russian standpoint, the decision to withdraw from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) Treaty was a disaster. The end of SALT, the end of START, these would be very dangerous. Here, Russia is on the same page with Macron, Merkel and others in Europe. Trump pushed us to a more dangerous world than before.
Francois Heisbourg (FH): At the G7 meeting in Canada, Trump threw a few Starburst candies at Angela Merkel and said, “Don’t say I never gave you anything, Angela.” Why is this important? Trump has a vision, even if he doesn’t have a strategy. It’s a vision of a world without allies. At the G7 meeting in question, Trump promised to destroy the G7 itself and NATO. The Syria decision told us that speaking with a dictator can be followed by a tweet indicating, “We are out.” This could apply to South Korea, to NATO, and so on. The other destabilizing incident was the removal of James Mattis.
Amos Yadlin (AY): Last year, the concerns about Trump were huge and revolved around the prospect of going to war. The pressure on North Korea, the South China Sea, these seemed to portend war. But in 2018, what I found encouraging is that tweeting is not killing anyone, it’s not sending aircraft carriers anywhere, and it’s not arming nuclear missiles. War with North Korea, an attack on Iran, and even a kinetic confrontation with Russia haven’t come to pass.
Has the US President eroded deterrence of rogue states from pursuing their nuclear plans?
DP: Deterrence is founded on an adversary’s perceptions of your capabilities and your will. Iran has seen the US use force twice in Syria, so it likely wonders whether this president will use force, likely more than they wondered under his predecessor. With respect to North Korea, at the very least, the meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un resulted in a slowing down of nuclear testing. It hasn’t resulted in a resolution, and we still don’t have a full inventory of North Korea’s capability. But the target of those talks was China, and there are signs they did have a deterrent effect.
AY: Deterrence is more difficult to achieve against building a force than it is against the use of an established force. So on the matter of developing capabilities (ballistic missiles, for example), deterrence in Iran and North Korea has been much weaker. On the nonconventional Iranian activity, the Americans are basically doing nothing – but this is similar to Obama’s approach, though there the reasoning was because the Administration didn’t want to jeopardize the nuclear deal.
IY: We had an illusion that Trump would be friendly to Putin, but the American system is much more sophisticated than some of our calculations. So we’re currently in a more difficult situation. Some conspiracy theorists would say, for Trump to get out of Syria drags Russia deeper in. So if I compare Obama and Trump, Obama/Kerry were a gift to us compared to Trump/Bolton.
DP: Russia is seen as having “won” in Syria, but that’s far from a given. And the sanctions on Russia are having powerful impacts on its economy. So the picture is more mixed when it comes to Russia. China has continued its extraordinary growth in the last few years.
Is Trump totally wrong in the aggressive policy toward China, given the trade balance between China and the US?
SF: Almost totally wrong, yes. This is a way of getting the Chinese to stop some of the measures they’re taking, including getting technology transfers “in an unusual way.” Something had to be done about that. But what he’s done is open the door to a terrible trade system. Once you start using tariffs on particular goods, you’re in a different world, one in which corruption is the main method of getting changes in the tariff structure. We’ve been there before, though not in the US and not in Israel, but in other parts of the world, and it took us a long time to dismantle such a system. It doesn’t work, it’s not efficient, and it’s just not a good idea. He won’t get long-run results.
JH: Trump is right on the theft of intellectual property, an issue the Obama administration was too timid about. But he’s using a sledgehammer, not a scalpel, against countries including Canada (!). Our strength in the US is in our economy, and yet the conversation remains stuck on kinetic and nuclear operations.
What is the European view of the trade wars?
FH: Some may think Europe is in terminal decline, but the fact is we’re the largest trading bloc in the world. So when Trump began the trade war with China in March 2018, Brussels sent feelers to Washington, but because in Trump’s world any sign of engagement is seen as a weakness, the response, instead of saying “let’s gang up on China together,” Trump slapped tariffs on European aluminum and steel. So if Europe was getting ready to go up against China, it’s now doing that despite the US and not in concert with the US.
Let’s zoom in on the Middle East. Is Trump totally wrong, from the US standpoint, to pull out from the Middle East? Can some of the traditional allies in the region survive in the US’ absence?
AY: From the Israeli perspective, I would stress that it’s important not to panic. Also, be slightly paranoid. In other words, we need to wait and see, and acknowledge that the US is not entirely leaving the region. They don’t want boots on the ground, but Israel will never ask Americans to spill blood for us. We do hope that the US will continue to remain our key strategic ally.
DP: I dispute the premise that the US is withdrawing from the region. The fact is the US still have huge bases around the region. I don’t think the US is going anywhere. The real question is what about the withdrawal from Syria, and what about the desire to draw down forces in Afghanistan? We need to ensure that Iran can’t establish a ground line of communications from Tehran into southern Lebanon. This is crucial. So if we pull out of Tanf, it will be used by the Iranians to that end. We also need to be concerned about the fate of those alongside whom we fought. And in Afghanistan, too, I’d question how we can achieve our objectives without a presence on the ground.
JH: It’s just a political fact that in the US there is war fatigue. Both Obama and Trump ran on campaigns to get us out of wars in the region. But are we withdrawing from the region? We can’t. There is no way the US will ever abandon its commitment to the existence of the State of Israel. But additionally, there are huge dangers in the region based on the possibility of miscalculations.
Let’s move on to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Is the Deal of the Century even relevant or important?
SF: If the Deal of the Century solves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then it’s worth it, yes. But what we’re seeing now looks very much like a plan to give Israel everything it wants and to abandon the Palestinians. And that’s not a recipe for a resolution.
JH: I’m not sure what the deal contains, and I’m not even sure we’ll ever see it. The way to solve this is an all-in deal, not a five-minute proposition.
DP: I don’t know what the deal contains. But I have come away with a sense that folks in the administration have been very deeply engaged in this over the past few years. I don’t believe the political leaders on either side, especially on the Palestinian side, are in a position to agree to a deal and make it a reality. This may not be the time for a homerun, but for singles and doubles.
IY: Russia is back in the Middle East, and we’re playing on all fields as a balancing force. Good relations with Iran, with Turkey, with Israel, and historically good relations with Palestinians, Syrians and so on. So we’re in a good position to help. Russia-Israel relations have never been as strong as they are today. Putin understands the role of Israel in the Middle East, and the place of Jews in the Russian Federation.
FH: I must admit I forgot what the Deal of the Century was all about. Nothing will happen if the Israelis and Palestinians don’t work out the problems between themselves. Arab states can offer support, Iran can be bludgeoned, and so on. But I’m not holding my breath and my expectations are as low as they were a year ago.
To Amos: Is there a way we can influence the content of the deal before it is released?
AY: Any “Deal” should come in the first year of a Presidency. Any more time and we reach the midterm elections, then an election in Israel. So one lesson is that if you want to offer a deal, best to do so in the first year of your first term. The West Wing deserves a medal for keeping this a secret. I am not optimistic about the possibility of reaching an agreement in the short term, but the INSS has presented a plan that a real leader in Israel can seize.