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Israel has exhausted most of the possible military achievements in the Gaza Strip, and from this point forward—continued fighting means “stagnation” and sinking into the Gazan quagmire, which will involve heavy human costs without tangible security benefit and may even lead to a full occupation of the Strip. Hamas, as a terrorist army, has been dismantled on the battlefield—it has lost most of its strength, nearly all of its command echelon has been eliminated, its military and civilian infrastructure is destroyed, and its capabilities are now limited to sporadic terror and guerrilla actions. Regarding the hostages—a gaping wound in the heart of the Israeli people—nothing has changed in the two months since the start of Operation Gideon’s Chariots. Therefore, it is preferable for Israel to leverage its military achievements, both in the Strip and particularly against Iran, as a lever for a political move that will promptly lead to the release of the hostages and the end of the war.

The infrastructure for such a political move already exists, in the form of the Egyptian outline placed on the agenda, which has gained the backing of Arab and Islamic states. The Egyptian proposal includes terms for a complete end to the war in Gaza and a staged Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, in exchange for the return of the hostages and the establishment of new governance arrangements that would ensure Hamas no longer rules there, as well as civilian and economic rehabilitation.

Simultaneously, Israel must leverage the dramatic shift in the regional strategic landscape following the round of fighting with Iran: Hamas has lost its sponsor—Iran and the resistance axis have been significantly weakened; Hamas has lost its status as a senior member of the Iran-led axis of resistance and has become a trapped organization dependent on the mercy of others—the channels for money transfer and weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip have dried up; a strong security-political alliance between the United States and Israel has emerged—one that even Qatar will find difficult to undermine; Cairo, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Amman, and Doha may fear Israeli hegemony in the region (especially as long as a far-right government is in power), but they are willing to take on involvement in Gaza to promote the end of the war and are more prepared to propose and implement a mechanism for demilitarizing the Strip; the Gazan public has grown weary of the war and of Hamas’s actions and is no longer as fearful of the organization’s internal security mechanisms and its “Arrow” units; in practice, Hamas stands at a crossroads between continuing its path of “resistance” and armed struggle—which entails an immediate existential risk to its survival—and relinquishing power and gradually handing over weapons, a course that would ensure the movement’s survival and enable the Strip’s reconstruction.

In this context, senior Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri stated after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran that Hamas is willing to release all the Israeli “prisoners” it holds as part of a single comprehensive deal, provided that genuine international guarantees are secured for a comprehensive ceasefire and an end to fighting in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is not conditioning the release of the “prisoners” on a long-term political agreement or strategic achievements; instead, it views this step as a humanitarian gesture—one that could be implemented if Israeli strikes cease immediately and the ongoing threat to civilian lives in the Strip is removed.

For Israel, halting the fighting now and moving toward an arrangement is not “surrender to Hamas’s terms”—as opponents of ending the war in Israel portray it—but rather a rational choice of a preferable option. Hamas has been forced to relinquish power, and its ability to rebuild its strength has been severely compromised. Israel now holds the tools to prevent its rearmament and resurgence—by blocking weapons smuggling and financial transfers, and by using its enforcement power and military freedom of action to thwart any terror threat or efforts to rebuild terrorist infrastructure in the Strip. The test is not Hamas’s declarations of victory but the situation on the ground: Hamas has effectively been removed from its position of power and has been forced to give up its governing grip and its vision of immediate liberation of Palestine, as its leaders envisioned before October 7, 2023.

Ending the war now could yield additional significant achievements for Israel that the military path alone cannot advance:

1. A chance to save the hostages: Hamas has repeatedly declared publicly since the beginning of the war that it is willing to release all Israeli hostages if Israel stops the fighting and withdraws from the Strip. Israel has nothing to lose by putting these declarations to the test. If it agrees to this offer and Hamas indeed releases all the hostages, both living and deceased, Israel will gain the most precious outcome and simultaneously strip Hamas of its central bargaining chip. If it turns out that Hamas is deceiving or unable to release all the hostages, Israel can resume fighting from a just position that will enjoy broad legitimacy. For the Israeli government, which (at least declaratively) prioritizes the return of the hostages, this is a necessary move to fulfill its commitment to their families and to the people of Israel.
2. Positive regional implications: The Arab world—especially key states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan—is waiting for Israel to reach a ceasefire in Gaza in order to engage in rebuilding the Strip and to expand and deepen the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia has explicitly signaled that rapprochement with Israel (normalization and formal relations) is possible only after the destructive war in Gaza ends and a path toward resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is outlined. The moderate Arab states are prepared to invest financial and political resources in Gaza’s reconstruction, participate in a multinational task force that will stabilize the area, and then resume the path of normalization and strategic relations with Israel.
3. Continued stagnation leads to chaos, which will force Israel to occupy the Strip: If Israel fully occupies the Gaza Strip (even if not officially declared), no Arab country will provide aid to Israel or Gaza’s population, nor will the international community. Israel will bear full responsibility for the Gaza problem in all its aspects, including rehabilitation and care for the needs of about two million residents, at an annual cost of tens of billions of shekels. Against this backdrop, international criticism of Israel is bound to intensify.
4. The internal situation in Israel: The prolonged and casualty-heavy war deepens societal rifts, harms the economy, and diverts attention from the need to rehabilitate domestic governance arrangements. Ending the war and releasing the hostages could stabilize the internal situation, allow economic recovery, restore the IDF’s readiness for other arenas, and focus on strategic threats (including maintaining deterrence against Hezbollah, preventing Iran’s nuclear project renewal, curbing Turkish dominance in Syria, and addressing terror in the West Bank). As long as Israel is bogged down in Gaza, valuable resources are diverted there at the expense of preparedness for future challenges.

Mechanisms for Ending the War

Following the dramatic change in the regional balance of power—the restoration of Israeli deterrence; the open motivation of the US president to end the war; the weakening of spoilers—rogue elements backed by Iran; Hamas’s weakness and isolation, while dependent on mediators’ mercy; the willingness of Arab states to engage and help stabilize the Strip and establish a technocratic administration to take power from Hamas—a window of opportunity has opened to end the war in Gaza that began in October 2023.

Proposed stages for ending the war and establishing a new order are as follows:

1. Israel’s commitment to end the war under US guarantee, in exchange for the release of all living hostages in one phase;
2. Hamas’s leadership—military and civilian—will be allowed to depart to a third country with a promise of non-harm;
3. A technocratic administration will be established to govern the Strip instead of Hamas, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority, with assistance and backing from moderate Arab states;
4. Israel will withdraw its forces from the Strip only after Hamas is removed from power and an effective physical barrier is established to prevent smuggling from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza;
5. Upon the IDF’s withdrawal, a Palestinian police force connected to the Palestinian Authority will be deployed in the Strip, alongside an Arab multinational task force that will assist in stabilizing the area, restoring public order, and securing and distributing humanitarian aid to the population;
6. Implementation of Egypt’s reconstruction plan for the Strip will be conditional on the establishment of an effective demilitarization mechanism through an Arab multinational task force for demilitarization supervision and enforcement.

The success of the ending and regulation processes will be contingent on the fulfillment of several cumulative conditions: active American and Egyptian involvement and the exclusion of Qatari interference in the mediation channel; preservation of Israel’s military freedom of action and its right to enforce measures to thwart threats and prevent the renewal of terrorist infrastructure; the deployment of a robust and effective Arab multinational task force to dismantle Hamas’s weaponry and block its rearmament; the supervision of humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts to ensure that materials intended for civilian infrastructure do not reach Hamas.

This is the time to present Hamas with a new survival equation—one that makes clear its continued existence depends on focusing on its identity as a grassroots-religious movement rather than a military-terrorist arm of the axis of resistance. In other words, Hamas’s leaders, especially those in Qatar, must be persuaded that the path to preserving the organization and ensuring its survival lies not in continued war but in relinquishing the hostages, power, and weapons. For this purpose, the Sunni Arab states can offer Hamas incentives, including guarantees for the safe exile of its leaders and operatives from the Strip; employment solutions in Gaza for mid- and low-ranking Hamas members who surrender their weapons; and permission to conduct local-level political and social activity—provided there is an immediate end to radical incitement to hatred, terror, and violence.

Future Trends Following the War’s End

The right to resume fighting: Israel’s right to act militarily will be recognized if Hamas violates the arrangement and begins to rebuild its military strength. After the hostages are returned, the IDF will be free to operate at high intensity throughout the Strip, unencumbered by current constraints related to concern for the hostages.

Humanitarian aspect: Ending the war will significantly ease the humanitarian crisis in the Strip. Aid flow and distribution to the population will be enabled, additional casualties will be avoided (about 55,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war, more than half of them non-Hamas operatives and non-terrorists).

Legitimacy: Israel, which enjoyed full legitimacy in its war against Iran and none regarding the war in Gaza, will be seen as having shown responsibility and responsiveness to calls to end the war—a move that may ease criticism against it and restore some sympathy and trust.

Expansion of the Abraham Accords: The normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia halted due to the war, and relations with peace states and Abraham Accords signatories were frozen. A positive response to their call to end the war would rekindle momentum in relations—a swift renewal of talks for establishing official relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and expanding the Abraham Accords. Progress in this direction would strengthen the regional integration of the moderate states’ bloc against Iran and its proxies.

The continuation of the war in Gaza means Israel’s ongoing hemorrhaging in the Strip without a clear objective, along with entrenchment in a quagmire that weakens the IDF, erodes national resilience, and exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and chaos in Gaza. It also blocks the opportunity to leverage Israel’s gains in the confrontation against Iran to expand the Abraham Accords and form a regional coalition led by the United States, with the participation of moderate Arab states and Israel. In short, failing to seize the opportunity to end the war and release the hostages is the worst possible alternative. Ending the war in Gaza is, therefore, an urgent imperative.