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Reports of talks between Syria and Israel reflect a drastic shift in Israeli policy toward Syria and mark a new phase in Israel’s approach to the new regime there. During the seven months since the rise of the new regime in Damascus, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, Israeli policy has evolved through a process comprising roughly three stages:

In the first stage, Israel adopted an aggressive military policy. This included the takeover of territories in southern Syria, a massive airstrike campaign aimed at destroying the country’s strategic weaponry, and overt, active support for minority groups, particularly the Druze. The military campaign was accompanied by suspicious and threatening statements by senior Israeli officials directed at the new president, whom they accused of being a jihadist who had not abandoned his extremist views. For example, in January 2025, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared that, “This is a group of extreme jihadists who simply moved from Idlib to Damascus.” In March, Defense Minister Israel Katz claimed that that the new government in Syria was led by “a jihadist terrorist from the Al-Qaeda school.”

During this period, Israel entrenched itself in the buffer zone and the Syrian Golan Heights, carried out raids in southern Syria intended to degrade Syrian military capabilities, although these sometimes led to clashes with armed groups and the local population. Israel continued to operate in areas that had previously been considered demilitarized, demanded the complete demilitarization of southern Damascus, and conducted strikes within Syria, including near the presidential palace in Damascus, in response to clashes between the regime and the Druze population. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also struck deep inside Syria, including at the T4 and Palmyra air bases, after Turkey expressed intentions to establish a military foothold there, using these strikes to signal that Israel would not tolerate Turkish actions that could threaten its aerial freedom of operation.

In the second stage (April–May 2025), a certain softening of Israel’s aggressive approach was observed, reflected in a reduction of strikes and in less hawkish rhetoric toward al-Sharaa. There were reports of initial contacts between official representatives of Israel and Syria, mediated by the United Arab Emirates. Due to concerns about friction with Turkey following Israel’s strikes on bases where Turkey intended to establish a military presence, a dialogue began in Azerbaijan between Israel and Turkey. This dialogue resulted in an agreement to establish a de-confliction mechanism.

In the third stage (May–July 2025), it became clear that Israel and Syria were conducting direct talks, going beyond limited security coordination. Following the visit of US President Donald Trump to Riyadh, the possibility that Syria might join the Abraham Accords was discussed. During the Trump–al-Sharaa meeting, the President Trump expressed his expectation that Syria would consider normalizing relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords. At the end of June, National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi revealed that Israel was engaged in direct dialogue with the Syrian regime and with the head of state, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Regarding security and political coordination, Hanegbi stated that he himself was managing these efforts, given the potential to establish relations between Israel and Syria. Hanegbi further remarked that Syria and Lebanon were the countries most likely to normalize ties with Israel.

At that time, the 12-day war between Iran and Israel broke out. During the conflict, the al-Sharaa regime not only refrained from condemning the Israeli assault on Iran, as most Arab states did, but also chose not to comment at all on Israel’s extensive operations within Syrian territory. During the war, Israel operated freely in Syrian airspace, with Israeli Air Force planes flying over Syria en route to strike Iran, and Syrian air defense forces intercepting drones and missiles heading toward Israel. This may have been a case of willful blindness, or perhaps even tacit, agreed-upon coordination between the two countries. In any case, Syria’s conduct during the confrontation highlighted the mutual interest shared by Syria and Israel—weakening Iran’s regional position and neutralizing its military threats.

However, it appears that the main driver behind Israel’s shift in approach was the American embrace of al-Sharaa, alongside the attempt to push Israel to end the war in the Gaza Strip. It is also possible that Jerusalem began to understand that continuing its aggressive policy toward Syria could entangle Israel more than it would benefit it: Actions intended to thwart potential threats through military means instead fueled opposition to Israel, undermined al-Sharaa’s legitimacy, and strengthened extremist voices within Syria who criticized al-Sharaa’s lenient policy toward Israel. These dynamics even increased the likelihood of a military confrontation—the very scenario Israel sought to prevent through its intervention in Syria.

It is highly plausible that Israel’s initial military response in Syria following the fall of the al-Assad regime was driven, on the one hand, by the trauma of October 7th and Israel’s determination to prevent the development of a northern threat that could result in a surprise attack, similar to what occurred with Hamas’s entrenchment in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the aggressive approach was rooted in Israel’s growing sense of security, given the IDF’s military achievements over the past year against the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance”—from the Pagers Operation against Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, to the commando raid on the SERS Institute in Syria, strikes in Iran, and the historic assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah.

However, the shift in the American approach toward Syria and President Trump’s embrace of al-Sharaa—culminating in the decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria—made it difficult for Israel to continue holding to a hardline stance against al-Sharaa and treating him as an illegitimate leader. This was compounded by Trump’s pressure on Israel to end the war in the Gaza Strip. The incentive Trump promised Israel in return was the accession of additional countries, including Syria, to the Abraham Accords.

Nonetheless, full responsibility for the shift in Israel’s approach should not be attributed solely to the American role. The reduction of military activity in Syria had already begun before the Trump–al-Shara meeting in Riyadh in May. This change may have stemmed from Israel’s recognition that its aggressive policy and continued strikes risked increasing friction with Syria rather than reducing it. Moreover, Israel could no longer overlook al-Sharaa’s restraint and moderation toward it, as well as several measures he initiated that largely served Israel’s security interests—such as the arrest of Palestinians affiliated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and his determined efforts to curb the transfer of weapons and Hezbollah’s military buildup in Syria.

The combination of these factors—together with the fact that Israel was entering negotiations from a position of strength in light of its military achievements, including the successful strike in Iran—made the prospect of reaching an arrangement with Syria easier to leverage, promote, and internalize.

Scope of the Talks, Interests, and Risks

When discussions about the emerging negotiations between the two sides began, a significant gap was evident between how the issue was being framed in Israel and how it was being portrayed in Syria. In Israel, the term “normalization” was frequently used, accompanied by references to the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. In Syria, however, the discourse was much more limited, cautious, and modest. From the Syrian perspective, the talks aim to establish a non-aggression pact and to update the framework of the 1974 disengagement agreements. As al-Shara had previously stated, “the conditions for that are not yet ripe,” indicating that it was premature to discuss broader goals.

Syrian commentators have argued that while the regime does not rule out the possibility of fully normalizing relations with Israel, such a move would depend on regional developments—especially normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia—and on finding a resolution to the Golan Heights issue. The new Syrian government has emphasized the welfare of its citizens and the country’s reconstruction, and, therefore, is satisfied with a narrow security agreement that could later form the basis for expanded economic cooperation. Moreover, the Syrian regime does not want to be seen as rushing to normalize relations with Israel, partly due to domestic criticism against al-Sharaa’s moderation. Some clearly argue that anything beyond a non-aggression pact would be political suicide.

Despite President Trump’s enthusiasm for the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords, the US administration seems to recognize the complexity of the situation, as reflected in the remarks of Tom Barrack, the US special envoy for Syria, that the Trump administration expresses a desire to see Syria join the Abraham Accords, but President al-Sharaa “cannot be seen by his own people to be forced or coerced into the Abraham Accords,” with Barrack further adding that al-Sharaa “has to work slowly.” Barrack further added that democratization or the establishment of an inclusive government in Syria is unlikely to occur soon and, in any case, is not one of Washington’s main demands.

The question of legitimacy is mainly tied to the unresolved status of the Golan Heights, which remains a key issue. On one hand, al-Sharaa understands that Israel is unwilling to make concessions on this matter, as there is no political or public consensus in Israel for such a move. Foreign Minister Sa’ar has made it clear that Syria’s joining the Abraham Accords is contingent upon renouncing its claims to the Golan Heights. On the other hand, al-Sharaa—whose legitimacy is fragile and who bears the responsibility to stabilize Syria—cannot, at least for now, afford to be seen as a leader who has abandoned Syria’s historic claim to the Golan Heights. As a result, it is possible that Israel and Syria may reach a narrow security agreement and leave the issue of border demarcation and the Golan Heights for future negotiations.

The renewed discussion surrounding the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Syria raises several questions: What would each side stand to gain from such an agreement? What interests might motivate Damascus to engage in these talks, and what potential benefits are there for Israel? Alongside the opportunities, significant risks remain, requiring careful consideration.

From Israel’s perspective, an agreement with Syria could offer significant strategic advantages: establishment of a calm, secure front on the northern border, with guarantees for maintaining quiet and a clear diplomatic mechanism for addressing any violations; forming of a joint struggle against the “Axis of Resistance”—Hezbollah, Iran, and Palestinian terrorist groups—with the understanding that the security interests of Israel and Syria align in facing these challenges. Intelligence and military cooperation could enhance the effectiveness of the fight against the axis; and an opportunity to rehabilitate Israel’s regional and international standing, especially after a prolonged erosion of its legitimacy following the fighting in the Gaza Strip. Thus, an agreement with Syria could position Israel as a constructive player and a counterweight to regional threats, while also demonstrating its role as a responsible partner in efforts to stabilize the Middle East.

From the Syrian perspective, an agreement with Israel could lead to official recognition by Israel of Syria’s new regime, representing another step toward international recognition and legitimacy for al-Sharaa. However, the more significant gain for Damascus would likely be an Israeli withdrawal from areas in southern Syria and a halt to Israeli airstrikes. These measures would allow the regime to focus resources on stabilizing the country and, most importantly, restore Syrian sovereignty over its territory. Additionally, the agreement might include strategically important clauses: intelligence-security coordination between Israel and Syria as part of their joint fight against Hezbollah and Iran’s presence in Syria, and later, economic cooperation such as Israeli gas exports to the Syrian market and joint water management in the Yarmouk Basin in coordination with Jordan—contributing to regional stability and Syria’s economic recovery.

Alongside these clear advantages, Israel must also consider potential risks, mainly stemming from the rapid pace of change in Syria. The regime in Damascus is still unstable, does not effectively control most of the country, enjoys only partial legitimacy, and faces numerous security and political challenges.

Indeed, a scenario whose likelihood cannot be dismissed is the collapse of the al-Sharaa regime or his loss of control over his strongholds in Syria. This raises serious questions about the future of any possible agreement with Israel. Tom Barrack even recently warned that Washington is concerned about al-Sharaa’s safety and fear that his efforts to promote inclusive governance and forge ties with the West could make him a target for assassination by extremists. If al-Sharaa’s regime collapses or he is assassinated, Israel may find itself having withdrawn too early from the buffer zone, losing an important military advantage, while Syria could descend once again into chaos and violence near Israel’s borders. Such a situation would not only nullify any political gains from the agreement but could also create new security risks along the border.

Conclusion

Despite the inherent risks in a security arrangement between Israel and Syria, it must be acknowledged that Israel’s continued unilateral and aggressive policy toward Syria may actually increase military friction and expose Israel to growing risks from various actors operating in the Syrian arena. Therefore, under the auspices of American and international support, it is appropriate to give a security arrangement with the Syrian regime a responsible and fair chance. An agreement with the al-Sharaa regime could contribute to stabilizing the northern border, weakening the Iranian axis, and improving Israel’s standing in the international arena.

At the same time, Israel must remain clear-eyed and recognize that Syria remains unstable, the Syrian regime does not exercise full control over its territory, and it does not enjoy full legitimacy. Accordingly, Israel must be strategically and operationally prepared for a scenario in which the current regime may fail to meet its commitments. That said, if trust is established with the new regime in Damascus, and if the regime demonstrates the ability to uphold its obligations, Israel could leverage this momentum to advance a gradual normalization process with Syria.

Such a development would highlight Israel’s strategic value, reduce the risk of renewed Islamist resurgence, further weaken Iran’s influence in Syria and the broader region, and encourage long-term regional stability.