Patterns of Military Activity in the Battle against the Coronavirus: Lessons for Israel from Other Nations | INSS
go to header go to content go to footer go to search
INSS logo The Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic, Innovative, Policy-Oriented Research, go to the home page
INSS
Tel Aviv University logo - beyond an external website, opens on a new page
  • Contact
  • עברית
  • Support Us
  • Research
    • Topics
      • Israel and the Global Powers
        • Israel-United States Relations
        • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
        • Russia
        • Europe
      • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
        • Iran
        • Lebanon and Hezbollah
        • Syria
        • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
        • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
      • Conflict to Agreements
        • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
        • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
        • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
        • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
        • Turkey
        • Egypt
        • Jordan
      • Israel’s National Security Policy
        • Military and Strategic Affairs
        • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
        • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
        • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
        • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
      • Cross-Arena Research
        • Data Analytics Center
        • Law and National Security
        • Advanced Technologies and National Security
        • Cognitive Warfare
        • Economics and National Security
    • Projects
      • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
      • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
      • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications
    • -
      • All Publications
      • INSS Insight
      • Policy Papers
      • Special Publication
      • Strategic Assessment
      • Technology Platform
      • Memoranda
      • Posts
      • Books
      • Archive
  • Database
    • Surveys
    • Spotlight
    • Maps
    • Real-Time Tracker
  • Events
  • Team
  • About
    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
    • Newsletter
  • Media
    • Communications
      • Articles
      • Quotes
      • Radio and TV
    • Video gallery
    • Press Releases
  • Podcast
  • Newsletter
  • Research
    • Topics
    • Israel and the Global Powers
    • Israel-United States Relations
    • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
    • Russia
    • Europe
    • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
    • Iran
    • Lebanon and Hezbollah
    • Syria
    • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
    • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
    • Conflict to Agreements
    • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
    • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
    • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
    • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
    • Turkey
    • Egypt
    • Jordan
    • Israel’s National Security Policy
    • Military and Strategic Affairs
    • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
    • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
    • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
    • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
    • Cross-Arena Research
    • Data Analytics Center
    • Law and National Security
    • Advanced Technologies and National Security
    • Cognitive Warfare
    • Economics and National Security
    • Projects
    • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
    • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
    • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications
    • All Publications
    • INSS Insight
    • Policy Papers
    • Special Publication
    • Strategic Assessment
    • Technology Platform
    • Memoranda
    • Posts
    • Books
    • Archive
  • Database
    • Surveys
    • Spotlight
    • Maps
    • Real-Time Tracker
  • Events
  • Team
  • About
    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
  • Media
    • Communications
      • Articles
      • Quotes
      • Radio and TV
    • Video gallery
    • Press Releases
  • Podcast
  • Newsletter
  • Contact
  • עברית
  • Support Us
bool(false)

Publications

Home Publications INSS Insight Patterns of Military Activity in the Battle against the Coronavirus: Lessons for Israel from Other Nations

Patterns of Military Activity in the Battle against the Coronavirus: Lessons for Israel from Other Nations

INSS Insight No. 1300, April 17, 2020

עברית
Stuart Cohen
Meir Elran
A serviceman sanitizes a factory amid the coronavirus disease outbreak in Saint Petersburg

A survey of the involvement of democratic nations’ militaries in the anti-coronavirus campaign identifies five, escalating levels of action: (A) logistical and medical support for agencies serving civilians; (B) transfer of military supplies and equipment to civilian networks; (C) assistance to police forces in maintaining order; (D) assumption of operative responsibility for the management of individual civilian networks; (E) direct management of the entire system of governance. The IDF is required to assist the country’s civilians in accordance with the political echelon’s directives at levels A through C, employing its many capabilities as circumstances evolve, with the Homefront Command spearheading the effort. Any shift among levels deepens friction with civilians, and hence mandates extreme caution and sensitivity. A shift to Level D, under circumstances of an acute immediate threat to public health (an example being the situation in Bnei Brak) would constitute a significant escalation, demanding careful deliberation. A shift to Level E should be considered only in mass-disaster conditions, and hinge on a decision by a comprehensive apparatus that commands a high level of public legitimacy – a framework that does not exist in Israeli law and experience.


No military in the world prepared for a civilian scenario on the scale of the coronavirus pandemic. Even so, most of the world’s militaries – in autocratic and democratic countries alike – began mobilizing in recent weeks to help tackle the spread of the virus. Frequently they have done so at the behest of the political leadership, which, especially in democratic countries, is understandably prone to summon military assistance to civilians in an emergency situation that many – among them US President Trump – designate a “war.” Notwithstanding budget cuts, most democratic countries’ militaries still have at their disposal many resources that can also be relevant to management of the struggle against the coronavirus. Some of these resources are material; others – more significantly – are human: a disciplined and organized workforce that is rich in experience and adaptability.

The following paragraphs outline a taxonomy of five levels of military activity, in ascending order of the degree of contact between the military and the civilian population. The levels range from assistance to direct management of services to control over the civilian sphere.

Level A: Logistical and Medical Support for Agencies Serving Civilians

This basic level includes the military activities that thus far have been most commonplace during the present crisis: employing military transport facilities for civilian purposes and allocating military personnel to crucial industries (in Taiwan, for example). A shared feature of all of these instances is the limited exposure to civilians of the militaries, which are employed solely to provide backing to citizen networks.

Level B: Assignment of Military Supplies and Equipment to Civilian Agencies

This level of military operations, launched on the orders and with the oversight of the civilian echelon, escalates the interface with civilian sectors:

  1. In extreme cases of lockdown (as in India) the military is called upon to distribute combat rations in remote villages.
  2. Use of the military's medical infrastructures to reinforce the civilian health system, for instance, by deploying military hospital ships to areas of contagion (as in the United States) and military field hospitals (Britain, India). In Switzerland and Mexico, military medical teams have been sent to reinforce hospitals, and in South Africa, doctors and nurses were mobilized from reserve forces.
  3. In Britain and Canada, the militaries have been called on to provide crucial medical equipment stockpiled in preparation for biological warfare.

Level C: Assistance to Police Forces in Maintaining Order

Decisions to limit the movements of citizens, or to order a total lockdown (as in India), necessarily increases the burden on police forces, especially given the danger of a collapse of public order and a proliferation of robbery and looting. In such conditions, militaries are called upon to provide support, mainly by performing constabulary missions. Such was the case during instances of natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrina in the United States, or the recent protracted wave of brushfires in Australia). With the spread of the coronavirus, the sight of armed soldiers in the public sphere became routine in Italy, Spain, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, and Peru. In the United States, where the governors of almost all states have declared a "state of emergency," National Guard units have been mobilized and briefed on how to fulfil such missions. To date, no soldier has reportedly resorted to live fire. Even in India, where the police and military are hard-put to enforce the lockdown, use of force has been limited to clubbing.

Level D: Assumption of Operative Responsibility for the Management of Individual Civilian Networks

This is currently a theoretical scenario in all the countries assessed, and would only materialize with the collapse of one or more of the civilian mechanisms (the health system, for example). In several countries (Britain, India) the military has drawn up contingency plans for such cases, where in any event it would be the government that summons the military to implement its policy in the civilian sphere.

Level E: Direct Management of the Entire System of Governance

At this level, conventional boundaries between the military and the civilian population are almost entirely obliterated. In democratic countries this scenario could occur in any one of the following circumstances:

  1. Failure of civilian rule to function in the face of mass-disaster
  2. Capitulation of the political system to pressures exerted on the legitimate government by segments of the civilian populace
  3. Widespread infection among the national leadership leading to its incapacitation to function.

In such cases, the government might call upon the military leadership to take charge of the management of the campaign against the coronavirus. Alternatively, the heads of the armed forces might themselves conclude that they must assume the reins of government. Newsweek reported (March 18) that preparations – which began after the 9/11 attacks – have been made in the United States for such a possibility. At this time, at issue is the possibility that the spread of the contagion would not allow an orderly succession of the handover of power as set out in the US Constitution. According to the investigative report, a senior officer (head of the US Army’s Northern Command) has already been named as temporarily responsible for running the country "in extraordinary circumstances."

In democratic countries, a number of considerations are likely to impact on a decision to use the military in the struggle against the coronavirus:

  1. To what extent are existing civilian agencies estimated to be capable of coping with the scale of the contagion and the ensuing damage.
  2. How much do the military commanders themselves wish to deepen their involvement in the civilian sphere, even when ordered to do so by the political echelon? Some might express clear discomfort, especially given the danger that increased exposure to civilians could increase the danger of infection to troops. The chief of India’s General Staff said explicitly: "As commander of the military, my first mission is safeguarding the health of my forces,” and thus demanded that the involvement of "unprotected" soldiers, i.e., those lacking appropriate medical protection kits, be limited to assistance missions.
  3. Is the military equipped to take part in the struggle against the coronavirus, especially in constabulary roles? Few militaries have established units dedicated to such missions.
  4. Normative considerations: in recent decades, the Western world has witnessed an increasing tendency to employ military forces for domestic needs, especially in Western Europe, usually within the framework of the "war on terror" or with the goal of preventing illegal migration.

Conversely, the German constitution forbids any use of military forces within the country; US law conditions "domestic" use of federal military forces (as opposed to the National Guard) on the explicit approval of both houses of Congress after the president declares a "state of emergency"; in other democratic countries (India, Canada, the UK), the law necessitates legislative approval for a government declaration of a "state of emergency" before the military can be activated.

Lessons for the Israeli Case

The commitment to serve the Israeli public is a cornerstone of the IDF's identity and image as a "people’s army" that functions for the sake of the nation. Ever since its establishment, the IDF has indeed acted within civilian domains. As such, even under conditions of a crisis that does not fall into a conventional national-security category, the IDF will deploy its considerable assets and varied capabilities at the forefront of the effort. Focus will be on the Homefront Command and an emphasis placed on its logistical capabilities and expertise in the realms of data collection and analysis.

There are caveats to this commitment, reflecting additional state considerations. One is linked to the IDF's particular mission: protecting the country, guaranteeing its existence, and attaining victory in war. This is the first priority and one that the IDF must meet under any and all circumstances. To that end, it must take care to conserve its capabilities, inter alia, by safeguarding its soldiers from infection. The second caveat reflects the need to safeguard the country's democratic character, principally by ensuring that the IDF does not cross the red line of absolute subordination to the elected political echelon. Even during the current crisis, neither the political nor the military leadership must lose sight of these two caveats, which remain categorical imperatives.

The corona pandemic is a harsh crisis that is liable to become even more severe, but it is not a war, which has other characteristics (armed clashes to achieve political goals). The current trial should thus be framed as a challenging natural phenomenon that compels the nation to undertake a determined civilian struggle to stamp out the contagion.

In this situation, the IDF should indeed provide as much assistance as possible to the country's civilians, in accordance with and under the oversight of the political echelon. Given its many capabilities, it should do so at levels A through C of the taxonomy outlined above, in a gradual manner and as circumstances evolve, placing the Homefront Command at the forefront of its effort. Should there be a shift from logistical and technological assistance to direct contact with civilians, then diligent care, sensitivity, and oversight will be required to avoid friction. A shift to Level D – operative management of the struggle, including in the local sphere – would constitute a significant escalation that should be authorized only when there is an acute immediate threat to public health, for example, the case of Bnei Brak. A shift to Level E – direct military responsibility for national rule – can take place only in the most extreme conditions of countrywide mass-disaster. That being the case, it would necessitate, especially during the State of Israel’s current, sensitive political turmoil, a comprehensive apparatus that commands a high level of public legitimacy, a framework that does not exist in Israeli law and experience.

 

* Prof. (emeritus) Stuart Cohen of Bar-Ilan University is a political scientist who specializes in military-societal relations.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight
TopicsCoronavirusMilitary and Strategic AffairsSocietal Resilience and the Israeli Society
עברית

Events

All events
The 18th Annual International Conference
25 February, 2025
08:15 - 16:00
Photo: Ronen Topelberg

Related Publications

All publications
Strategic Analysis for Israel 2023
Read the INSS Strategic Analysis for 2023
23/02/23
Shutterstock
The International System: One World, Two Worldviews, and Greater Divisiveness
The international system is struggling with many crises and challenges, led by the continued efforts at economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis while coping with the pandemic itself; the intensifying competition between the United States and China, which heightens the divisiveness in the international dynamic; and the climate crisis, which tests the ability to cooperate despite disagreements. The US administration has less attention for the Middle East, and is restoring human rights considerations to a central place in its policy, against the backdrop of the mid-term elections and deep political polarization in the United States. All these issues underline the need to update Israel’s policy regarding the international arena, especially: deepening the coordination with the US administration and key actors in the international community, and enlisting their support for advancing Israel’s objectives. Chief among them are preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and maximizing Israel’s comparative advantages, particularly in the fields of science and technology, to advance initiatives to help stabilize the Middle East and cope with the global climate crisis.
13/02/22
Strategic Survey for Israel 2022
The strategic assessment for Israel for 2021 is shaped by significant uncertainty in three principal areas: the level of success in coping with COVID-19; the modus operandi and policies of the new administration in the United States; and the political developments in Israel. The current assessment is based on a broader conception of national security, which places greater weight than in the past on the domestic arena and on threats to internal stability, social cohesion, values, and fabric of life. This of course does not detract from the urgency of security threats, which remain significant. In the face of this uncertainty, Israel will need to prioritize attention to the internal crisis; adjust itself to the competition between the great powers, which is affected by the pandemic; adapt to the Biden administration and coordinate with it on Iran and other issues; expand alliances and normalization agreements with additional countries in the region; and be ready for military escalation in the north and in the Gaza Strip arena, which could occur even though all of the actors involved prefer to avoid it.
21/12/21

Stay up to date

Registration was successful! Thanks.
  • Research

    • Topics
      • Israel and the Global Powers
      • Israel-United States Relations
      • Glazer Israel-China Policy Center
      • Russia
      • Europe
      • Iran and the Shi'ite Axis
      • Iran
      • Lebanon and Hezbollah
      • Syria
      • Yemen and the Houthi Movement
      • Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite Militias
      • Conflict to Agreements
      • Israeli-Palestinian Relations
      • Hamas and the Gaza Strip
      • Peace Agreements and Normalization in the Middle East
      • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
      • Turkey
      • Egypt
      • Jordan
      • Israel’s National Security Policy
      • Military and Strategic Affairs
      • Societal Resilience and the Israeli Society
      • Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel
      • Climate, Infrastructure and Energy
      • Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict
      • Cross-Arena Research
      • Data Analytics Center
      • Law and National Security
      • Advanced Technologies and National Security
      • Cognitive Warfare
      • Economics and National Secutiry
    • Projects
      • Preventing the Slide into a One-State Reality
      • Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States
      • Perceptions about Jews and Israel in the Arab-Muslim World and Their Impact on the West
  • Publications

    • All Publications
    • INSS Insight
    • Policy Papers
    • Special Publication
    • Strategic Assessment
    • Technology Platform
    • Memoranda
    • Database
    • Posts
    • Books
    • Archive
  • About

    • Vision and Mission
    • History
    • Research Disciplines
    • Board of Directors
    • Fellowship and Prizes
    • Internships
    • Support
  • Media

    • Communications
    • Articles
    • Quotes
    • Radio and TV
    • Video Gallery
    • Press Release
    • Podcast
  • Home

  • Events

  • Database

  • Team

  • Contact

  • Newsletter

  • עברית

INSS logo The Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic, Innovative, Policy-Oriented Research, go to the home page
40 Haim Levanon St. Tel Aviv, 6997556 Israel | Tel: 03-640-0400 | Fax: 03-744-7590 | Email: info@inss.org.il
Developed by Daat A Realcommerce company.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.