Moderator: Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel
Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon | Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amir Eshel | Brig. Gen. (res.) Yoram Hamo
Campaign between the wars: Nitsan Alon remarked that the campaign between wars was the preparation between the wars, and the high readiness for war. The point is to avoid escalation but still to operate. Eisenkot is seen as having enriched and conceptualized this, and he introduced many actions that the IDF did routinely. They were small campaigns between wars that had achievements.
How do you weigh one war against the other: Yoram Hamo stated that if the war breaks out, we will have better conditions. It is constant risk management. It requires short and focused activities that can be controlled.
Regarding the thousands of sorties that the IDF is doing, what is the point: In terms of when EIsenkot was chief of staff, this action has four parameters: 1. To attack potential threats and to not wait on the border, but rather to be proactive. 2. The Iranian issue, which was typical of the Eisenkot period, and the military objective is to motivate a political effort, not necessarily an Israeli one, to remove the Iranians out of Syria. 3. To deter and postpone war by action. 4. If war does break out, then the conditions for victory will be better.
When asked whether the IDF had stopped the Iranians in Syria, Nitsan Alon replied that yes, we did, and this is a rare issue in which the military and political point of views align. Both the military and the government understand the potential threat from Iran. Israel must exert pressure on Iran to leave Syria. While in the end, it will be Iran’s decision, Israel can use psychological warfare, military diplomacy, economic pressure, to get them out of Syria.
The panel agreed that the conditions are changing and it was not like the 1970s when the IDF used to do sorties into the skies of Syria. The two players, Russia and Iran are different players, and with Russia, a war could develop. Russian presence narrows Israel’s freedom of action. Israel is trying to create a thinking process and to learn from the frictions. For example, the IDF speaks directly to Russian military officials to understand what their interests are and to better understand the danger.
The idea that the government uses the army to create a world of images was also discussed. Yoram Hamo agreed that results have to do with images, since we live in a world of images. Most of the activities are a result of analysis that is approved by the government. However, there is no goal of trying to “show off” in order to serve political needs.
When asked about Lebanon, Amir Eshel responded that we do not have sporadic overt activities there, but rather cyber activities, covert actions, combined actions. We cannot just look at Lebanon, however, but must look to the alternatives. They are: 1. Continuing what the IDF is doing even though it doesn’t stop the smuggling completely 2. Get the Iranians out of Syria, although our military capacities alone will not remove the Iranians. A political effort will and the address is Russia. There is a chance for escalation, but the Russians will not let it happen, as it’s a threat to the project in Syria, Assad.
As for campaigns between wars, the idea is the cooperation of capabilities and to do everything covertly. It can prevent war from escalating. This approach is not new and we have operations on an ongoing basis.
When asked about Eisenkot’s legacy, Nitzan Alon stated that the incoming Chief of Staff Kochavi will work properly, and will continue the process of thought and adjustment to change that Eisenkot had started.