Publications
Memorandum No. 142, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2014

Contents
Preface
Part I: Toward a Comprehensive Deal
Principles and Guidelines for Comprehensive Nuclear Deal with Iran / Emily B. Landau
Iran’s Progress to the Bomb: Changes since the Interim Deal / Ephraim Asculai
A Nuclear Deal with Iran and the Perils of Sanctions Relief / Emanuele Ottolenghi
A New Middle East: Thoughts on a Deterrence Regime against a Nuclear Iran / Avner Golov
Part II: The Broader Context
Is Iran Indeed More Moderate? / Meir Litvak
Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran / Zaki Shalom
US Public Opinion: How “Obamacare” Matters for the Interim Deal / Owen Alterman, Cameron S. Brown, and Tamar Levkovich
Part III: Regional Perspectives
Israel and the Negotiations on Iran’s Nuclear Program / Shlomo Brom
The Gulf States and Iran following the Interim Deal / Yoel Guzansky
A Sigh of Relief: The Turkish Perspective on the Interim Deal with Iran / Gallia Lindenstrauss
Conclusion: What’s in a Deal?
Israel’s “Strategic Flexibility” / Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov
Preface
The eleven essays compiled in this volume represent concise analyses of some of the key issues that have emerged in the context of efforts over the past months to carve out a “good” nuclear deal with Iran, while also highlighting a number of perspectives that have not been at the heart of debate.
The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), also known as the interim deal with Iran, secured in late November 2013 and implemented from January 20, 2014, was intended to create space for the tough negotiations with Iran over a comprehensive and final nuclear deal that would close the Iranian nuclear file. A deal was not secured by the original July 20, 2014 deadline, and negotiations were extended for another four months. This is the context for the collection of essays that follows.
It would be hard to overstate the difficulty that the P5+1 negotiators face in bargaining with Iran over its nuclear program, and the current prospects for a strong, constructive nuclear deal look very dim. In this difficult negotiation, the ability of the P5+1 to apply pressure on Iran will be a key factor affecting the likelihood of securing a good agreement. President Obama has expressed his doubts about prospects for concluding an acceptable deal, and he is on record saying that no deal would be better than a “bad” deal with Iran. However, the terms of a bad deal have never been clarified by the administration. This has led some analysts to suspect that the administration is actually averse to the prospect of having to pronounce this negotiation to have failed – so much so that almost any deal that Iran is willing to entertain is likely to be accepted in the end, justified as being better than no deal. If these analysts are correct, projection of eagerness for a deal no doubt undermines the ability of the P5+1 to advance a tough line at the bargaining table, which weakens their collective hand in pressing Iran to accept their terms.
Highlighting some of the dilemmas that have emerged as the international negotiators move toward the new deadline of November 24, 2014, the collection begins with essays that address general principles for negotiating with Iran; Iran’s advances in the nuclear realm; the situation regarding economic sanctions; and the US-Israel-Iran deterrence triangle. Essays in the next section deal with the broader context for assessing the situation: specifically, whether Iran has indeed shifted to a more moderate stance; the fate of the military option vis-à-vis Iran; and US public opinion on talks with Iran. Regional perspectives on the negotiations dynamic are the focus of the next group of essays, which deal with Israel, the Gulf states, and Turkey. The volume closes with an essay that lays out the contours of an acceptable deal from Israel’s perspective.
One issue also addressed, which over recent months has become a major concern, is the challenge posed by the Islamic State (IS), and the question whether the US and the broader international community should cooperate with Iran in confronting this threat. The issue is of paramount importance because of the adverse consequences that such cooperation could have for the fragile nuclear negotiations. Some leading figures, including Prime Minister of Britain David Cameron, have entertained the idea of cooperating with Iran in confronting the brutal extremist jihadi organization, while putting aside the implications for the nuclear file. Others warn that Iran is the greater menace, and argue that the very message that the international community is considering cooperation with Iran in facing the IS threat weakens the international hand at a critical moment in the nuclear negotiations. Beyond the danger of cooperating with Iran, these analysts question why the international community cannot confront the extremist terrorists without Tehran’s assistance.
Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz
September 2014