INSS Presents H. E. President Isaac Herzog with “Strategic Challenges Facing Israel, and Policy Recommendations”

 

July 28, 2021

At the start of H. E. President Isaac Herzog’s term of office, and following the many global and local developments and changes over the past six months – including a new administration in Washington, President Biden’s decision to try to return to the nuclear deal with Iran, the formation of a new government in Israel, and growing tensions in Israeli society, including clashes between Arabs and Jews in Israeli cities – the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) presented to President Herzog highlights on the main strategic challenges facing Israel and policy recommendations for addressing those challenges.

Findings on the main strategic challenges and policy recommendations were submitted to President Herzog at his official residence on Tuesday, July 27, 2021, at 3 p.m. INSS Director Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg and selected INSS researchers reviewed the leading current challenges facing the country and presented policy recommendations that can advance opportunities for Israel.

Upon receiving the INSS material, President Herzog said: “The report by INSS on Israel’s strategic challenges illustrates the extent of the national challenges facing the State of Israel. Security and national challenges, along with society and the economy, are interlocking elements. I am impressed by the depth of the analysis, and decision makers would do well to review the material presented in the report.”

Click here for the report presented to the President.

 

Read the full press release

The Main Strategic Challenges and Policy Recommendations

 

The Iranian nuclear program is the most serious threat to Israel. Iran is acquiring the necessary knowledge and experience to obtain nuclear weapons – it is making progress on high level enrichment of uranium and has begun producing metallic uranium, suitable for a military rather than a civilian program. Iran is also acquiring technological nuclear capabilities in the operation of advanced centrifuges.

Iran is continuing and even accelerating the development of fissile material essential for nuclear weapons, under cover of the negotiations underway primarily in Vienna, i.e., the six rounds of discussions to date with the superpowers over the return to the nuclear agreement of 2015 (the JCPOA). As the talks drag on, the question arises whether Tehran wishes to return to the agreement or is playing for time. Meanwhile it has crossed lines that were never previously crossed – uranium enrichment to 60 percent, production of metallic uranium, and reduced supervision – in order to position itself as a nuclear threshold state, and reduce the time required for a breakout to nuclear weapons.

With respect to the short term, two scenarios must be considered: reaching and not reaching a new agreement. Each of these scenarios has great significance for Israel. If an agreement is reached, Israel and the United States must discuss the next stage in depth – how to promote a lengthy follow-up agreement with stronger supervision, what it will include, and what will happen if it is not achieved, while maintaining Israel’s freedom of action. At the same time, Israel must ensure the existence of a credible military option to counter Iran, and prepare for the second scenario – failure to reach an agreement, while Iran positions itself as a near nuclear threshold state with the ability to breaking out to a nuclear weapon within a few months.

In the regional arena, Iran continues to consolidate its political, military, and economic influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Iran reinforces its influence through the spread of long-range weapons – missiles and attack UAVs; and the establishment of local militias that it controls and develops with weapons, training, and finance. Iran’s entrenchment, in terms of both presence and influence in the region, is a long-term strategic project, and although it is currently languishing given Iran’s severe economic and budgetary crisis due to American sanctions, Iran has found resources to invest in the project. Israel must continue to try to obstruct Iranian entrenchment in the northern arena and disrupt its subversive regional activity as part of the ongoing campaign between wars (CBW), while improving capabilities and avoiding signs of weakening in its struggle against Iranian influence.

In the wake of Israeli attacks, Tehran has an open account with Israel. The blows Iran suffered over the past year that were attributed to Israel – the targeted killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, damage to its advanced centrifuge assembly facility, damage to the electrical system at the Natanz site that destroyed about half the centrifuges, and the attacks in Syria – have not so far seen a “fitting” Iranian response (one that won’t deteriorate into total hostilities), but it will come when conditions permit.

The northern arena: the potential threat in the northern arena is reinforced by the weakness and even imminent collapse of Lebanon and the ongoing division of the Syrian state, allowing Iran to increase its involvement and build a “war machine” that is more and more based on the ability to launch precision attacks deep into Israeli territory.

Although there is mutual deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah, there is greater potential for deterioration because of actions that could create a dynamic of escalation.

Lebanon is collapsing as a result of the political crisis and power struggles between sectoral elites; the impotence of the political system, which has failed to deal with the profound economic, social, and political crisis and renders the government unable to meet the needs of its population; the healthcare crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has so far claimed the lives of some 8,000 Lebanese; and the ongoing effects of the explosion at the Beirut Port (August 2020), which left some 200,000 people homeless. International willingness to assist Lebanon is conditioned on the formation of a functioning and less corrupt government, able to promote political-governmental and economic reforms. Among the general public there is evidence of despair and an increased desire to emigrate, with rising rates of violence and signs of anarchy.

In spite of its difficult situation and the growing internal criticism directed against it, Hezbollah retains its power and continues to reinforce its grip on the Lebanese system, while building the precision attack capabilities that make it a real and severe threat to Israel and the spearhead of the anti-Israel Shiite axis. Notwithstanding Hezbollah’s belligerent declarations during Operation Guardian of the Walls and the freedom given to Palestinian factions to fire rockets into Israel from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah is restrained, although it continues to challenge Israel and test the rules of the game. The IDF must prepare for scenarios of escalation, including clashes with Hezbollah that could develop into war in the north.

Israel’s government must determine the “when and how” to deal with the precision missile project. In addition, Israel must promote an international and regional effort to prevent Lebanon’s slide into anarchy or civil war, or a seizure of power by Hezbollah.

Syria is divided, mired in a deep economic crisis and far from reconstruction or a settlement and political reforms. The crisis heightens the regime’s dependence on Russia and Iran.

Iran’s entrenchment in Iran is multi-dimensional, dynamic, and currently focused on the effort to recruit local manpower, to move the center of gravity to the east and north (Aleppo), and to reinforce civilian entrenchment through investment in real estate and educational and cultural institutions. Alongside the dominance of Hezbollah forces and militias under Iranian influence on the Golan Heights, southern Syria is a no man’s land subject to bloody fighting between local groups, rebels, Hezbollah, Iranian proxies, regime supporters, and Russian forces. Turkey, for its part, continues to strengthen its presence in territories it has captured in northern Syria and to clash with the Kurds.

Russia and Iran compete for influence in Syria, but are dependent on each other. For both of them, Assad’s rule guarantees their military and economic assets in Syria, and neither envisions an alternative to his regime. The Biden administration is still formulating its strategy toward Syria and maintaining an American military presence, which from Israel’s viewpoint is an essential barrier to stop Iran from taking control of the Iraqi-Syrian border area and extending the land bridge from Tehran to Damascus and Beirut.

Israel must recognize that Syria will remain divided, and that as long as Assad is the sovereign, there is no possibility of driving Iran and its proxies out of the country. In order to limit the Iranian threat from Syria while continuing the CBW, Israel must adopt a proactive policy of pushing Iran and its proxies out of Syria – by means of international and regional cooperation and by forming and supporting a network of possible allies within the country.

The Palestinian system: the assumption that the Palestinian arena is marginal to the international and regional agenda has been undermined. It is important to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and promote understandings with Hamas in order to achieve a long-lasting ceasefire that includes the subject of the prisoners and missing soldiers, and reconstruction of Gaza Strip infrastructures.

Events in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in the first months of the year were once again the focus of local, regional, and international attention. The Biden administration has in effect discarded the Trump Plan and renewed contacts with the Palestinian Authority; the internal legitimacy of the PA has been eroded by the cancellation/suspension of the plan to hold elections for the Legislative Council and the presidency; tension in Jerusalem has risen, and Palestinians, including Arab citizens of Israel, joined in the protests against Israeli policy on the Temple Mount and in the Jewish areas in East Jerusalem; the clashes in Jerusalem and the struggles between Hamas and Fatah for leadership of the Palestinian camp led to Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Palestinian protests in Jerusalem and the West Bank during this conflict highlighted the limitations of Israel’s long-time policy of separation, with encouragement of the internal Palestinian rift. In effect Israel accepted Hamas rule of the Strip while seeking to restrain and weaken it, while the Palestinian Authority was the “contractor” that dealt with civilian and security matters in the West Bank, although it is not a partner for a political settlement. However, over the years, Hamas grew stronger, AND erosion of the PA’s legitimacy continued.

Recent developments and events should prompt renewed Israeli thinking about the conflict with the Palestinians. An updated approach is needed, and consequently a new policy:

  • The PA must be strengthened in order to achieve stability in the West Bank and to retain it as a partner in a future settlement, while maintaining high level dialogue and extending security coordination.
  • Preparations must be made for the post-Abu Mazen era, particularly since Hamas continues to gain strength.
  • Israel must promote a long term ceasefire in Gaza, brokered by the Egyptians with international help, including the Strip’s reconstruction and economic development, while establishing an effective mechanism to prevent its over-empowerment.
  • Israel must improve its preparedness for a military operation in the Strip, including ground maneuvers designed to cause serious damage to the Hamas military wing.

The international system: Israeli policy must be adapted to global trends: establish close relations with President Biden, renew the dialogue with the European Union, strengthen ties with Jewish communities, and prepare for struggles on the legal front.

The central factor shaping strategy in the international system remains unchanged – the global competition between the powers, particularly the United States and China. This competition is underway on economic, technological, security, and political fronts, as well as at the level of values and ideology. After years of increasing weakness of multilateral institutions and mechanisms, US President Biden seeks to reorganize the international system under his leadership. Biden’s strategy is to set up a broad international coalition of democratic states and other parties, as a counterweight to the competing camp led by authoritarian regimes, and above all China. The administration is promoting an international agenda, with top priority for the climate crisis as a shared global issue, while aiming to defuse any risks of escalation and friction (with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Turkey) and to focus on what it sees as the main challenge – strategic competition with China, which it believes is the most serious threat to the United States and the free world. In this framework, the United States is reducing its military forces in the Middle East (it has withdrawn from Afghanistan) and moving the emphasis to South and East Asia.

The Middle East therefore has low priority for the international system, apart from the efforts to return to the nuclear deal with Iran and contain focuses of military and civilian unrest that endanger sources of energy and shipping routes or lead to waves of migration and terror.

With respect to the international players, headed by the United States, the following action items should be on the Israeli agenda:

Influencing the negotiations with Iran, and above all, the development of options for the day after a return to the nuclear deal, or alternatively, failure of the talks; reducing exposure to danger in relations with China, particularly in the fields of cyber, technology, infrastructures, espionage, and influence; developing and leveraging normalization with countries of the region, while maintaining Israel’s qualitative edge; promoting what Israel sees as desirable trends in the renewed international discourse on the Palestinian issue, while dealing with the challenges of the growing delegitimization of Israeli policy and the risks to its political and military freedom of action; promoting a regional-international architecture for stability in the northern arena (Lebanon and Syria) and the Palestinian arena (a settlement in the Gaza Strip and prevention of a Hamas takeover of the West Bank); utilizing Israel’s advantage in emerging from the COVID-19 crisis to promote its relations with other countries.

Above all, Israel must strengthen the relations with President Biden and his administration, and repair relations with the Democratic Party and its supporters, who include most US Jews, while maintaining close ties with the Republican Party and its supporters. In this context, there is a need to establish channels for discreet dialogue to facilitate coordination and exercise some influence on American policy in the Middle East, maximizing all opportunities (in particular – a response to Iranian threats, promotion of normalization) and discussing threats and points of disagreement between the two countries (in particular – Iran, China, the Palestinians, aspects of Israel’s qualitative edge in the region). At the same time, it is important to avoid any public disagreements with the United States. Israel must also promote and reinforce its added value as an asset to the United States in the fields of technology, innovation, and security.

The regional system and the opportunity for normalization 2.0: Israel must repair its relations with Jordan and recognize the unique status of Egypt on the axis of moderate states; Israel is advised to reduce the friction with Ankara (while avoiding open conflict with President Erdogan) and to continue reinforcing elements opposed to its influence in the region.

The normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco survived the escalation during Operation Guardian of the Walls, although a number of events that were planned to promote normalization (particularly with the UAE and Morocco) were cancelled as a result. At the moment, it is still not clear whether continuation of open relations with these countries indicates the basic strength of the normalization agreements, or whether it is explained by the limited character of the operation and the rapid transfer of attention from events at al-Aqsa and in Jerusalem to the Gaza Strip. Against this background, it appears that Israel’s new government can lead further developments of the agreements, and perhaps even extend them to other countries. Regarding the UAE, it is correct to continue developing economic ties and working to realize the full tourism potential, which in part has been hampered by the pandemic. Emphasis must also be put on developing economic ties with Morocco. Sudan likewise hopes to realize the potential economic benefits of its agreement with Israel.

Israel’s relations with Jordan deserve special atention at the most senior level. This involves a renewal of the strategic dialogue between the countries, clarification of Israel’s recognition of Jordan’s special status on the Temple Mount, and help in resolving the serious water crisis facing the Kingdom.

As for Turkey, it is advisable to reduce any friction with Ankara (and avoid open conflict with President Erdogan), while continuing to strengthen elements opposed to its regional influence.

The Operational Environment: Guardian of the Walls as a wake-up call

Israeli deterrence against a broad-based conflict and war still exists. Israel’s enemies are aware of its power, and all are preoccupied with internal problems. However, hostilities could break out, whether in the northern arena or around Gaza, due to the dynamics of escalation.

In wartime the IDF will make use of its attack capabilities – on the ground, in the air, and at sea – and cause very serious damage to its opponents, but might have difficulty in achieving a clear and unambiguous decisive outcome. In such a war Israel could also face massive attacks on its civilian population from ground-to-ground missiles, including precision missiles and some that could even penetrate its air defense systems; UAV and multi-rotor drone attacks on its civilian front; entry of ground forces involving thousands of fighters into Israeli territory; and cyber and cognitive attacks, designed to undermine the resilience of the Israeli public and its trust in its political and military leadership.

The IDF attack capabilities face improved aerial and marine defense systems and complex ground defense systems, including the utilization of underground space and advanced anti-tank missiles.

Operation Guardian of the Walls – a wake-up call

  • The operation demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with rockets launched from the civilian population and underground sites. Israel has built an active defense system (Iron Dome), which is extremely effective and recorded highly impressive achievements during the operation. It also invests intense efforts on attacking the launch sites. However, it again became clear that the IDF cannot prevent rocket salvoes or a small number of lethal hits. This situation, which is expected to be far worse in any conflict in the north, cannot be changed significantly in the short term. Rocket salvoes therefore have strategic significance and the ability to shape public cognition.
  • The operation illustrated the limited benefits of standoff fire and the gap between operational achievements and political achievements that affect cognition. The desire to score a clear and unambiguous decisive victory still characterizes how the Israeli public thinks about the desirable outcome of military conflicts. It also shapes the perspective through which the public looks at the actual outcomes. This is one of the reasons for the sense of frustration in the Israeli public, which was heightened by the lengthy analyses in the extended news broadcasts on the various channels.

Policy Recommendations: The IDF and the Operational Environment

  • Israel must formulate an updated national security strategy as the basis for the IDF operational concept and updated operational plans, and approve a long-term plan for force buildup, including a multi-year budget framework.
  • It is imperative to prepare for the possibility of a multi-front war as the main reference threat, and to close the gaps in cognition and perceptions regarding features of this war and possible outcomes.
  • It is vital to ensure the existence of ground maneuvering capabilities that are able to deal with the newest challenges.

Israel’s internal problems, with growing gaps between the various sectors of society, the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, violent clashes between Arabs and Jews in mixed Israeli cities, and growing numbers of uncontrolled enclaves within the country, demand focused government attention on internal matters.

The political crisis is just one element of the multi-dimensional crisis that has characterized Israeli society in recent years. This crisis is expressed in the ongoing decline of public trust in the government, in the damage to social solidarity in a society that was already polarized, and in serious defects of governance and the processes of taking and enforcing decisions. The main question now is how to deflect a period of complex crisis in order to make way for a new era of seizing opportunities, which will be characterized by recovery and growth in areas that are essential for society and the economy. The data on this issue are mixed:

  • The rapid exit from the pandemic and the public conduct during Operation Guardian of the Walls were evidence of the positive capabiity of systems and of national resilience. This shows there is significant potential to recover from the complex crisis with proper government leadership.
  • The economic recovery in general has been fast and can serve as leverage for growth. However, the recovery has not benefited the whole population equally and some weak groups may be left behind, thus increasing the gaps in Israeli society – a challenge that must be met by means of fair and accessible employment.
  • Clashes between Jews and Arabs, mainly in mixed cities, exposed some deep layers of hatred and fear, extreme nationalism, and the difficulties of imposing law and order and governance.
  • The political crisis is not yet over, and government stability is essential for handling the fundamental problems, beyond mere survival.

Policy Recommendations for Exiting the Multi-Dimensional Crisis

  • In the framework of approving the state budget, it is important to prepare a policy outline for the central issues (housing, transportation, health, and education) and work to reduce the debt-to-product ratio.
  • A framework for “living in the presence of Covid” is required, in view of the new variants and the waning of vaccine protection.
  • Work to improve Jewish-Arab relations – prepare a plan to combat crime and violence in Arab society and to promote education, employment, and construction programs.
  • Work to restore faith in democratic processes and institutions, with the emphasis on the legal system and law enforcement (governance in the “enclaves”), and to promote mechanisms of dialogue within Israeli society.

There is a need for formulation of an agreed national security concept in an orderly political-professional process. This must lead to the formation of an updated operational approach for the IDF, an update of its operational plans, approval of a plan for force buildup, and approval of a multi-year budget.