The war called by Israel “Swords of Iron” began with an unprecedented surprise attack by Hamas that led to the death of hundreds of Israelis and the abduction of dozens more. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is following the events carefully, providing situation updates and policy recommendations for decision makers and the general public.
After approximately a year and a half of war in the Gaza Strip, Israel stands at a crossroads and must formulate a relevant strategy regarding the future of the Strip. It faces a rather grim range of alternatives, all problematic in their implications and feasibility: encouraging “voluntary emigration”—an option whose strategic consequences have not been thoroughly examined in Israel and whose feasibility is low; occupying the Strip and imposing prolonged military rule—while this may severely weaken Hamas, it does not guarantee its eradication, and comes with the risk of endangering the Israeli hostages held by Hamas and incurring other significant long-term costs to Israel; establishing a moderate Palestinian governance in the Strip with international and Arab support—an option whose costs to Israel are low, but currently lacks an effective mechanism for demilitarizing the Strip and dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities; and finally, the possibility that political and military stabilization initiatives will fail, leaving Hamas in power.
Israel’s National Security Concept: Functional Incoherence and the October 7 Disaster
The October 7, 2023, attack recharged discussions surrounding Israel’s national security concept. This article claims that the national security concept consists of three interwoven layers—security doctrine, security strategy and military strategy (or operational concept in the Israeli jargon)—and that their misalignment is a prominent reason that led to Israel’s failure. Accordingly, the article attempts to present a partial answer to why the October 7 failure occurred, unlike the investigations so far, which address what happened and not why. The author argues that the renewed discussion of this issue does not distinguish clearly enough between the national security concept per se and its implementation through security decision-making. The principles of the existing national security concept were relevant enough to successfully cope with the October 7 attack, and the failure resulted from how they were applied in practice by both the political echelon and the military leadership. The article presents and analyzes the three layers of the national security concept and their misalignment in the years before October 7, 2023, and examines the corrections needed to improve decision-making processes and the functional coherence of the national security concept.
